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Abstract 
 Whether visual perception is directly influenced by top-down cognitive processes 
or not is an on-going debate in vision science. Modular theories of perception claim that 
vision is separate from, and not affected by, cognitive processes such as emotion, 
intention or action (Firestone, 2013; Firestone & Scholl, 2015). However, an increasing 
body of evidence suggests that vision is directly influenced by action capacity. Known as 
the action-specific account of perception, this model of vision may challenge the idea of 
cognitive impenetrability and, if true, suggests that a drastic overhaul in our 
understanding of visual perception is required (Firestone, 2013). Proffitt and Linkenauger 
(2013) suggested that action-specific scaling effects occur because our bodies provide us 
with perceptual rulers, which they proposed transform visual angles into units 
appropriate for guiding effective action. For instance, Proffitt and Linkenauger (2013) 
claimed that grasping capacity provides a ruler for perceiving the size of graspable 
objects, and maximum reaching capacity provides a ruler for perceiving distances in near 
space.  
In this thesis, I investigated the claims of the action-specific account, but found 
no evidence in its favour. In some experiments, I failed to replicate previous studies 
showing action-specific effects. In cases where I did find effects consistent with the 
action-specific account, I demonstrated that these effects reflected changes in post-
perceptual judgement, or could be explained as visual illusions. In summary, this thesis 
provides evidence against the action-specific account of perception, and instead suggests 
that visual spatial perception is not directly affected by variations in action capacity. By 
extension, the work in this thesis supports the idea that visual spatial perception is 
cognitively impenetrable.
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Chapter One 
 
1. Introduction and chapter overview 
The first chapter of this thesis contains a short review of the relationship between action 
and perception, followed by a longer review of the action-specific account of perception. 
Although the claims of the action-specific account will be discussed in more detail at the 
beginning of each experimental chapter, it is worth broadly exploring the account, its 
development, and how it differs from other theories of visual perception here. This is 
because the account is relatively new, and some of its claims remain controversial in visual 
science. This chapter will conclude with a chapter overview, where the main hypotheses 
and findings reported in each empirical chapter will be summarised. 
 
1.1 Introduction 
A key purpose of visual perception is to guide action (Clark, 1999; Gibson, 1979; 
Proffitt & Linkenauger, 2013; Witt & Riley, 2014). For example, to successfully navigate a 
cluttered room, sighted individuals typically use visual information about the relative positions 
of objects and obstacles in the room in order to first choose a viable route. Then, as they move 
through the room, they acquire new perceptual information about the layout of the room, which 
may cause them to change their route several times. This on-going loop between perception 
and action is critical for successfully navigating the environment (Franchak, van der Zalm & 
Adolph, 2010; Gibson, 1979).  
In the example above, the observer’s opportunities for action are constrained by the 
relative positions of objects in the room they intended to navigate. However, their 
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opportunities for action are also constrained by the functional morphology (size, shape, etc.) 
of their body (Adolph & Berger, 2006; Proffitt & Linkenauger, 2013). The functional 
morphology of our bodies affects our capacity to perform actions. For example, squeezing 
through a narrow doorway is easier for a healthy-weight than an overweight individual, 
reaching a mug on a high shelf is easier for a tall than a short individual, and grasping an apple 
with one hand is easier for an adult than a small child.  
People are sensitive to the fit between the actions that their bodies afford and the spatial 
layout of the environment (Franchak et al., 2010; Gibson, 1979; Ishak, Lin & Adolph, 2008; 
Warren, 1984). They also rapidly update and recalibrate their perceived action capacity 
through acting (Franchak et al., 2010; Franchak & Adolph, 2014). For example, Franchak et 
al. (2010) showed that participants who had experience walking through apertures were more 
accurate when estimating whether subsequently seen apertures were passable or not. In 
addition, Franchak and Adolph (2014) found that pregnant participants accurately updated 
their estimates of the narrowest aperture they could walk through as their body size increased 
throughout their pregnancy. In contrast, participants who were fitted with a pregnancy 
prosthesis that immediately increased their girth were initially poor at estimating the narrowest 
aperture they could squeeze through. However, their estimates became accurate after 
attempting the task. Franchak and Adolph (2014) suggested that there are at least two ways in 
which experience walking through the apertures may have influenced participants’ subsequent 
judgements of aperture passability. One possibility is that participants gained information 
about success and failure by acting. This information may have allowed them to judge aperture 
passability more accurately later. Another possibility is that their perceived action capacity 
was recalibrated by other sensory information. For instance, proprioceptive information from 
compressing their bodies may have provided bottom-up feedback about how easily they could 
fit through apertures of different width.  
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The action-specific account of perception 
One theory of visual perception suggests that there may be another reason that 
individuals can so rapidly update their perceived action capacity following a change in the 
functional morphology of their body. The action-specific account suggests action opportunities 
are the content of perception; in other words, we see the world in terms of how we can act (for 
reviews see Cañal-Bruland & van der Kamp, 2015; Firestone, 2013; Linkenauger, 2015; 
Proffitt, 2013; Proffitt & Linkenauger, 2013; Philbeck & Witt, 2015; Witt, 2011a, 2017; Witt 
& Riley, 2014; Witt, Linkenauger & Wickens, 2016). It is important to note that the action-
specific account is separate to the literature investigating how changes in action capacity affect 
people’s assessments of the actions their bodies afford. Instead, the action-specific account 
makes the strong claim that people’s visual representation of spatial properties is directly 
affected by changes in action capacity. For the results of Franchak and Adolph (2014), for 
instance, the action-specific account might suggest that after experience walking through 
apertures while wearing a pregnancy prosthesis, participants perceived the apertures as 
narrower (because they were harder to walk through) and therefore reported them as 
unpassable. This possibility is supported by the results of Stefanucci and Geuss (2009), who 
reported that individuals with wider shoulders estimated the width of apertures as smaller than 
participants with narrower shoulders.  
Proponents of the action-specific account suggest that our bodies supply us with 
perceptual rulers which scale incoming visual information (Proffitt & Linkenauger, 2013). A 
key aspect of the action-specific account is that relevance matters, and that different rulers are 
relevant for different actions. For example, Proffitt and Linkenauger (2013) suggest that the 
relevant ruler for traversing a long distance is the caloric cost of walking, whereas the relevant 
ruler for graspable objects is hand size and the accompanying grasping capacity. These 
perceptual rulers pertain to several aspects of action, including the bioenergetic cost of action, 
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skill and performance variability, and the functional morphology of the body. Some evidence 
supporting action-specific scaling effects according to these three aspects of action is reviewed 
below. 
Scaling according to bioenergetics 
 Proffitt and Linkenauger (2013) argued that the most relevant activity for traversing 
long distances on the ground is walking. By extension, the relevant unit for scaling the 
environment for an individual who intends to walk a given distance is the energy required to 
walk that distance – in other words, the bioenergetic cost of walking. One of the oldest and 
most famous examples of action-specific scaling according to bioenergetics is that hills were 
estimated as steeper by observers who wore a heavy backpack (Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999; 
Proffitt, Bhalla, Gossweiler, & Midgett, 1995). This effect was explained as estimates of hill 
slant increasing to reflect the additional bioenergetic cost of ascending the hill while wearing 
a backpack. It has also been reported that observers who are of low fitness, are fatigued, 
overweight, hungry and in ill health estimate hills as steeper (Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999; Eves, 
Thorpe, Lewis & Taylor-Covill, 2014; Schnall, Zadra & Proffitt, 2010; Taylor-Covill & Eves, 
2013, 2014).  
 In another study which investigated the influence of bioenergetics in perceived 
distance, competitive bicycle racers estimated the distance to targets (Zadra, Schnall, Weltman 
& Proffitt, 2010). They completed two experimental sessions: one where they drank a 
calorically sweetened (sugary) drink, and another where they drank a beverage sweetened with 
calorie-free sweeteners. In each session, they estimated the distance to a target (pre-test 
estimate), consumed one of the drinks, rode a stationary bike at high intensity for 45 minutes, 
and then estimated the distance to the target again (post-test estimate). While they rode the 
stationary bike, a battery of physiological measurements was continually taken, including heart 
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rate, blood glucose, oxygen uptake, blood lactate, and power applied to the pedals. The authors 
reported that distances were estimated as shorter at post-test, but only by participants who had 
ingested the sugary drink. In addition, they found that post-test estimates were significantly 
related to several physiological variables. For example, lower blood glucose levels were 
associated with greater distance estimates. This suggests that participants with less glucose in 
their blood, and therefore lower energy levels, estimated distances as greater.  
Scaling according to performance variability 
 Proffitt and Linkenauger (2013) argued that, for goal-directed actions, success is 
dependent on the performer’s skill. They defined skill as “consistency in the successful 
performance of a behaviour” (p. 189) and suggested that an individual’s visual perception of 
action-relevant stimuli can be scaled according to their skill. Many studies supporting this type 
of action-specific scaling have investigated visual estimates of spatial properties in people with 
varying athletic performance. For example, more skilled swimmers estimated underwater 
targets as closer (Witt, Schuck & Taylor, 2011), putting holes were estimated as larger by more 
skilled golfers (Witt, Linkenauger, Bakdash & Proffitt, 2008) and tennis balls were estimated 
as slower by more successful tennis players (Witt & Sugovic, 2010). 
 In many studies investigating the relationship between performance and spatial 
perception, participants were presented with a range of different circles and asked to choose 
the circle which best matched the action relevant stimulus (e.g., the tennis ball, putting hole 
etc.) and a positive correlation between performance and circle size was obtained (e.g., Witt 
& Proffitt, 2005; Witt et al., 2008). However, correlational data does not provide information 
about the direction of the effect: did better putters see the holes as larger, or did individuals 
who saw the hole as larger putt more successfully? Witt and Dorsch (2009) investigated the 
direction of this relationship. Participants in Witt and Dorsch (2009) kicked a ball 10 times to 
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a set of American football goals. They estimated the height of the goals both before and after 
attempting their kicks. The authors found no relationship between pre-kick estimates of goal 
height and performance, but a significant relationship between post-kick estimates and 
performance. The authors claimed that this demonstrated that performance influenced 
perception, rather than perception influencing performance. 
Scaling according to functional morphology 
The functional morphology of the body (e.g., arm length, hand size) constrains action 
capacity and so, according to the action-specific account, variations in the functional 
morphology of the body can directly affect visual spatial perception (Linkenauger, Witt & 
Proffitt, 2011; Linkenauger, Mohler & Proffitt, 2011). For example, observers estimated 
targets that were out of reach to be nearer after reaching to them with a tool which made them 
reachable (Witt, Proffitt & Epstein, 2005) and apertures were estimated as narrower when 
observers held a horizontal rod that was wider than their body (Stefanucci & Geuss, 2009). In 
another example, Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011) reported that right handers 
underestimated the size of objects they intended to grasp with their right hand relative to 
objects they intended to grasp with their left hand. This effect was thought to reflect the bias 
held by right handers that their right hand has a greater grasping capacity than their left hand 
(Collier & Lawson, 2017a; Gentilucci, Daprati & Gangitano, 1998; Linkenauger, Witt, 
Bakdash, Stefanucci, & Proffitt, 2009). This, in turn, could make objects appear more 
graspable, and therefore smaller, when they intend to grasp with their right hand (Linkenauger, 
Witt & Proffitt, 2011). 
The action-specific account of perception: theoretical implications 
The action-specific account is not the only theory of visual perception to emphasise the 
relationship between action and perception. However, it stands out from other theories by 
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claiming that action capacity directly affects conscious spatial perception. Other perceptual 
theories which have emphasised action (e.g., Goodale & Milner, 1992; Goodale & Haffenden, 
1998; Goodale, 2014) do not make the strong claim that action capacity directly influences 
what we see. For example, Cañal-Bruland and van der Kamp (2015) suggested that perception 
for what actions an environment affords and perception for spatial properties are different 
types of perception, with different underlying purposes. In what has become one of the most 
well-known models of vision to date, Goodale and Milner (1992) suggested that there exist 
two separate but interdependent visual pathways: one serving vision for perception (the ventral 
pathway which is involved in, for example, object recognition) and the other serving vision for 
action (the dorsal pathway which in involved in, for example, the online control of action). 
Behavioural evidence in favour of this account includes the finding that geometric illusions 
affect estimates of visual size, but not grasping behaviour (e.g., Aglioti, DeSouza & Goodale, 
1995; van Doorn, van der Kamp & Savelsburgh, 2007; but see Franz et al., 2001). However, 
some proponents of the action-specific account (e.g., Witt, 2017) have criticised the two-
stream model because processing in the dorsal stream is generally considered non-conscious 
(Goodale & Haffenden, 1998; Milner & Goodale, 2008) and so, they claim, action is still 
regarded as being outside of conscious perception. In contrast, the action-specific account 
claims that action capacity directly contributes to our conscious visual experience. The action-
specific account therefore makes strong claims about the role of action in visual perception 
that go beyond those made even by other theories of vision which have emphasised action. 
Demonstrating whether action-specific scaling effects reflect true changes in what is perceived 
therefore matters because of the implications this would have for understanding how visual 
representations of the world are built, and how the mind is organised (Firestone & Scholl, 
2015; Witt, 2017).  
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Action-specific scaling effects, if truly perceptual, could even be interpreted as 
evidence supporting cognitive penetrability – the idea that what we perceive is directly 
influenced by top-down cognitive states (Firestone & Scholl, 2015). If what we perceive is 
influenced by top-down cognitive factors, then this would challenge the long-held, modularist 
perspective that vision is cognitively impenetrable (Firestone & Scholl, 2015; Fodor, 1983; 
Pylyshyn, 1999). Exactly what counts as an example of cognitive penetrability has been 
fiercely debated (Deroy, 2015; Firestone & Scholl, 2015; Stokes, 2012). Firestone and Scholl 
(2015) suggested that researchers should instead focus on what should not be considered 
examples of cognitive penetrability. For instance, changing the sensory input by looking at a 
different location in the environment or a different part of an object should not be considered 
an example of cognitive penetrability. 
 
Figure 1: Typical configuration of the Ebbinghaus Illusion. The inner circles of both displays 
are the same size, yet the inner circle on the left appears smaller than the inner circle on the 
right. 
 
Visual illusions are generally considered a powerful argument in favour of cognitive 
impenetrability (Firestone & Scholl, 2015). For example, in the Ebbinghaus Illusion, a disc 
surrounded by large discs appears smaller than a disc of the same size surrounded by small 
discs (Coren & Girgus, 1979, see Figure 1). Importantly, even when observers are aware that 
the perceptual effect is illusionary, this does not prevent them from reporting the inner disc as 
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smaller when it is surrounded by larger discs. Thus, their cognitive knowledge that the effect 
is illusionary does not prevent them from experiencing the illusion.  
Given the potential challenge to cognitive impenetrability, Firestone (2013; see also 
Firestone & Scholl, 2015) argued that if action-specific effects were shown to be true changes 
in vision due to action capacity, vision science would require a large-scale overhaul (Firestone, 
2013; Firestone & Scholl, 2015). However, Witt (2017) argued that action-specific effects 
could be true perceptual effects which do not challenge cognitive impenetrability. This is 
because action-specific effects could be considered motor effects as opposed to examples of 
explicit knowledge influencing visual perception. Similarly, Sugovic, Turk and Witt (2016) 
argued that if other sensory information which may specify action capacity (e.g., 
proprioceptive or physiological cues) influences vision, then this would be consistent with 
cognitive impenetrability because the effects could be considered multisensory effects. 
Firestone and Scholl (2015) themselves suggested that multisensory integration does not 
reflect cognitive penetrability. They claimed that, as with illusions, multisensory integration 
occurs reflexively and regardless of any cognitive inferences made by the observer. 
Furthermore, multisensory integration occurs entirely within perception itself, as opposed to 
reflecting top-down cognitive influences on perception (Firestone & Scholl, 2015). For 
example, when observers hear the phoneme /ba/ at the same time as seeing lip movements 
showing the phoneme /ga/, they often report hearing /da/ (Barutchu, Crewther, Kiely, Murphy 
& Crewther, 2008). This is an example of the McGurk Effect (McGurk & MacDonald, 1976), 
a result of multisensory integration between vision and audition. This type of multisensory 
integration does not demonstrate cognitive penetrability because the effect is not driven by the 
observer’s explicit knowledge about the visual input. Instead, the visual and auditory cues are 
integrated to give rise to a visuo-audio signal (see Deroy, 2015, for an in-depth discussion 
about the differences between multisensory integration and cognitive penetrability).   
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 Therefore, action-specific scaling effects may not directly challenge cognitive 
impenetrability if they are considered motor effects (Witt, 2017). However, some action-
specific effects have been claimed to depend on people’s beliefs about their action capacity 
(Linkenauger, Witt & Proffitt, 2011). For example, Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011, 
Experiment 2) reported that right handers estimated objects that they intended to grasp in their 
right hand as smaller than objects they intended to grasp in their left hand. This was interpreted 
as evidence that apparent grasping capacity directly influenced perceived object size because 
right handers overestimate the size and grasping capacity of their right hand relative to their 
left hand (Collier & Lawson, 2017a; Linkenauger, Witt & Proffitt, 2011). However, there was 
no evidence that the mean grasping capacity of the right hand was actually greater than that of 
the left hand in Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011, Experiment 2) and so the only possible 
cause of scaling, at least according to the action-specific account, was perceived grasping 
capacity. This seems to challenge cognitive impenetrability by suggesting that higher level 
biases and beliefs about action capacity can directly influence perceived object size.  
 In summary, the action-specific account differs from other perceptual theories which 
emphasise action because it claims that action capacity directly influences conscious visual 
experience (Witt, 2017). Furthermore, some action-specific effects, e.g., Linkenauger, Witt 
and Proffitt (2011), seem to challenge the long-held idea that vision is not affected by cognitive 
factors such as belief, intention and motivation (Firestone & Scholl, 2015; Fodor, 1983; 
Pylyshyn, 1999). Thus, the action-specific account has important implications for how we 
understand the organisation of the mind, and what kinds of information is used to construct 
our visual representations of the environment (Firestone, 2013; Firestone & Scholl, 2015; Witt, 
2017). 
The action-specific account of perception: criticisms 
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Given the theoretical implications of the action-specific account, its proponents have 
been under pressure to demonstrate that the effects reported are truly perceptual in nature. 
Despite the wealth of empirical evidence supporting the action-specific account, several 
criticisms and concerns have been raised with this account (for reviews see Cañal-Bruland & 
van der Kamp, 2015; Collier & Lawson, under review; Firestone, 2013; Firestone & Scholl, 
2015; Philbeck & Witt, 2015; Proffitt, 2013; Proffitt & Linkenauger, 2013; Witt, 2011a, 2017). 
The action-specific account has been subject to both methodological and theoretical criticisms, 
which are discussed below. There are also other, more general, concerns with the action-
specific account, which are discussed at the end of this section. 
Methodological criticisms  
One of the most powerful methodological criticisms of the action-specific account is 
that the methods often used in studies which obtain effects consistent with the action-specific 
account could induce demand characteristics (Collier & Lawson, 2017b; Durgin et al., 2009, 
2012; Firestone, 2013; Firestone & Scholl, 2015; Woods, Philbeck & Danoff, 2009). One form 
of demand characteristics, which Collier and Lawson (2017b) referred to as hypothesis 
guessing, occurs when participants consciously alter their responses to reflect what they 
believe the experimental hypothesis to be. Durgin et al. (2009) showed that one of the most 
famous examples of action-specific scaling could be explained by hypothesis guessing. Proffitt 
and colleagues (Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999; Proffitt et al., 1995) reported that hills were estimated 
as steeper when participants wore a heavy backpack. This was claimed to reflect the increased 
difficulty of ascending the hill while wearing a heavy backpack. However, Durgin et al. (2009) 
showed that providing participants with a cover story for why they were wearing the backpack 
eliminated the effect. Specifically, Durgin et al. (2009) found that slant estimates by 
participants who were told that the backpack contained equipment for monitoring their ankle 
muscles did not differ from estimates made by participants who did not wear a backpack. In 
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contrast, participants who wore the backpack without being given an explanation showed the 
original scaling effect (Durgin et al., 2009).  
Related to, but different from, hypothesis guessing, is poor control of easily overlooked 
factors in the experimental context which may produce response biases in post-perceptual 
judgements (Collier & Lawson, 2017b; Firestone, 2013). Unlike hypothesis guessing, biases 
in post-perceptual judgement may be non-conscious and sincerely held by participants 
(Firestone & Scholl, 2015). For example, the way a task is presented can affect whether action-
specific effects are obtained or not (Collier & Lawson, 2017b). Woods et al. (2009, Experiment 
5) demonstrated this experimentally after failing to replicate the results of Witt, Proffitt and 
Epstein (2004), who reported that participants estimated the distances to targets as greater after 
throwing a heavy ball than a light ball. Woods et al. (2009, Experiment 5) asked participants 
to throw either a light or a heavy ball to a target, and then estimate the distance to the target. 
Participants were assigned to one of three groups. One group estimated distance based on 
objective distance (how far away they thought the really target was), another estimated 
distance based on apparent distance (how far away the target visually appeared), and the third 
group based distance estimates on non-visual factors (how far away they felt the target was). 
Only participants who based their judgements on non-visual factors showed the scaling effect 
reported by Witt et al. (2004). This suggests that the original effect reflected what participants 
thought about the distance, i.e., their judgement, rather than how the distance actually visually 
appeared to them.  
Another methodological concern with the action-specific account that is related to 
demand characteristics is misattribution effects (Philbeck & Witt, 2015). Such misattribution 
effects may occur when participants interpret a question concerning the spatial attributes of an 
object in terms of the actions that object affords. For example, when asked the question “how 
big is this object?” participants may, implicitly, respond to the associated question “could you 
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grasp this object?” This may lead to an effect consistent with the action-specific account which 
does not actually reflect a change in the visual representation of the object. However, this 
concern is rarely discussed in the action-specific literature (Philbeck & Witt, 2015). 
The action-specific account has also been criticised for overreliance on a confirmatory 
research strategy (Firestone & Scholl, 2014), that is predicting, and then finding, a given effect. 
A comprehensive account of a phenomenon should be able to predict both when an effect 
should occur and when it should not. Firestone and Scholl (2014) investigated whether action-
specific scaling effects would be appropriately present or absent under different conditions by 
employing the El Greco fallacy. According to this fallacy, when both the stimulus and the 
means of reproduction should show the same distortion following a given manipulation, the 
distortions should cancel each other out and no effect should be found. This offers a 
disconfirmatory prediction: when a manipulation should influence both the stimulus and the 
means of reproduction in the same way, no action-specific effects should be detected. Firestone 
and Scholl (2014) applied this logic to the finding by Stefanucci and Geuss (2009) that 
apertures were estimated as narrower when participants held a horizontal rod that was wider 
than their body. Participants in Firestone and Scholl (2014) verbally guided the experimenter 
to alter the width of an aperture to match the width of an identical aperture, which they 
imagined walking through. One group of participants completed the task while holding a wide 
rod, while another group did not hold a rod. Applying the El Greco fallacy, no scaling effect 
should have occurred here because the stimulus and the means of reproduction, which were 
identical, should have been visually distorted in the same way. However, participants holding 
the rod estimated the apertures as wider than participants who did not hold the rod. Therefore, 
the action-specific account lacks predictive power because scaling effects occur even when 
they should not (see also Collier & Lawson, in press). 
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Some authors have also expressed concern that visual differences across conditions in 
an experiment may drive action-specific effects (Firestone & Scholl, 2015). Differences in the 
visual appearance of the body are particularly important in studies investigating the influence 
of grasping capacity on estimated object size (Witt, 2017) because a common manipulation in 
these studies has been to change visual hand size (e.g. Linkenauger, Witt & Proffitt, 2011, 
Experiment 3; Linkenauger et al., 2013). For example, in Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011, 
Experiment 3), participants visually matched the size of objects placed near their hand both 
while it was and was not magnified. Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011, Experiment 3) 
reported that objects were estimated as smaller when placed near to the magnified hand, and 
claimed that this demonstrated a scaling of object size by perceived grasping capacity. 
However, this effect could be explained by visual differences in hand size inducing a size-
contrast effect. Specifically, the objects may have appeared smaller when placed next to the 
magnified hand through a similar mechanism that drives the Ebbinghaus Illusion (see Figure 
1, above). 
In addition to these specific concerns, many effects reported within the action-specific 
literature have not been successfully replicated (for a review see Firestone, 2013). For 
example, de Grave, Brenner and Smeets (2011) failed to replicate the influence of tool use on 
perceived distance reported by Witt et al. (2005), Woods et al. (2009) failed to replicate the 
influence of throwing a heavy ball on perceived distance reported by Witt et al. (2004), and 
Collier and Lawson (2017a) failed to replicate the influence of apparent grasping capacity on 
perceived object size reported by Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011). Thus, the action-
specific account has several methodological short-comings which must be overcome before 
action-specific scaling effects can be considered truly perceptual. 
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Theoretical criticisms   
 There are also a number of theoretical concerns with the action-specific account. First, 
it is not immediately clear why it would be evolutionarily beneficial for the visual 
representation of the environment to scale according to action capacity in the first place 
(Firestone, 2013). The action-specific account has its roots in the ecological approach to visual 
perception which suggests that the central function of perception is to guide and control action 
(Gibson, 1979). Proponents of the action-specific account have therefore suggested that action-
specific scaling effects may assist in guiding effective action (Proffitt, 2008; Proffitt & 
Linkenauger, 2013). It has also been argued that a visual system which scales the environment 
according to action capacity may lighten the burden on decision making systems when 
choosing a course of action (Proffitt, 2008; Proffitt & Linkenauger, 2013). For example, 
individuals who are fatigued may see a hill as steeper in order to deter them from attempting 
the ascent.  
However, it has been argued that the idea of action-specific scaling as useful for action 
execution is flawed (Firestone & Scholl, 2015; Durgin, 2014, 2017; Hajnal, Abdul-Malak & 
Durgin, 2011; Li & Durgin, 2010). Instead, action execution may be better served by stability 
rather than by fluctuation. This issue has been investigated regarding estimates of hill slant. 
People tend to overestimate the steepness of hills. For example, a 5o hill is often estimated as 
20o (Li & Durgin, 2010). Durgin and colleagues (Durgin, 2014; Hajnal et al., 2011; Li & 
Durgin, 2010, 2013) suggested that steepness exaggeration is a systematic, functional bias 
which reflects greater sensitivity to functionally significant information in the environment. 
They called this phenomenon perceptual scale expansion. They argued that perceptual scale 
expansion is a coding strategy which allows predictable (although biased) coding of slant so 
that actions, e.g., walking, can be calibrated effectively. Thus, according to the perceptual scale 
expansion model, stability and predictability are critical in the control of action. In contrast, 
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the action-specific account suggests that changes in action capacity can immediately affect the 
visual layout of the environment. However, this may introduce instability in the visual system 
which seems to undermine the purpose of visual perception as a guide for action. 
Firestone and Scholl (2015) further argued that scaling what is perceived according to 
action capacity may undermine the usefulness of that percept for other purposes. For example, 
to again take the case of hill slant perception, we may look a hill with the in-the-moment 
intention of ascending it, but the hill could be viewed with other, non-walking related, purposes 
in mind. For example, we may intend to use it as a landmark for navigation (Firestone & 
Scholl, 2015) or to paint a realistic painting of the landscape. Both of these would be impeded 
if our perception of the hill is automatically scaled according, for example to our current energy 
levels. 
This is related to another theoretical concern: the action specific account does not offer 
any explicit prediction for how visual spatial perception operates when observers do not intend 
to act. The account predicts that action-specific effects should not be found when people do 
not intend to act (e.g. Linkenauger, Witt & Proffitt, 2011a; Witt et al., 2005), but since people 
can estimate spatial properties in the absence of explicit intention to act, what informs what 
they perceive in this situation? Cañal-Bruland and van der Kamp (2015) suggested that 
perceiving spatial properties may be a different form of perception from perceiving action 
opportunities. This possibility is supported by evidence that participants’ gaze patterns differ 
depending on whether the task at hand pertains to spatial perception or to action. For example, 
van Doorn, van der Kamp, de Wit and Savelsburgh (2009) used the Müller-Lyer illusion to 
investigate differences in gaze patterns when participants intended to grasp and pick up a rod 
(grasping task), and when they estimated the length of a rod by separating their thumb and 
index finger (perceptual task). They found that gaze fixations during the perceptual task were 
concentrated at the ends of the rods, while fixations during the grasping task were concentrated 
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towards one end and the centre of the rods. This suggests that when participants viewed the 
rods while intending to grasp them, the visual information they picked up was different from 
the information used to estimate its size. However, the suggestion that perceiving spatial 
properties may be a different process to perceiving action opportunities was quickly rejected 
by proponents of the action-specific account. Specifically, Linkenauger (2015) argued that we 
see spatial properties only as relative to ourselves, and so absolute spatial judgements cannot 
exist (see General Discussion for a review of this issue). Thus, it remains for the action-specific 
account to explain how people make spatial estimates in the absence of intention to act. 
Other concerns 
A general concern with the action-specific account is that the critical factors claimed 
to drive action-specific effects sometimes appear to contradict each other. For example, 
Sugovic et al. (2016) claimed that heavier participants estimated the along-the-ground distance 
to targets as greater than lighter participants. They found this effect only for actual weight, and 
not for perceived weight. However, Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011, Experiment 2) found 
that biases in the perceived relative grasping capacity of the left and right hands influenced 
estimates of object size, in the absence of any actual difference in the grasping capacity 
between hands. These effects are contradictory: Sugovic et al. (2016) found an effect of actual, 
but not of perceived, body morphology, whereas Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011) found 
an effect of perceived, but not actual, body morphology. It is not clear how the action-specific 
account can resolve this discrepancy.  
Sugovic et al.’s (2016) study also fails to account for individual differences in other 
factors that have been claimed to influence distance perception, such as fitness (Proffitt & 
Linkenauger, 2013; Zadra et al., 2010). For instance, what action-specific effect would be 
expected for “fit-but-fat” athletes e.g., sumo wrestlers? On one hand, they may estimate 
24 
 
distances as greater because they weigh more (Sugovic et al., 2016), but on the other hand, 
they may estimate distances as shorter because they are physically fit (Zadra et al., 2010). The 
action-specific account does not seem equipped to make a clean prediction in this case1.  
It has also been claimed that action-specific effects are informationally ungrounded 
(Firestone, 2013). In other words, it is unclear what information vision draws upon in order to 
perform the scaling in the first place. As discussed above, one possibility is that information 
from other sensory sources interacts with vision (Sugovic et al., 2016; Witt & Riley, 2014). 
For example, Witt (2017) argued that action-specific effects may be motor effects, and Witt 
and Riley (2014) suggested that haptic (active touch), proprioceptive or interoceptive 
information may interact with vision to drive action-specific scaling. However, framing action-
specific effects as multisensory effects cannot explain effects such as perceived grasping 
capacity influencing estimates of object size (Linkenauger, Witt & Proffitt, 2011) as it is 
unclear how proprioceptive or interoceptive signals could communicate such higher-level 
biases to vision. Furthermore, if proprioceptive or haptic information about grasping capacity 
influenced visual estimates of object size, then Collier and Lawson (2017a) should have found 
such an effect when both actual and perceived grasping capacity were manipulated by taping 
together participants’ fingers. In Collier and Lawson (2017a, Experiments 4 and 5), 
participants actually grasped the objects with both their taped and untaped hands, and therefore 
received proprioceptive feedback specifying their current grasping capacity. In both of these 
experiments, participants reported that their grasping capacity was reduced by the taping 
manipulation, however this did not influence their estimates of object size. This suggestion 
also cannot account for the finding that participants estimated distances to targets as shorter 
after they imagined using a baton (Witt & Proffitt, 2008) since in this situation there is no 
sensory information signal inferring action capacity (Firestone, 2013).  
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It should be noted that these more general concerns are largely based on problems 
associated with the fact that the action-specific account does not specify what kinds of 
mechanisms underlie action-specific effects (Firestone, 2013). Proponents of the action-
specific account readily accept that the account is incomplete in some areas, and research is 
on-going to identify an underlying mechanism that supports action-specific scaling effects 
(Proffitt & Linkenauger, 2013; Witt, 2011a, 2017; Witt & Riley, 2014; White et al., 2013). 
1.2 Summary and chapter outline 
In summary, action and perception are intimately linked (Adolph & Berger, 2006; 
Proffitt & Linkenauger, 2013; Warren, 1984), however the nature of this relationship is not yet 
fully understood (Cañal-Bruland & van der Kamp, 2015). The action-specific account of 
perception claims that the primary purpose of vision is to guide action, and that this is achieved 
by scaling the spatial layout of the environment according to action capacity (Proffitt & 
Linkenauger, 2013; Witt, 2011a, 2017). Action-specific scaling effects challenge our current 
view of what visual perception is for, what information it utilises, and how the mind is 
organised (Firestone, 2013; Firestone & Scholl, 2015; Proffitt, 2013; Witt, 2017). However, 
there are both methodological and theoretical concerns with the action-specific account. For 
example, it is not clear what the benefits of action-specific scaling effects in everyday 
perception are (Durgin, 2017; Firestone & Scholl, 2015), the account reports inconsistent 
effects which sometimes contradict each other, and action-specific scaling seems to be 
informationally ungrounded (Firestone, 2013). Furthermore, many effects consistent with the 
action-specific account could be accounted for by demand characteristics or differences 
resulting from changes in the visual representation of the body. It is also possible that such 
effects reflect changes in post-perceptual judgement rather than perception. The account has 
also been criticised for relying on an overly confirmatory research strategy, and many action-
specific scaling effects have not been replicated (Firestone, 2013). In the current thesis, we 
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tested several hypotheses derived from the action-specific account, and used different 
methodologies to investigate the claims of the account, with a focus on the criticisms outlined 
above. 
In Chapter 2, we attempted to replicate the effect reported by Linkenauger, Witt and 
Proffitt (2011, Experiment 2), that apparent grasping capacity directly affects estimated object 
size. We tested both the manipulation of hand dominance, used in the original study, and then 
introduced a more powerful manipulation which directly physically restricted participants’ 
grasping capacity. We also tested whether variation in grasping capacity would influence 
haptic size estimates, which has not previously been investigated by proponents of the action-
specific account. We found no evidence that grasping capacity (either actual or perceived) 
influences estimates of object size. 
In Chapter 3, we sought to understand our earlier failure to replicate Linkenauger, Witt 
and Proffitt (2011, Experiment 2). We investigated whether differences in demand 
characteristics between ours and Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt’s studies could explain this. 
We found no reliable evidence that providing leading instructions influenced estimates of 
object size. However, when participants judged both the graspability and the size of an object 
on every trial, as was done in Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt, (2011, Experiment 2), we found 
effects consistent with the action-specific account. This suggests that the effect reported by 
Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011, Experiment 2) can be explained by response biases 
associated with completing two conceptually linked tasks on the same trial. In other words, 
estimating object size in a context which makes graspability seem relevant gives rise to the 
effect, rather than grasping capacity directly affecting estimates of object size.  
In Chapter 4, we tested whether low-level differences as a result of manipulating 
visually perceived hand size could explain the results of Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011, 
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Experiment 3). Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt used magnification to manipulate visually 
perceived hand size, and reported that objects were estimated as smaller when placed next to 
the hand while it was magnified than while it was not. We replicated this finding both when 
participants viewed their own hand, and when they viewed a fake, plastic hand. This suggests 
that the effect reported by Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011, Experiment 3) can be 
explained by visual differences induced by magnification. Specifically, their result can be 
explained by size-contrast effects, possibly through a similar mechanism that gives rise to the 
Ebbinghaus Illusion (see Figure 1).  
In Chapter 5, we explored the criticism that the action-specific account has relied on 
an overly confirmatory research strategy by testing a disconfirmatory prediction offered by the 
account. It has been claimed that action-specific scaling effects should only be found when 
participants intend to act (Linkenauger, Witt & Proffitt, 2011; Witt et al., 2005). We therefore 
tested whether scaling effects would be absent if participants did not intend to act. Our results 
supported the claim that the action-specific account lacks predictive power (Firestone & 
Scholl, 2014) as we found effects consistent with the action-specific account when participants 
did not intend to act, and no effects when participants did intend to act.  
In Chapter 6, we investigated a potential practical application of the action-specific 
account. Specifically, we tested whether being hungry influenced the estimated size of food 
products. We found no evidence that being hungry influenced size estimates of food products. 
Thus, estimates of the relative size of food products do not scale in the way proposed by the 
action-specific account. This suggests that calls for the use of action-specific effects in 
everyday life (Witt et al., 2016) may be premature. 
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Chapter 7 provides a response to a recent review article by Witt (2017), who claimed 
that grasping capacity directly influences perceived object size. We critically evaluate the 
claims made by Witt (2017) and explain why we disagree that this is a true perceptual effect. 
Finally, Chapter 8 provides a general discussion and the conclusion of this thesis. The 
empirical work undertaken in this thesis suggests that there are at least four major concerns 
with the action-specific account which demonstrate that its central claim is false. We conclude 
that although people are sensitive to changes in their action capacity following modifications 
to the functional morphology of their body, this does not modulate visual spatial perception. 
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1.3 Footnotes: Chapter 1
1 It might be argued that heavier individuals expend more energy for a given action such as 
walking, since it takes more energy to move a heavier object (e.g. Sugovic et al., 2016). 
Thus, even a fit-but-fat individual may perceive distances as greater because distance is 
measured according to their “metabolic gas gauge” (Proffitt & Linkenauger, 2013). 
However, calorie expenditure is not dictated solely by an individual’s weight (Weigle & 
Brunzell, 1990; Leibel, Rosenbaum & Hirsch, 1995). In fact, it has been shown that 
individuals with more fat-free mass (body tissues other than fat which are non-metabolic, 
e.g. muscle, bones) and less body fat burn more calories during walking and running than 
individuals with less fat-free mass and more body fat (Pauley et al., 2016). This suggests that 
individuals who are muscular should expend more calories when walking and therefore, if 
energy expenditure is the driving mechanism underlying bioenergetic scaling effects, 
perceive the distance as greater. This means that a 90kg but mostly fit/muscular individual 
should see the distance to a target as greater than a 90kg but less fit/muscular individual. 
This undermines both Sugovic et al.’s (2016) suggestion that actual weight directly 
influences perceived distance, and Proffit and colleagues’ (Proffitt et al., 1995; Profitt & 
Linkenauger, 2013) assertion that improved fitness is associated with shorter distance 
estimates. 
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Chapter Two 
 
2. Grasping capacity does not directly influence 
perceived object size 
 
*This chapter has been published as: 
Collier, E. S., & Lawson, R. (2017). It’s out of my hands! Grasping capacity may 
not influence perceived object size. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human 
Perception and Performance, 43(3), 749-769. DOI: 10.1037/xhp0000331 
 
2.1 Abstract 
Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011) found that the perceived size of graspable 
objects was scaled by perceived grasping capacity. However, it is possible that this effect 
occurred because object size was estimated on the same trial as grasping capacity. This 
may have led to a conflation of estimates of perceived action capacity and spatial 
properties. In five experiments, we tested Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt’s claim that 
right-handed observers overestimate the grasping capacity of their right hand relative to 
their left hand, and that this, in turn, leads them to underestimate the size of objects to-
be-grasped in their right hand relative to their left hand. We replicated the finding that 
right handers overestimate the size and grasping capacity of their right hand relative to 
their left hand. However, when estimates of object size and grasping capacity were made 
in separate tasks, objects grasped in the right hand were not underestimated relative to 
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those grasped in the left hand. Further, when grasping capacity was physically restricted, 
observers appropriately recalibrated their perception of their maximum grasp but 
estimates of object size were unaffected. Our results suggest that changes in action 
capacity may not influence perceived object size if sources of conflation are controlled 
for.  
2.2 Introduction 
Action capacity refers to an observer’s ability to perform a given action. Physical 
changes to the body can alter both actual and perceived action capacity. The action-
specific account of perception claims that observers perceive features of the environment 
as scaled according to their abilities (Proffitt, 2006a; 2006b; 2013; Proffitt & 
Linkenauger, 2013; Witt, 2011a). Spatial perception has been shown to scale according 
to energetic expenditure and effort (Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999; Proffitt et al., 1995; Proffitt, 
Stefanucci, Banton & Epstein, 2003; Witt et al., 2004) and performance variability (Witt 
et al., 2008; Witt & Dorsch, 2009). For example, proponents of the action-specific 
account have claimed that hills appear steeper when observers wear a heavy backpack or 
are fatigued (Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999), that putting holes and softballs appear larger (Witt 
et al., 2008; Witt & Proffitt, 2005) and that tennis balls appear to move slower (Witt & 
Sugovic, 2010) to more skilled players of the relevant sport. According to the action-
specific account, perception is scaled in these ways in order to guide effective actions 
(Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999; Proffitt & Linkenauger, 2013). For example, an observer 
wearing a heavy backpack will find it harder to walk up a hill and so the visual slant of 
the hill appears steeper to them in order to deter them from attempting the ascent.  
It has also been reported that perception may be influenced by action capabilities 
pertaining to the morphology of the body (Linkenauger, Ramenzoni & Proffitt, 2010; 
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Linkenauger, Witt & Proffitt, 2011). For example, observers estimate an object to be 
nearer when they hold a tool that increases their maximum reach (Witt et al., 2005) and 
apertures are estimated as narrower if observers hold a horizontal rod that is wider than 
their body (Stefanucci & Geuss, 2009). Further evidence for the action-specific account 
comes from the claim that right handed participants underestimate the size of objects they 
intend to grasp with their right hand relative to objects they intend to grasp with their left 
hand (Linkenauger, Witt & Proffitt, 2011; see also Linkenauger, Ramenzoni & Proffitt., 
2010; Linkenauger, Mohler & Proffitt, 2011). Linkenauger and colleagues claim that this 
is because right handed observers perceive that their right hand is larger than their left 
hand and therefore that it can grasp larger objects (Gentilucci et al., 1998; Linkenauger, 
Witt & Proffitt, 2011).  
Action-specific scaling effects challenge modular theories of vision, as they 
suggest that perception can be influenced by cognitive factors. Modular theories of 
perception claim that perception is cognitively impenetrable, that is perception is not 
affected by top-down, cognitive influences (for discussions see Firestone, 2013; Firestone 
& Scholl, 2014; 2015; Proffitt, 2013). However, Sugovic et al. (2016) recently pointed 
out that if action-specific scaling effects are driven by real, physical body morphology 
(for example, actual weight) rather than beliefs or thoughts about the body, then these 
effects are, in fact, compatible with the idea of cognitive impenetrability. This is because 
information about the physical abilities of the body - rather than conscious beliefs or 
thoughts - is influencing perception, possibly through multimodal processes. This 
information need not be specified in the visual array, but instead may, for example, be 
provided by other modalities or physiological cues. As Firestone and Scholl (2015, p.11) 
suggest, for multisensory integration, “such results are consistent with the entire process 
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being contained within perception itself, rather than being an effect of more central 
cognitive processes on perception.” 
Interestingly, Sugovic et al. (2016) found that only actual weight, and not beliefs 
or perceptions about body mass, predicted action-specific scaling effects – in this case, 
distances were estimated as greater by heavier observers. This finding, namely that only 
actual, and not perceived, body morphology influenced spatial estimates contrasts to 
Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt’s (2011) finding that it was people’s perceptions of their 
grasping capacity that scaled their estimates of object size, whilst their actual grasping 
capacity did not differ between the right and left hands.  
One concern with the action-specific account is that the reported scaling effects 
may not reflect changes to perceived size in the strongest sense. Instead, participants’ size 
estimates may reflect their perception of their ability to act on an object as opposed to 
being based on the object’s spatial properties alone. A conflation of perceived action 
capacity and spatial perception is more likely to occur when spatial estimates are made in 
a context which encourages participants to consider non-visual factors, possibly including 
their action capacity (Firestone, 2013; Woods et al., 2009).  
Woods et al. (2009) demonstrated this possibility experimentally. Participants 
threw either a light or a heavy ball to a target three times, and then verbally estimated the 
distance to the target. Participants in three different groups were asked to base their 
distance judgements on objective distance (how far away the target really was), apparent 
distance (how far away the target visually appeared to be), or nonvisual factors (how far 
away they ‘felt’ the target was). Action-specific scaling was considered to have occurred 
if the distance to the target appeared greater to those who threw the heavy ball, since more 
effort is needed to throw a heavy than a light ball (see Proffitt, Stefanucci, Banton & 
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Epstein, 2003; Witt et al., 2004). Woods et al. (2009) found that action-specific scaling 
occurred only for participants judging how far they ‘felt’ the target was. Only here were 
participants encouraged to consider non-visual factors, which may have included their 
throwing ability. This result suggests that the scaling effect obtained by Woods et al. 
(2009) arose from a difference in how easily participants could throw the ball to the target, 
and did not actually reflect a change in what they perceived visually.  
We investigated this issue by re-examining the results of a study conducted by 
Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011) where right-handed participants were presented 
with blocks of varying size. On each trial in Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011), 
participants were first asked whether they thought they could grasp the block with either 
their left or right hand. They then visually matched the width of the block on a screen by 
moving two circles apart. Participants estimated the grasping ability of their dominant 
right hand as greater than that of their left hand. Critically, participants also 
underestimated the size of blocks they had imagined grasping with their right hand to a 
greater extent than blocks they had imagined grasping with their left hand. These findings 
were taken to demonstrate a scaling of perceived object size according to perceived action 
capacity. However, on each trial participants were explicitly asked whether they would 
be able to grasp the block with their thumb on one side and any finger on the other side 
immediately before they estimated the block’s width. It is therefore possible that their 
estimates of object size were influenced by whether the block seemed graspable, rather 
than its objective size alone.  
Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011) asked participants to imagine grasping the 
blocks because it has sometimes been argued that observers must intend to act in order 
for action-specific effects to be found (Witt et al., 2005; Witt & Proffitt, 2008). However, 
action-specific scaling effects have been found when participants performed the relevant 
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action without being asked to consider doing it. For example, in Bhalla and Proffitt’s 
(1999) studies with backpacks no attention was drawn to action when slopes were 
estimated. In a further example, Witt and Dorsch (2009) asked participants to attempt 10 
kicks to a set of field goal posts and then to visually match the height of the goal posts. 
When they estimated height they were not encouraged to consider their previous kicks 
and they did not kick the ball again after making their estimate and so they were not 
anticipating further action.  
It could be argued that this example reflects a different kind of perceptual scaling 
to that measured by Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011). Specifically, in Witt and 
Dorsch (2009), spatial properties were scaled by variability in performance, whereas in 
Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011) spatial properties were scaled by functional 
morphology (for a discussion of this issue, see Proffitt & Linkenauger, 2013). 
Nevertheless, the results of Witt and Dorsch (2009) suggest that action does not need to 
be consciously considered in order for action-specific effects to occur. Furthermore, if 
people know they have to perform a given action they must intend to act even if they are 
not consciously considering that action. Thus if intention is sufficient to influence 
perception, then performing the relevant action should carry the same biases as imagining 
doing so. In addition, actually performing an action creates a more ecologically valid 
context in which to test the claims of the action-specific account. Thus in our studies, 
participants actually grasped a block on each trial, rather than only imagining grasping a 
block, as in Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011).  
We conducted five experiments investigating whether spatial perception is scaled 
by perceived action capacity. We focused on the claim made by Linkenauger, Witt and 
Proffitt (2011) that right handed observers estimate the size of objects they intend to grasp 
in their right hand as smaller than objects they intend to grasp in their left hand because 
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they perceive the grasping capacity of their right hand as greater than that of their left 
hand. However, we avoided conflation effects by dissociating estimates of action capacity 
from estimates of object size. In Experiments 2-4 we did this by asking our participants 
to estimate their grasping capacity in a separate task which was completed only after they 
had made all of their estimates of object size. In the final experiment (5) we did this by 
deceiving participants by giving them a cover story that the action capacity and object 
size estimate tasks were unrelated and were part of two separate studies. Thus, we 
investigated whether a difference in either perceived or actual grasping capacity predicted 
a difference in perceived object size when potential sources of conflation were avoided. 
If perception is cognitively penetrable, and so if it is influenced by perceived action 
capacity, then we should replicate Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011) results when 
participants actually perform the relevant action, in this case grasping. In contrast, failure 
to replicate these effects when the action is performed and conflation effects are 
controlled for would support the claim that perception is cognitively impenetrable 
(Firestone, 2013; Firestone & Scholl, 2014).  
2.3 Experiment 1 
 Linkenauger et al. (2009) reported that right-handed participants perceived that 
they could grasp larger objects in their right hand than in their left hand. This may reflect 
an asymmetry in the perceived size of the hands, such that the right hand is perceived as 
larger than the left, since right-handers rely on their right hand more. A similar asymmetry 
has been reported for arm length, where the right arm is perceived by right-handed 
individuals to be longer than the left arm (Linkenauger et al. 2009; Morgado, Gentaz, 
Guinet, Osiurak & Palluel-Germain, 2013). In order to test the robustness of the claim 
that right handers perceive their right hand as bigger than their left hand, in Experiment 
1 we asked participants which of their hands was bigger.  
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2.3.1 Method 
Ethical approval was granted for all of the experiments presented in this paper by 
the relevant local ethics committee at the University of Liverpool. 
2.3.1.1 Participants 
An opportunity sample of 50 participants who self-reported as right-handed (25 
females, mean age = 23.3 years) was recruited for this experiment. Thirty-nine 
participants were approached in person on the University of Liverpool campus and 11 
were questioned online via Skype.  
2.3.1.2 Stimuli and procedure 
The experimenter recorded the participant's age, gender and handedness then 
asked “Is your right hand smaller, larger or about the same size as your left hand?” If they 
responded that they believed their hands were about the same size, they were asked the 
follow-up question, “If I forced you to choose, which is bigger, your right or left hand?” 
Participants often looked at their hands before they made their judgement. 
2.3.2 Results and discussion 
A Chi-Square test of goodness-of-fit for the participants who responded right (n 
= 25) and left (n = 10) to the first question showed a significant difference, X2 (1, N = 35) 
= 6.4, p < .001. We repeated this analysis including participants who responded right (n 
= 14) or left (n = 1) to the second question and again found a significant difference, X2 (1, 
N = 50) = 15.7, p < .001. Thus, right handers were more likely to say their right hand was 
larger than their left hand than vice versa. This supports the claim made by Linkenauger 
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et al. (2009) that most right handed observers perceive their right hand as larger than their 
left hand.  
2.4 Experiment 2 
Having confirmed that right handers perceive their right hand as larger than their 
left hand in Experiment 1, in Experiment 2 we went on investigate whether this effect 
would lead to the size of objects grasped by the right hand being underestimated relative 
to those grasped by the left hand (Linkenauger, Witt & Proffitt., 2011). The action-
specific account claims that this should occur because perceived action capacity alters the 
perceived size of action-relevant objects. As explained by Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt 
(2011, p. 1436): "Because the right hand appears larger and is deemed to be able to grasp 
larger objects (Linkenauger, Witt, Bakdash et al. 2009), the same object measures as 
smaller on the right hand’s larger ruler, and therefore, appears smaller than when it is 
placed on the left hand". 
In addition to testing for a pre-existing bias to overestimate the grasping ability of 
the right hand, in Experiment 2 we tried to manipulate perceived grasping ability in a 
second way, by using a priming task. Franchak and Adolph (2014) showed that changes 
to the body are not sufficient to change perceived action capacity but that perceived action 
capacity may be recalibrated through acting. They demonstrated this by comparing 
pregnant and non-pregnant participants’ estimates of their ability to walk through 
apertures of different widths. Pregnant participants accurately updated their estimates of 
the narrowest aperture that they could squeeze through as their body size increased 
throughout their pregnancy. In contrast, non-pregnant participants who were fitted with a 
pregnancy prosthesis that immediately increased their girth were initially poor at 
estimating the narrowest aperture they could fit through. However, after physically 
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attempting the task their estimates became accurate. Thus, perceived action capacity can 
be quickly recalibrated through acting (see also Franchak et al., 2010; Ishak et al., 2008). 
We aimed to take advantage of this rapid recalibration in Experiment 2 by priming 
participants to feel that one of their hands had a greater grasping capacity than the other 
hand prior to estimating the size of objects. One group was primed to feel their right hand 
was able to grasp larger objects. Here, any pre-existing bias to overestimate the grasping 
ability of their right hand should have been enhanced. If this bias influences estimates of 
object size, then any scaling effects should also have been enhanced. The other group 
were primed to feel their left hand could grasp larger objects. Here, any priming effect 
should have countered a pre-existing bias to overestimate the grasping capacity of their 
right hand. This, in turn, should reduce or even reverse any scaling effects when 
estimating object size.  
Finally, in Experiment 2 we also tested whether perceived grasping capacity 
would influence perceived object size if objects were presented haptically as well as 
visually. Both vision and active touch (haptics) process spatial information (Collier & 
Lawson, 2016; Lawson, 2009; Lawson, Ajvani & Cecchetto, 2016). Active exploration 
of the environment is critical to learning about the action capacity of the hands, and Gori 
and colleagues have shown that haptic information calibrates visual estimates of object 
size in young children (Gori, Del Viva, Sandini & Burr, 2008; Gori, Sciutti, Burr & 
Sandini, 2011). Some evidence suggests that the direction of perceptual scaling effects 
may reverse from vision to touch. For example, Taylor-Clarke, Jacobsen and Haggard 
(2004) found that magnifying the forearm led participants to estimate visual stimuli 
presented on the forearm as smaller. However, they found that when the forearm was 
again visually magnified but unseen stimuli passively touched the skin, objects were 
estimated as larger. Similarly, using the rubber hand illusion, Bruno and Bertamini (2010) 
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found that when participants embodied a large hand, they estimated discs that they 
grasped in that hand as larger than when they embodied a small hand. This research 
suggests that differences in the perceived size of the relevant body parts can elicit opposite 
perceptual scaling effects for vision and touch. Applying this size-scaling logic to the 
current studies, if right-handed participants perceive their right hand to be larger than their 
left hand then objects they grasp in the absence of vision may be perceived as larger in 
the right hand, which is the opposite prediction to that of the action-specific account. 
2.4.1 Method 
2.4.1.1 Participants 
Thirty right handed undergraduate students from the University of Liverpool were 
recruited for this study (21 females, mean age = 20.6 years, mean Edinburgh Handedness 
Inventory score = 86, range = 25 - 100). Participants were rewarded with course credit 
for their participation. 
2.4.1.2 Apparatus, stimuli and procedure 
There were four phases to this experiment. In summary, first participants were 
implicitly primed to perceive one of their hands as having a greater grasping capacity than 
the other (priming task). Second, they completed a haptic-to-vision size estimation task 
(HV task) where they used a visual matching response to estimate the size of haptically 
presented stimuli. Third, they repeated the HV task but this time the stimuli were 
presented visually (VV task). Finally, we measured the largest object that participants 
could grasp with each hand (grasping capacity task). These four phases are described in 
more detail below.  
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Participants were first told that the experiment would test their ability to estimate 
the size of blocks. The stimuli were 21 foamboard square blocks (0.5 cm deep) with sides 
varying in length from 4 to 24 cm in 1cm increments. A box (40 × 10 × 32 cm) was placed 
on top of a table at which participants were seated. The open end of the box facing the 
participant was covered by a curtain, see Figure 1A. Stimuli were presented inside the 
box in the priming phase and in the HV and VV tasks.  
The purpose of the priming phase was to induce the feeling that one hand could 
grasp larger objects than the other by giving a smaller set of objects to that hand. We 
reasoned that if participants were able to grasp more blocks with one hand than the other, 
they could be led to perceive that hand as having a greater grasping capacity if they 
assumed that the same set of stimuli were being given to both hands. Any difference in 
graspability between the two hands might subsequently lead to objects seeming smaller 
when seen near to that hand. Participants were assigned to either the 
LHFeelsSmallerObjects or the RHFeelsSmallerObjects group (n = 15 per group) and 
were given a series of stimuli to try to pick up. 
As a cover story for the priming phase, participants were told that before starting 
to estimate object sizes, they would do a practise phase in which they would feel objects 
from across the range of available sizes without making a response. In this phase 
participants reached behind the curtain with their left or right hand and attempted to grasp 
and pick up the presented block. The experimenter told the participant which hand they 
should use on each trial. Participants were told to always attempt to first grasp the square 
block with their thumb on one side and any other finger on the opposite side. They were 
also told that if the block was too big to grasp in this way, they should then move their 
hand across the block to feel its width. There were two sets of 13 stimuli, the small set 
(sizes = 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 cm) and the large set (each member 
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of which was 4cm larger than its corresponding item in the small set, so its sizes = 8, 9, 
10, 11, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23 and 24 cm). For the LHFeelsSmallerObjects group, 
on each trial one block from the small set was presented to the left hand and then the 
corresponding (4cm larger) block from the large set was presented to the right hand, and 
vice versa for the RHFeelsSmallerObjects group. Each pair of blocks was presented 
twice, giving 26 trials in total. Trial order was randomised for each participant and the 
hand given the small set (so being primed to have a greater grasping capacity) acted first 
on every trial.  
The HV then VV size estimation tasks followed immediately after the priming 
phase, see Figure 1B. At the beginning of each trial, the experimenter told the participant 
which hand they should use to grasp the block. In the HV matching task, participants put 
their hand through the curtain to feel the block, as in the priming phase. In the VV task, 
participants reached through the curtain to pick up the block and placed it on the table in 
front of the curtain so that they could see it. In both tasks, participants always attempted 
the specified grasp (with the thumb on one side and any other finger on the opposite side) 
first. However, if the block was too big to pick up in this way then they were told to move 
their hand across the block to feel its width (for the HV task) or they were told to use a 
different grasp to pick up the block (for the VV task). Thus, in both tasks participants 
attempted to grasp the block in a specific way on every trial prior to estimating its size.  
For the HV and VV tasks, size estimates were made on a computer monitor, which 
was placed on top of the box. Two 2 cm tall, 0.5 cm wide, vertical black lines, which were 
initially 1.75cm apart, were displayed on the screen, see Figure 1A. The participant 
moved the lines closer or further apart by scrolling the wheel of a wireless mouse. The 
mouse was fixed to the table in front of the participant, in line with their body midline. 
To estimate the width of each block, participants adjusted the horizontal distance between 
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the lines until they believed it matched the width of the block they were either feeling 
(HV task) or seeing (VV task; here, the block was offset from the two lines, see Figure 
1A. This ensured that participants could not simply line up the edges). Participants 
pressed the space key on a keyboard placed on top of the box in front of the monitor when 
they were satisfied with their response.  
In the HV task, participants felt the block with one hand and used their other hand 
to scroll the mouse wheel. In the VV task, they used the same hand they picked the block 
up with to use the mouse and they were told to keep their other hand out of sight (as a 
cover story, participants were told that this was to ensure that their other hand did not get 
in the way, and so that they could clearly see the block). This ensured that the hand they 
had just acted with was more likely to then be used as a perceptual ruler as it was the only 
hand visible. Participants estimated the size of each of the blocks once for each hand in 
each task, thus completing 42 trials (2 hands × 21 blocks) in each task, with trial order 
randomised within each task. 
After completing the VV task we measured the largest block that participants were 
able to successfully grasp with each hand (grasping capacity task). Participants attempted 
to grasp blocks, starting at 14 cm wide, in increasing size until the largest block they could 
grasp was found. Only actual, not perceived, maximum grasp was measured in 
Experiment 2. Participants then completed the 4-item short Edinburgh Handedness 
Inventory. Finally, to check for demand characteristics, participants were asked a series 
of questions about the experiment prior to being fully debriefed. The entire procedure 
lasted approximately 40 minutes. 
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Figure 1: A: Diagram of the set-up of Experiment 2, showing a left hand trial in the VV 
task. The participant has moved the block from behind the curtain and placed it on the 
table in front of them, to the right of the mouse. They would then use their left hand to 
scroll the mouse wheel to respond. B: Diagram showing the procedure during left hand 
trials in Experiment 2 in the priming phase (top), the HV task (middle) and the VV task 
(bottom). The same procedure was used in Experiment 3 (except that the HV task was 
omitted), Experiment 4 (except that the priming phase was omitted). In Experiment 5 both 
the priming phase and HV task were omitted and changes were made to the VV task. In 
1B, unlike in 1A, the curtain is drawn as transparent in order to show the block placed 
behind the curtain. In fact, though, participants could not see the block while it was behind 
the curtain (in (a) and (b) and also in (c) for the HV task). On left hand trials in the HV 
task, the left hand was used to feel the block, while the right hand was used to respond 
using the mouse. In the VV task, the right hand was not used and was kept out of sight, 
whilst the left hand was used to move the block from behind the curtain, to place it to the 
right of the mouse and then to respond using the mouse.  
A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B 
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2.4.2 Results 
No participant correctly guessed the main manipulation and purpose of the 
experiment without prompting from the experimenter. Details of the responses to the 
post-experimental questions can be found in Appendix J. We first discuss the results for 
the HV and VV tasks which measured perceived object size, followed by the results for 
grasping capacity. 
 
Perceived object size  
Fourteen individual trials were removed (2 HV-left, 2 HV-right, 6 VV-left, and 4 
VV-right) where invalid responses occurred (e.g. pressing the spacebar without adjusting 
the distance of the lines). Ratios were then calculated for the visually estimated size of 
each block by dividing the estimated size by the actual size. Linkenauger, Witt and 
Proffitt (2011) claimed that action-specific scaling effects should only occur when the 
action in question is performable. Therefore, to be consistent with Linkenauger, Witt and 
Proffitt (2011), here we report the analysis only for the average ratio for trials where 
graspable stimuli were presented, based on the largest block that participants were able 
to grasp in the grasping capacity task (we also report results for the average ratio of all 21 
sizes in Appendix A).  
A mixed ANOVA was conducted where grasping hand (left/right) and task 
(HV/VV) were within-participants factors and prime group 
(LHFeelsSmallerObjects/RHFeelsSmallerObjects) was a between-participants factor (p-
values for pairwise comparisons were Bonferroni corrected). This revealed that ratios for 
the left hand grasping (0.82) did not differ significantly from ratios for the right hand 
grasping (0.83), F(1, 28) = 0.27, p = .6, ηp2 = .01, see Figure 2. Ratios were significantly 
greater in the VV task (0.89) than in the HV task (0.77), F(1, 28) = 49.37, p < .001, ηp2 = 
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.64, so people underestimated size more when the blocks were perceived haptically rather 
than visually. There was no significant effect of prime group, F(1, 28) = 1.42, p = .2, ηp2 
= .05, of task × prime group, F(1, 28) = 0.17, p = .7, ηp2 = .01, of grasping hand × prime 
group, F(1, 28) = 2.16, p = .2, ηp2 = .07, or of grasping hand × task × prime group, F(1, 
28) = 0.16, p = .7, ηp2 = .004. The only significant interaction was for grasping hand × 
task, F(1, 28) = 9.75, p = .004, ηp2 = .26. There is some evidence that for touch, contrary 
to the predictions of the action-specific account, objects may feel larger if the hand is 
perceived as larger (Bruno & Bertamini, 2010). Consistent with this proposal, pairwise 
comparisons showed that ratios were significantly greater for the right hand grasping in 
the HV task (mean difference = 0.021, p = .011). In the VV task, ratios for the right hand 
were not significantly lower, as the action-specific account would predict, though the 
trend was in this direction (mean difference = -0.015, p = .08).  
We ran a Bayesian analysis to check the strength of evidence for the null effects 
revealed by the ANOVA, see Table 1. We used the procedure described by Masson 
(2011) and the descriptive terms for strength of evidence suggested by Raftery (1995).  
Table 1  
Posterior probabilities for the null [pBIC(H0|D)] and alternative [(pBIC(H1|D)] hypotheses 
for the main effects and interactions in Experiment 2. 
Effect pBIC(H0|D) pBIC(H1|D)  ηp2 
Grasping hand .826** .174 .01 
Task .999*** .001 .64 
Prime group .723** .277 .05 
Grasping hand × task .058 .942** .26 
Grasping hand × prime group .643* .357 .07 
Task × prime group .833** .167 .01 
Grasping hand × task × prime group .837** .163 .004 
*weak evidence, **positive evidence, *** strong evidence 
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Figure 2: Results of the object size estimation task in Experiment 2: Size estimates of 
objects grasped in the left and right hands in the HV and VV tasks for the 
LHFeelsSmallerObjects and RHFeelsSmallerObjects prime groups. One-sample t-tests 
on ratios for the LHFeelsSmallerObjects prime group for the HV-left, HV-right, VV-left 
and VV-right conditions were all significantly lower than 1, t(14) = -10.01, t(14) = -7.70, 
t(14) = -3.40, and t(14) = -4.02 respectively, all p < .001. Similarly, for the 
RHFeelsSmallerObjects prime group, ratios for HV-left, HV-right, VV-left and VV-right 
conditions were all significantly lower than 1, t(14) = -7.40, t(14) = -7.77, t(14) = -3.50, 
and t(14) = -4.61 respectively, all p < .001. Error bars show +/- one standard error of the 
mean.  
 
Actual grasping capacity 
A mixed ANOVA analysing the maximum grasp for each grasping hand 
(left/right) as a within-participants factor and prime group 
(LHFeelsSmallerObjects/RHFeelsSmallerObjects) as a between-participants factor was 
conducted. This revealed no effect of grasping hand, F(1, 28) = 0.33, p = .6, ηp2 = .01, 
prime group, F(1, 28) = 1.22, p = .3, ηp2 = .04, or a grasping hand × prime group 
interaction, F(1, 28) = 1.318, p = .3, ηp2 = .05. Thus although Experiment 1 found that 
most right handed observers think that their right hand is larger than their left, we found 
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no evidence in Experiment 2 that the right hand actually has a greater grasping capacity 
than the left hand.  
2.4.3 Discussion 
In Experiment 2 we tested whether perceived differences in grasping capacity 
would influence the perceived size of objects presented either visually or haptically. There 
were two reasons why objects grasped by the right hand might be perceived as smaller 
than objects grasped by the left hand: first, a pre-existing tendency for right-handers to 
overestimate the size of their right hand (Linkenauger et al., 2009; replicated in 
Experiment 1 here) which could lead to them overestimating the grasping capacity of 
their right hand (Linkenauger, Witt & Proffitt, 2011); and, second, a priming 
manipulation intended to make observers feel that their right hand had a greater grasping 
capacity by having it grasp a set of smaller objects than the left hand before estimates 
were made. We also tested whether being primed to feel that the left hand had a greater 
grasping capacity would reduce estimates of object size for objects grasped in the left 
hand.  
Our results suggest that neither our priming manipulation nor a pre-existing 
overestimation of the grasping capacity of the right hand influenced visually perceived 
object size. We thus found no action-specific scaling effect for visually presented stimuli. 
The only effect we found was that, for the HV task, objects grasped in the right hand were 
estimated as slightly larger than objects grasped in the left hand, regardless of priming 
group. This result is consistent with findings that unseen stimuli are estimated as larger if 
they are felt by a body part which is perceived as larger (Bruno & Bertamini, 2010; 
Taylor-Clarke et al., 2004). This latter, size-scaling effect was in the opposite direction to 
that predicted by the action-specific account, so we suggest that it does not reflect 
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perceptual scaling based on perceived grasping capacity. Instead, this effect may reflect 
a difference in the perceived size of the left and right hands, consistent with the results of 
Experiment 1. This effect may arise from the greater representation in the somatosensory 
cortex of the right than the left hand for right handers (Sörös, Knecht, Imai, Gürtler, 
Lütkenhöner et al., 1999). This implies that the right hand may have smaller receptive 
fields and be more sensitive to touch than the left hand causing unseen objects held in the 
right hand to be estimated as larger. This suggests that the acuity of touch may influence 
visual estimates of object size as a result of multimodal integration. In summary, 
Experiment 2 suggested that perceived object size was not influenced in ways predicted 
by the action-specific account.  
2.5 Experiment 3 
 Experiment 1 demonstrated that right-handed observers perceived their right hand 
as larger than their left hand whilst Experiment 2 suggested that this asymmetry in 
perceived hand size does not lead to differences in perceived object size when attention 
is not explicitly drawn to action capacity. However, we did not measure perceived 
maximum grasp in Experiment 2 so we could not be certain that our hand dominance and 
priming manipulations of perceived action capacity were effective. To address this point, 
in Experiment 3 we used the VV task from Experiment 2 to measure perceived object 
size and then, afterwards, we measured perceived maximum grasping capacity for each 
hand. 
2.5.1 Method 
2.5.1.1 Participants 
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Thirty right-handed undergraduate students from the University of Liverpool (22 
females, mean age = 19.9 years, mean Edinburgh Handedness Inventory score = 85, range 
= 37.5-100) were recruited for this experiment. Participants either volunteered or were 
rewarded with course credit. 
2.5.1.2 Apparatus, stimuli, design and procedure 
 The stimuli, design and procedure were identical to Experiment 2, except that 
there was no HV task and perceived maximum grasping capacity for each hand was 
measured after completion of the VV task. Here, participants were asked which block 
they believed was the largest they could grasp (again, using their thumb on one side and 
any other finger on the opposite side) in each hand. Participants saw nine foam board 
blocks, 0.5cm deep, which were laid out in size order on a shelf from 14 cm (on the far 
left) to 22 cm (on the far right), in 1cm increments. Participants pointed at the block that 
they believed was the biggest one they could grasp. 
2.5.2 Results 
No participant correctly guessed the main manipulation and purpose of the 
experiment without prompting from the experimenter. Details of the responses to the 
post-experimental questions can be found in Appendix J. We first discuss the results for 
the VV task which measured perceived object size, followed by the results for perceived 
and for actual grasping capacity. 
 
Perceived object size 
Ratios were calculated for each block as in Experiment 2. For consistency with 
Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011), here we report only the results for stimuli that 
participants perceived they could grasp (results for the full dataset are reported in 
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Appendix B, and results based on whether participants could actually grasp the stimuli 
are reported in Appendix C). 
A mixed ANOVA with grasping hand (left/right) as a within-participants factor 
and prime group (LHFeelsSmallerObjects/RHFeelsSmallerObjects) as a between-
participants factor was conducted. This revealed no significant effects of grasping hand, 
F(1, 28) = 1.70,  p = .2, ηp2 = .06, prime group, F(1, 28) = 0.39, p = .5, ηp2 = .01, or of 
grasping hand × prime group, F(1, 28) = 0.20, p = .7, ηp2 = .004, see Figure 3. As in 
Experiment 2, we ran a Bayesian analysis to check the strength of evidence for the null 
effects revealed by the ANOVA, see Table 2.  
 
 
Figure 3: Results of the object size estimation task in Experiment 3: Size estimates of 
objects grasped in the left and right hands in the VV task for the LHFeelsSmallerObjects 
and RHFeelsSmallerObjects prime groups. For comparison, we include data from 
Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011). One-sample t-tests showed that ratios for the VV-
left and VV-right conditions were both significantly lower than 1 for the 
LHFeelsSmallerObjects group (t(14) = -4.89, and t(14) = -5.69 respectively), and for the 
RHFeelsSmallerObjects group (t(14) = -5.97, and t(14) = -6.40 respectively), all p < .001. 
Error bars show +/- one standard error of the mean.  
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Table 2  
Posterior probabilities for the null [pBIC(H0|D)] and alternative [(pBIC(H1|D)] hypotheses 
for the main effects and interactions in Experiment 3. 
Effect pBIC(H0|D) pBIC(H1|D)  ηp2 
Grasping hand .694* .306 .06 
Prime group .816** .184 .01 
Grasping hand × prime group .838** .162 .004 
*weak evidence, **positive evidence 
 
Actual and perceived grasping capacity 
We analysed participant’s perceived and actual maximum grasp for their left and 
right hands in separate1 mixed ANOVAs where hand (left/right) was a within-participants 
factor and prime group (LHFeelsSmallerObjects/RHFeelsSmallerObjects) was a 
between-subjects factor. For perceived grasp, maximum grasp for the right hand (18.0 
cm) was greater than for the left hand (17.5 cm), F(1, 28) = 10.85, p = .003, ηp2 = .30. 
There was no significant effect of prime group, F(1, 28) = 1.15, p = .3, ηp2 = .04, or of 
hand × prime group, F(1, 28) = 1.61, p = .2, ηp2 = .05. For actual grasp, maximum grasp 
for the right hand (16.2 cm) did not differ from the left hand (16.3 cm), F(1, 28) = 1.11, 
p = .3, ηp2 = .04. There was no significant effect of prime group, F(1, 28) = 1.01, p = .3, 
ηp2 = .04, or of hand × prime group, F(1, 28) = 0.001, p = .9, ηp2 < .001. Together these 
results suggest that these right-handed participants estimated the maximum grasp of their 
right hand as greater than that of their left (replicating Experiment 1) but that there was 
no difference in the actual grasping capacities of their hands (replicating Experiment 2).  
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Figure 4: Results of the maximum grasping capacity tasks in Experiment 3: Estimates of 
maximum grasp for the left and right hands for the LHFeelsSmallerObjects and 
RHFeelsSmallerObjects groups. Perceived grasp is the largest block participants believed 
they could grasp. Actual grasp is the largest block that could be grasped in each hand. 
Error bars represent +/- one standard error of the mean. 
 
2.5.3 Discussion 
In Experiment 3 we showed that, regardless of prime group, participants 
overestimated the grasping capacity of their right hand relative to their left hand. This 
supports the findings of Experiment 1 which showed that right handers usually think their 
right hand is larger than their left hand. Nevertheless, replicating the results of Experiment 
2, neither a pre-existing overestimation of the grasping capacity of the right hand, nor our 
priming manipulation influenced estimates of object size. Thus, although participants 
overestimated the grasping capacity of their right hand relative to their left hand, this did 
not influence their perception of object size when no attention was drawn to action. 
Together these results suggest that perceived object size is not directly influenced by 
perceived action capacity.  
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2.6 Experiment 4 
 In Experiments 2 and 3 we found no evidence that overestimating the grasping 
ability of one hand relative to the other has a direct influence on visual perceptions of 
object size. Consistent with Linkenauger et al. (2009; Linkenauger, Witt & Proffitt, 
2011), in Experiment 1, right-handers perceived their right hand as larger than their left, 
and in Experiment 3 participants perceived the grasping capacity of their right hand as 
larger than their left hand. However, this latter effect was modest, with the right hand 
estimated as being able to grasp objects that were, on average, only 0.5 cm larger. 
Furthermore, Experiment 3 showed that there was no difference in the actual grasping 
capacity of the right and left hands, replicating Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011). 
Finally, our priming manipulation in Experiment 3 did not influence the relative 
perceived grasping capacity of the hands. This might be because the effect of priming 
dissipated during the size estimation task and thus was not detected in the subsequent 
grasping capacity task. Here, if acting rapidly recalibrates perceived action capacity 
(Franchak & Adolph, 2014) then grasping during the VV task may have overridden any 
changes in perceived grasping capacity from the priming manipulation.  
Thus, it is possible that in Experiments 2 and 3 we found no scaling effects on 
perceived object size that were consistent with the action-specific account because there 
was only a modest difference in the perceived grasping capacity of the left and right 
hands, or because there was no difference in the actual grasping capacity of the left and 
right hands. Related to this second point, Sugovic et al. (2016) found that only actual 
differences in body size, and not people's beliefs or perceptions about their body size, 
affected spatial perception. To examine both of these possibilities, in Experiment 4 we 
used a more powerful taping manipulation which produced substantial changes in actual 
as well as perceived grasping capacity.  
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Surprisingly, comparisons between conditions where the spatial extent to be 
estimated is kept constant but action capacity is varied have rarely been reported in the 
action-specific literature, although some manipulations which alter the action boundaries 
of the body have been previously shown to influence spatial perception (Lessard, Creem-
Regehr & Stefanucci, 2012; Witt et al., 2005). One such study was conducted by Shaffer 
and Flint (2011) who showed that estimated slant for an escalator did not differ to 
estimated slant for a set of stairs. This is inconsistent with the action-specific account 
which suggests that the stairs should have appeared steeper because they require effort to 
climb, unlike standing on an escalator. In Experiment 4 here, to directly alter participants’ 
ability to grasp objects, we taped together the fingers of one hand to reduce its grasping 
capacity relative to the untaped hand. We predicted that participants would estimate their 
maximum grasp to be lower when their hand was taped relative to when it was untaped. 
Nevertheless, based on the results of Experiments 2 and 3, we predicted that even if there 
was a large change in perceived (and actual) action capacity following taping this would 
not alter estimates of object size. 
2.6.1 Method 
2.6.1.1 Participants 
Thirty right handed undergraduate students (26 females, mean age = 20.1 years, 
mean Edinburgh Handedness Quotient score = 81, range = 50-100) were recruited from 
the University of Liverpool. Participants either volunteered or received course credit for 
their time. 
2.6.1.2 Apparatus, stimuli and procedure 
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 The stimuli, apparatus and procedure were identical to Experiment 3 apart from 
the following changes. First, we included the HV task from Experiment 2. Second, instead 
of the priming phase the fingers were taped on either the left hand (LHTaped group) or 
the right hand (RHTaped group). The middle and ring fingers were first taped together 
above the proximal interphalangeal (middle) finger joint, then all four fingers were taped 
together just under the same joint. The hand remained taped whilst participants completed 
the HV and then the VV tasks. After completing these two object size estimation tasks, 
participants’ perceived maximum grasp followed by actual maximum grasp were 
measured for the untaped hand, then for the taped hand, and finally for the taped hand 
after removing the tape. The post-experimental questions were similar to those asked in 
Experiments 2 and 3, but were re-worded to better fit the taping manipulation. 
2.6.2 Results 
No participant correctly guessed the main manipulation and purpose of the 
experiment without prompting from the experimenter. Details of the responses to the 
post-experimental questions can be found in Appendix J. We first discuss the results for 
the HV and VV tasks which measured perceived object size, followed by the results for 
perceived and actual grasping capacity. 
Perceived object size 
Ratios were calculated for each block as in Experiments 2 and 3. For consistency 
with Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011), here we report only the results for stimuli that 
participants perceived they could grasp (results for the full dataset are reported in 
Appendix D, and results based on whether participants could actually grasp the stimuli 
are reported in Appendix E). 
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A mixed ANOVA with grasping hand (left/right) and task (HV/VV) as within-
participants factors and tape group (LHTaped/RHTaped) as a between-participants factor 
was conducted, see Figure 5. Importantly, no significant effect was found for grasping 
hand F(1, 28) = 0.33, p = .6, ηp2 = .01. As in Experiment 2, ratios were significantly lower 
for the HV task (0.84) than the VV task (0.95), F(1, 28) = 16.28, p < .001, ηp2 = .37, so 
people underestimated size more when the blocks were perceived haptically rather than 
visually. There were no other significant effects: tape group, F(1, 28) = 2.42, p = .1, ηp2 
= .08; task × tape group, F(1, 28) = 2.44, p = .1, ηp2 = .08; grasping hand × tape group, 
F(1, 28) = 1.10, p = .3, ηp2 = .04; task × grasping hand, F(1, 28) = 0.11, p = .7, ηp2 = .01; 
grasping hand × task × tape group, F(1, 28) = 0.28, p = .6, ηp2 = .01.  
As in Experiments 2 and 3, we ran a Bayesian analysis to check the strength of 
evidence for the null effects revealed by the ANOVA, see Table 3. 
 
Table 3  
Posterior probabilities for the null [pBIC(H0|D)] and alternative [(pBIC(H1|D)] hypotheses 
for the main effects and interactions in Experiment 4. 
Effect pBIC(H0|D) pBIC(H1|D)  ηp2 
Grasping hand .812** .179 .01 
Task .006 .994*** .37 
Tape group .611* .389 .08 
Grasping hand × task .838** .162 .004 
Grasping hand × tape group .754** .246 .04 
Task × tape group .610* .390 .08 
Grasping hand × task × tape group .825** .175 .01 
*weak evidence, **positive evidence, *** strong evidence 
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Figure 5: Results of the object size estimation task in Experiment 4: Size estimates of 
objects grasped in the left and right hands in the HV and VV tasks for the LHTaped and 
RHTaped tape groups. One-sample t-tests showed that for the LHTaped group, the HV-
left and HV-right conditions were significantly lower than 1 (t(14) = -2.61, p = .02, and 
t(14) = -4.03, p = .001 respectively), whereas ratios for the VV-left and VV-right 
conditions did not differ from 1 (t(14) = 0.45, p = .7, and t(14) = 0.07, p = .9 respectively). 
For the RHTaped group, ratios for the HV-left, HV-right, VV-left and VV-right 
conditions were all significantly lower than 1 (t(14) = -4.00, t(14) = -3.99, t(14) = -3.84, 
and t(14) = -3.83 respectively, all p < .001). Error bars show +/- one standard error of the 
mean  
 
Actual and perceived grasping capacity 
We analysed participants’ perceived and actual maximum grasp for their left and 
right hands in separate2 ANOVAs, where grasping hand (left/right) was a within-
participants factor and tape group (LHTaped/RHTaped) was a between-participants 
factor (p-values for pairwise comparisons were Bonferroni corrected). For perceived 
grasp there was no significant effect of grasping hand, F(1, 28) = 0.51, p = .8, ηp2 = .02, 
or of tape group, F(1, 28) = 1.52, p = .2, ηp2 = .05, but there was a grasping hand × tape 
group interaction, F(1, 28) = 118.37, p < .001, ηp2 = .81. Pairwise comparisons showed 
that, as expected, perceived maximum grasp was smaller for the left hand (14.9 cm) than 
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the right hand (18.1 cm) in the LHTaped group (mean difference = -3.3 cm, p < .001), but 
was larger for the left hand (17.5 cm) than the right hand (14.4 cm) in the RHTaped group 
(mean difference = 3.1 cm, p < .001). Thus, both groups appropriately recalibrated their 
estimates of maximum grasp following taping of their hand. 
Similarly, for actual grasp, there was no significant effect of grasping hand, F(1, 
28) = 0.40, p = 0.8, ηp2 = .01, or of tape group, F(1, 28) = 0.06, p = .8, ηp2 = .02, but 
grasping hand × tape group was again significant, F(1, 28) = 54.76, p < .001, ηp2 = .66. 
Pairwise comparisons showed that actual maximum grasp was smaller for the left hand 
(14.7 cm) than the right hand (15.9 cm) in the LHTaped group (mean difference = -1.3 
cm, p < .001), but was larger for the left hand (16.0 cm) than the right hand (14.8 cm) in 
the RHTaped group (mean difference = 1.2 cm, p < .001). Thus, for both groups, taping 
a hand reduced the size of the biggest block it could actually grasp, with a similar, but 
enhanced, pattern of effects on perceived grasp, see Figure 6. 
2.6.3 Discussion 
In Experiment 4, taping one hand reduced estimates of the perceived maximum 
grasping capacity of that hand by, on average, 3.2cm, and actual grasp by 1.2cm, relative 
to the untaped hand, see Figure 6. This powerful manipulation had, though, no influence 
on estimates of object size, see Figure 5. Experiments 2 and 3 found no evidence that a 
difference in perceived grasping capacity (either due to right-hand dominance or to 
priming) influenced perceived object size. Experiment 4 provided direct experimental 
evidence supporting this finding. Participants rapidly and appropriately recalibrated their 
perceived action capacity when their fingers were taped together (see also Franchak & 
Adolph, 2014; Ishak et al., 2008). However, this recalibration had no impact on perceived 
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object size. We also found no evidence that actual grasping capacity influences perceived 
object size.  
 
Figure 6: Results of the maximum grasping capacity tasks in Experiment 4: Estimates of 
maximum grasp for the left and right hands for the LHTaped and RHTaped groups. 
Perceived grasp is the largest block participants believed they could grasp. Actual grasp 
is the largest block that they could, in fact, grasp. Error bars represent +/- one standard 
error of the mean. 
 
2.7 Experiment 5 
Together, the results of Experiments 2-4 suggest that grasping capacity does not 
directly influence perceived object size. This conclusion is not consistent with 
Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011) who concluded that because right handers perceive 
their right hand as having a greater grasping capacity then objects grasped by the right 
hand are perceived as smaller than those grasped by the left hand. However, the method 
used in our experiments deviated in a number of ways from the experiments of 
Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011). For example, since the blocks were placed under 
the monitor, participants may have tried to use landmark matching to make their estimates 
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(though some evidence suggests that people do not spontaneously use landmark 
matching, e.g. Lawson & Bertamini, 2006, Experiment 4, and note that the blocks were 
offset from the response lines, see Figure 1A).  
Arguably the most important change made was that we did not ask participants 
about their grasping capacity on each size estimation trial. As discussed in the 
introduction, we reasoned that if intending to act is sufficient to induce action-specific 
scaling effects, then scaling effects should occur if participants actually grasp an object 
and not only when they imagine grasping it. Actual grasping preceded every size 
estimation trial in Experiments 2-4 and yet we found no action-specific scaling effects. 
We made this change due to our concern that the results reported by Linkenauger, Witt 
and Proffitt (2011) could have arisen because imagining grasping an object in order to 
verbally report its graspability may have drawn attention to action. This may have led 
their participants to conflate estimates of action capacity (graspability) with their 
subsequent estimates of object size. If so, then their participants may not have experienced 
a change in perceived object size in the strongest sense. However, it could be argued that, 
in Experiments 2-4, we not only removed this potential conflation but that we also 
removed participants' intention to act on the object that they were estimating the size of. 
This is because our participants had finished picking up and moving the object before 
they estimated its size, and they did not act on it again until after making their estimates. 
It is also possible that because grasping is such an everyday action, participants were not 
thinking about the action in a way which made it seem relevant to the task. We tackled 
these possibilities, and others, in Experiment 5 by moving to a method more similar to 
that used by Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011), as described below.  
Importantly, though, we wanted to still ensure that any effects that we observed 
could not be attributed to demand characteristics, which has been a concern with the 
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action-specific account (for reviews see Firestone, 2013; Firestone & Scholl, 2015; 
Philbeck & Witt, 2015), or conflation. Demand characteristics refer to participants 
altering their behaviour in accordance with what they believe the experimenter’s 
hypothesis to be. A number of studies have tried to control for demand characteristics, 
for example by assessing individual differences (Linkenauger, Witt & Proffitt, 2011, 
Experiment 3) or by using indirect measures (Witt, 2011b). However, there is evidence 
that when demand characteristics are reduced, for example by giving participants a cover 
story for an otherwise unexplained manipulation, action-specific effects may disappear. 
For example, Durgin et al. (2009; see also Durgin, Klein, Spiefel, Strawster & Williams, 
2012; Shaffer, McManama, Swank & Durgin, 2013) showed that participants wearing a 
heavy backpack did not estimate slant as steeper than those who did not wear a backpack 
when they were told that the backpack contained equipment that monitored their ankle 
muscles. This suggests that when no explanation is provided for wearing the backpack, 
participants may infer that wearing it is intended to increase their estimates of slant, and 
so they might adjust their estimates accordingly.  
Thus, in Experiment 5, although we explicitly told participants that we were 
interested in graspability, and although on every trial they actually grasped the object both 
before and after estimating its size, we used a cover story to minimise the chances of 
finding an effect simply due to conflation or demand characteristics. Specifically, we told 
participants that, for practical reasons, we were running two separate studies 
simultaneously, one of which was a grasping task and the other was a size matching task. 
They were told that the experimenter would record how they grasped each object to 
provide data for a control study about grasping behaviour which was independent of the 
main experiment in which they estimated object size. We also provided a cover story for 
the post-estimation grasp by asking participants to hand the object back to the 
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experimenter after making their size estimate. Finally, we made a number of further 
changes (such as removing the priming and HV tasks, blocking rather than randomising 
trials with each hand, and having the non-action-relevant hand make responses) to further 
reduce the differences between our previous experiments and those of Linkenauger, Witt 
and Proffitt (2011). 
In Experiment 5 we manipulated perceived graspability using the same, direct 
manipulation of hand taping that we used in Experiment 4, as well as using the pre-
existing effect of right-hand dominance used in Experiments 2-4. We minimised 
conflation effects using a cover story and tested whether our previous results were due to 
participants in Experiments 2-4 not thinking about grasping when they estimated object 
size. If the results of Experiment 5 show an effect of perceived grasping capacity on 
estimated object size, this would replicate the findings of Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt 
(2011) and suggest that the lack of an immediate intention to act may be the critical 
difference between their studies and Experiments 2-4 here. However, if the results 
showed no such effect, it would suggest that having an intention to grasp is not sufficient 
to scale perceived object size. This, in turn, would suggest that Linkenauger, Witt and 
Proffitt (2011) results may have arisen because their participant's attention was drawn to 
the possible association between grasping capacity and object size, and not due to 
cognitive penetrability resulting in perceptual scaling in the strongest sense (Firestone & 
Scholl, 2015).  
2.7.1 Method 
2.7.1.1 Participants 
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 Thirty-two (24 females, mean age = 19.3 years, mean Edinburgh Handedness 
Inventory score = 91, range = 62.5-100) right handed participants were recruited for this 
study. Participants either volunteered or were rewarded with course credit for their time.  
2.7.1.2 The instructions 
 In Experiment 5, we ensured that participants were thinking about grasping by 
informing them at the beginning of the experiment that we were interested in both how 
they grasped the blocks and how well they could visually match the size of the blocks. 
They were told that they would do two separate studies during the same session, due to 
time constraints in data collection. We also told them that they would have to hand the 
blocks back to the experimenter after making their size estimates. The full instructions 
are given in Appendix F. 
2.7.1.3 Apparatus, stimuli and procedure 
 The apparatus, stimuli and procedure were identical to Experiment 4 apart from 
the following changes. We used a laptop (monitor = 27 × 35 cm) which was placed at 90o 
to the participant. The laptop was placed on the opposite side to the grasping hand used 
for that block and, to be consistent with Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011), 
participants responded with the non-grasping hand. For example, if they grasped the block 
with their left hand, the laptop was placed on their right hand side and they responded 
with their right hand. Responses were made using the up and down arrow keys on the 
laptop keyboard (to move the lines further apart and closer together respectively). Trials 
were blocked by hand. There was no HV task and, instead, participants completed three 
subblocks of the VV task. In one subblock, they grasped the blocks with their untaped 
left hand and estimated size with their untaped right hand, and in a second subblock the 
assignment of task to hands was reversed. In the third subblock, participants had the 
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fingers of one hand taped as in Experiment 4 and they grasped blocks with their taped 
hand and responded with their untaped hand. Half of the participants completed the first 
two subblocks in each order and, of these, half had their left hand taped (LHTaped Group) 
and half had their right hand taped (RHTaped group) in the final subblock.  
The box was removed so participants saw the blocks before they grasped them. 
The experimenter checked whether participants performed the specified grasp on each 
trial, see Appendix G. If participants did not initially attempt the specified grasp, they 
were reminded to do so by the experimenter. If the object was too big to be successfully 
grasped in this way, the experimenter recorded how the participant then chose to pick up 
the object (e.g., by the corner). Participants completed 63 VV trials (21 stimuli x 3 
subblocks) and the whole procedure lasted around 30 minutes.  
2.7.2 Results 
One participant correctly guessed the aims and purpose of the experiment during 
the post-experimental questions (after question 3) but their data was still included in the 
analysis. As has been done in previous work investigating participants’ beliefs (e.g. 
Durgin et al., 2012) we provide responses to the post-experimental questions in Appendix 
K. In this section, we first discuss the results for the VV task which measured perceived 
object size, followed by the results for perceived and actual grasping capacity. 
Perceived object size 
Ratios were calculated for each block, as in Experiments 2-4. For consistency with 
Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011), here we report only the results for stimuli that 
participants perceived they could grasp (results for the full dataset are reported in 
Appendix H, and results based on whether participants could actually grasp the stimuli 
are reported in Appendix I). 
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A mixed ANOVA with grasping hand (left/right/taped) as a within-participants 
factor and tape group (LHTaped/RHTaped) as a between-participants factor was 
conducted. This revealed that neither grasping hand, F(2, 60) = 0.48, p = .6, ηp2 = .02, nor 
tape group, F(1, 30) = 0.95, p = .4, ηp2 = .03, influenced estimated object size, and there 
was no grasping hand × tape group interaction, F(2, 60) = 0.16, p = .9, ηp2 = .01, see 
Figure 7. As in Experiments 2-4, we ran a Bayesian analysis to test the strength of 
evidence for the null effects revealed by the ANOVA, see Table 4. 
 
Figure 7: Results of the object size estimation task in Experiment 5: Size estimates of 
objects grasped in the left, right and taped hands for the LHtaped and RHTaped groups. 
One-sample t-tests showed that for the LHTaped group, estimates for the left, right and 
taped hands were all significantly lower than 1 (t(15) = -3.85, p = .002, t(15) = -3.77, p = 
.002, and t(15) = -4.47, p < .001, respectively). For the RHTaped group, estimates for the 
left and taped hands were significantly lower than 1 (t(15) = -2.32, p = .035, and t(15) = 
-2.74, p = .015, respectively) and estimates for the right hand were marginally lower than 
1 (t(15) = -2.13, p = .05). Error bars show +/- one standard error of the mean. 
 
Table 4  
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Posterior probabilities for the null [pBIC(H0|D)] and alternative [(pBIC(H1|D)] hypothesis 
for the main effects and interactions in Experiment 5. 
Effect pBIC(H0|D) pBIC(H1|D)  ηp2 
Grasping hand .961*** .039 .02 
Tape group .775** .225 .03 
Grasping hand × tape group .967*** .033 .01 
**positive evidence, *** strong evidence 
 
Actual and perceived grasping capacity 
We analysed participant’s perceived and actual maximum grasp for their left and 
right hands in separate3 mixed ANOVAs where hand (left/right/taped) was a within-
participants factor and tape group (LHTaped/RHTaped) was a between-subjects factor. 
For perceived grasp, the right hand (17.0 cm) was perceived as having a greater grasping 
capacity than both the left hand (16.4 cm) and the taped hand (15.8 cm), F(2, 60) = 20.50, 
p < .001, ηp2 = .41, see Figure 8. There was no effect of tape group, F(1, 30) = 0.60, p = 
.5, ηp2 = .02, nor a hand × tape group interaction, F(2, 60) = 2.39, p = .1, ηp2 = .07. For 
actual grasp, the right (16.0 cm) and left (16.0 cm) hands did not differ, but the taped 
hand was significantly less (14.5 cm), F(2, 60) = 73.47, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.71. There was 
no effect of tape group, F(1, 30) = 0.24, p = .6, ηp2 = .01, but there was a hand × tape 
group interaction, F(2, 60) = 4.306, p = .018, ηp2 = .13. For both groups, taping reduced 
actual maximum grasp relative to both hands, with this reduction being somewhat larger 
for the LHTaped group (mean 1.8 cm) than the RHTaped group (mean 1.1 cm).   
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Figure 8: Results of the maximum grasping capacity tasks in Experiment 5: Estimates of 
maximum grasp for the left and right hands for the LHTaped and RHTaped groups. 
Perceived grasp is the largest block participants believed they could grasp. Actual grasp 
is the largest block that could, in fact, be grasped. Error bars represent +/- one standard 
error of the mean. 
 
2.7.3 Discussion 
In Experiment 5, we eliminated a number of methodological differences between 
Experiments 2-4 reported here and the experiments reported by Linkenauger, Witt and 
Proffitt (2011) in order to test whether these differences could explain why Linkenauger, 
Witt and Proffitt (2011) found an effect of grasping capacity on perceived object size but 
we did not. Most importantly, we changed our instructions so participants were explicitly 
told that we were interested in whether they could grasp each object using their thumb 
and finger. In addition, we changed the trial procedure so that participants always 
intended to act on the object when they were estimating its size, by having them pick up 
the object to give it back to the experimenter after making their size estimate. 
Nevertheless, we replicated our findings from Experiment 4. Specifically, although 
participants believed they could grasp larger objects with their right compared to their left 
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hand, and with their untaped rather than their taped hand (see Figure 8), neither of these 
effects on perceived action capacity modulated their estimates of object size (see Figure 
7).  
Participants in Experiment 5 both intended to act, and did indeed act, on a given 
object both before and after estimating the size of that object, and they were explicitly 
and repeatedly told that we were assessing both their grasping capacity and their estimates 
of object size. However, we provided a cover story to persuade participants that there was 
no relation between our interest in their grasping capacity and in their object size 
estimates (only one participant guessed the true purpose of the study). Instead 
Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt’s (2011) results may have reflected a conflation of 
estimates of perceived grasping capacity and of object size which arose from asking 
participants about both action capacity and object size on each trial without providing any 
explanation of why both measures were being taken (Collier & Lawson, 2017b). 
 
2.8 General Discussion 
 The action-specific account of perception suggests that an observer’s action 
capacity scales how they perceive the spatial properties of the environment (Bhalla & 
Proffitt, 1999; Fajen, 2005; Linkenauger et al., 2009; Linkenauger, Witt & Proffitt, 2011; 
Linkenauger, Mohler & Proffitt, 2011; Proffitt et al., 1995; 2003; Proffitt, 2006a; 2006b; 
2013; Proffitt & Linkenauger, 2013; Witt et al., 2004; 2005; Witt, 2011a; Witt & Riley, 
2014). However, other evidence suggests that estimates of spatial attributes, such as 
distance, may only scale according to action capacity when observers are encouraged to 
consider non-visual factors (Woods et al., 2009; Firestone, 2013).  
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In five experiments, we tested whether the perceived size of graspable objects is 
scaled according to people's ability to pick up those objects. We began by testing the 
claim that right handed individuals overestimate the grasping capacity of their right hand 
relative to their left hand and, because of this, they underestimate the size of objects to-
be-grasped in their right hand (Linkenauger et al., 2009; Linkenauger, Witt & Proffitt, 
2011). We replicated the finding that right handers perceive their right hand as both larger 
(Experiment 1) and as having a greater grasping capacity (Experiments 3 and 5) than their 
left hand. In addition, when the fingers of one hand were taped together, participants 
appropriately reduced their estimates of the maximum grasp of that hand (Experiments 4 
and 5). However, none of our three manipulations of perceived grasping capacity – right 
hand dominance (Experiments 2, 3 and 5), priming (Experiments 2 and 3) and restricting 
the grasp of the hand by taping (Experiments 4 and 5) – reliably modulated estimates of 
object size, whether objects were presented visually (for the VV tasks) or haptically (for 
the HV tasks). Thus, we did not replicate the results of Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt 
(2011) since we failed to find the predicted influence of perceived action capacity on 
spatial perception.  
The exact relationship between spatial properties and perceived action capacity is 
not yet fully understood (Cañal-Bruland & van der Kamp, 2015). Nevertheless, our 
results are consistent with previous work demonstrating that estimates of spatial features 
are not always predicted by perceived action capacity (e.g. de Grave et al., 2011; Woods 
et al., 2009). For example, Cañal-Bruland, Aertssen, Ham and Stins (2015) failed to 
replicate the reported finding that decreasing postural stability makes walkable beams 
appear narrower (Geuss, Stefanucci, de Benedictis-Kessner & Stevens, 2010). Other 
studies have shown that providing a cover story for otherwise unexplained task 
manipulations can offset action-specific scaling effects (e.g. Durgin et al., 2009; Firestone 
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& Scholl, 2014; we used a similar manipulation in Experiment 5 here). For example, 
Firestone and Scholl (2014) showed that apertures are not estimated as narrower while 
holding a rod that is wider than the body (as reported by Stefanucci & Geuss, 2009) if 
participants are given a convincing cover story for why they are holding the rod.  
We suggest that our results differ from those reported by Linkenauger, Witt and 
Proffitt (2011) because on every trial in their experiment, participants were explicitly 
encouraged to consider their ability to grasp an object immediately before they estimated 
the size of that object. In contrast, participants in Experiments 2-4 here always estimated 
object size first, and in a context where attention was not drawn to action capacity, whilst 
in Experiment 5 participants were given a cover story to explain why we were assessing 
both their ability to grasp an object and their estimate of its size. Note that despite being 
told that the grasping and the size estimation tasks were separate and independent, the 
predictions of the action-specific account still hold in Experiment 5. First, participants 
still performed the relevant grasping action, second, they were explicitly and repeatedly 
told that we were interested in their grasping behaviour so their attention was drawn to 
grasping, and third, they knew that they would have to act on each object immediately 
after estimating its size so they intended to act on it when they made their estimate. 
In Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011), participants were asked on each trial if 
they could grasp a given block so they imagined grasping the presented blocks, as 
opposed to actually grasping them as was done in the present studies. We did not directly 
test for a difference between actual and imagined grasping, and it is possible - though, we 
feel, unlikely - that this is a critical methodological difference. It is important to 
emphasise that, on every trial in Experiments 2-5 here, our participants always actually 
grasped the object by either feeling objects behind a curtain in the HV (haptic-to-vision) 
tasks or picking up and moved them in the VV (vision-to-vision) tasks. Therefore, what 
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was removed from our tasks was only drawing participant’s attention to action for no 
apparent reason. We did not remove the action itself. We did not replicate Linkenauger, 
Witt and Proffitt (2011) by testing imagined action without actual action because we do 
not believe that this situation occurs often in everyday life. If the action-specific account 
applies only when we consciously think about action, then its relevance for everyday life 
is severely limited. Furthermore, action-specific scaling effects have been found in 
previous work when participants actually acted rather than imagined doing so (e.g. Witt 
& Dorsch, 2009; Witt et al., 2005).  
It is not entirely clear why effects consistent with the action-specific account were 
found in these previous experiments but not in our current work. One possibility is that 
spatial estimates in previous studies reflected participants' attribution of their poor 
performance (in the case of Witt & Dorsch, 2009) or difficulty of the task (in the case of 
Witt et al., 2005) to the nature of the external stimulus, rather than to their own action 
capacity. This has been demonstrated experimentally. For example, although Wesp, 
Cichello, Gracia and Davis (2004) reported that more successful dart throwers estimated 
targets as bigger than less successful throwers, in a later study Wesp and Gasper (2012) 
found that when participants were told that the darts were of poor quality, the association 
between success and estimated target size disappeared. In the original experiment, less 
successful throwers may have assumed the targets were smaller than they appeared and, 
because of this, they were harder to hit (Cole & Balcetis, 2011; Wesp & Gasper, 2012). 
In contrast, in the follow-up study participants could attribute their lack of success to the 
poor-quality darts, so there was no need for them to assume the targets were smaller than 
they appeared, and so their estimates did not change.  
This account is subtly - but importantly - different from the explanation that the 
action specific account would provide, namely that the targets actually looked smaller to 
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poorer dart throwers. This alternative account instead proposes that poorer throwers may 
have estimated the targets as smaller in order to reduce the cognitive dissonance between 
their expectation about how good they would be at the task and the reality of their poor 
performance. This explanation would not apply in our studies because our participants 
could explore and estimate the size of all the stimuli. Even the largest blocks could be felt 
by moving the hand from one side to the other so participants could always estimate block 
size, regardless of graspability. Our results therefore suggest that performing a task-
relevant action is not sufficient for action-specific scaling effects to occur. 
The present studies are not without limitations. For example, we did not include 
a condition including conflation of estimates of perceived action capacity and spatial 
properties in order to test if this allowed us to replicate the original Linkenauger, Witt and 
Proffitt (2011) finding that perceived grasping capacity influences perceived object size. 
We also did not directly test whether only imagining acting would give rise to the 
expected action-specific effect where actually grasping did not. We therefore do not have 
direct evidence to support our proposal that drawing attention to the relationship between 
grasping capacity and spatial perception (by asking about both on every trial) caused the 
results of Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011). A future study comparing their 
methodology with the methods used here, which were intended to dissociate action 
capacity and spatial perception, would be fruitful.  
The results of the present experiments indicate that changes in action capacity do 
not affect perceived spatial properties in the strongest sense. We have suggested that there 
are at least two alternative explanations for previous reports of action-specific scaling 
effects. First, participants’ spatial estimates may have changed because of a discrepancy 
between their expectations about how well they would perform a task and their actual 
performance. Second, spatial judgements may have been conflated with perceived action 
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capacity. In conclusion, though the relationship between perceived action capacity and 
spatial perception is not yet fully understood, we have demonstrated that estimates of both 
can be dissociated. We found no evidence that perception is cognitively penetrable. 
Instead, our results suggest that action capacity and spatial properties can be perceived 
independently. 
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2.9 Appendices: Chapter 2 
 
Appendix A: Results of the perceived object size tasks in Chapter 2, Experiment 2 
for all blocks (full dataset) 
 Ratios were calculated for the visually estimated size of each block by dividing 
the estimated size by the actual size. These were averaged over all 21 block sizes. For the 
LHFeelsSmallerObjects group, one-sample t-tests showed that ratios for the HV-left 
(0.76), HV-right (0.77), VV-left (0.87) and VV-right (0.86) conditions were all 
significantly lower than 1, t(14) = -8.99, t(14) = -7.12, t(14) = -4.39, and t(14) = -4.31 
respectively, all p < .001. Similarly, for the RHFeelsSmallerObjects group, ratios for the 
HV-left (0.81), HV-right (0.82), VV-left (0.92) and VV-right (0.90) conditions were all 
significantly lower than 1, t(14) = -7.32, t(14) = -7.57, t(14) = -4.32, and t(14) = -4.87 
respectively, all p<.001. 
 A mixed ANOVA with grasping hand (left/right) and task (HV/VV) as within-
participants factors and prime group (LHFeelsSmallerObjects/RHFeelsSmallerObjects) 
as a between-participants factor was conducted (p-values for all pairwise comparisons 
were Bonferroni corrected). This revealed that ratios for the HV task (0.79) were 
significantly lower than ratios for the VV task (0.89), F(1, 28) = 40.70, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.59. We found no difference between ratios for the left hand (0.84) and right hand (0.84), 
F(1, 28) = 0.07, p = .8, ηp2 = .002, and no effect of prime group, F(1, 28) = 2.07, p = .2, 
ηp2 = .07, of task × prime group, F(1, 28) = 0.01, p = .9, ηp2 < .001., of grasping hand × 
prime group, F(1, 28) = 0.81, p = .4, ηp2 = .03, or of grasping hand × task × prime group, 
F(1, 28) = 0.01, p = .9, ηp2 < .001. However, there was a significant task x grasping hand 
interaction, F(1, 28) = 4.81, p = .037, ηp2 = .18. Pairwise comparisons showed that ratios 
were marginally smaller for the right hand than the left hand in the VV task (mean 
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difference = -0.011, p = .06), but there was no difference between the right and left hands 
in the HV task (mean difference = -0.009, p = .2). 
 
Appendix B: Results of the perceived object size task in Chapter 2, Experiment 3 
for all blocks (full dataset) 
Ratios were calculated for the visually estimated size of each block by dividing 
the estimated size by the actual size. These were averaged over all 21 block sizes. Ratios 
for both the left hand (0.86) and right hand (0.84) were significantly lower than 1 in the 
LHFeelsSmallerObjects group, t(14) = -4.75, and t(14) = -5.40 respectively, both p < 
.001. Ratios for both the left hand (0.88) and the right hand (0.87) were significantly lower 
than 1 in the RHFeelsSmallerObjects group, t(14) = -6.24, and t(14) = -5.93 respectively, 
both p < .001.  
We conducted a mixed ANOVA, with grasping hand (left/right) as a within-
participants factor and prime group (LHFeelsSmallerObjects/RHFeelsSmallerObjects) as 
a within-participants factor. We found no significant effect of hand, F(1, 28) = 2.17, p = 
.2, ηp2 = .07, prime group, F(1, 28) = 0.32, p = .5, ηp2 = .01, or a hand × prime group 
interaction, F(1, 28) = 1.53, p = .2, ηp2 = .05.  
 
Appendix C: Results of the perceived object size tasks in Chapter 2, Experiment 3 
for only the blocks that were actually graspable, based on participants’ actual 
maximum grasp 
Ratios were calculated for the visually estimated size of each block by dividing 
the estimated size by the actual size. For stimuli that were actually graspable in 
Experiment 3, ratios for the left hand (0.85) and the right hand (0.84) were significantly 
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lower than 1 in the LHFeelsSmallerObjects group (t(14) = -4.76, and t(14) = -5.49 
respectively, both p < .001). Ratios for the left hand (0.87) and the right hand (0.87) were 
also significantly lower than 1 in the RHFeelsSmallerObjects group (t(14) = -5.57, and 
t(14) = -6.29, respectively, both p < .001).  
We conducted a mixed ANOVA, where grasping hand (left/right) was a within-
participants factor and prime group (LHFeelsSmallerObjects/RHFeelsSmallerObjects) 
was a between-participants factor. There was no significant effects of grasping hand, F(1, 
28) = 3.24, p = .08, ηp2 = .10, prime group, F(1, 28) = 0.52, p =.5, ηp2 = .02, or grasping 
hand × prime group, F(1, 28) = 0.64, p = .4, ηp2 = .02.  
 
Appendix D: Results of the perceived object size tasks in Chapter 2, Experiment 4 
for all blocks (full dataset) 
 Ratios were calculated for the visually estimated size of each block by dividing 
the estimated size by the actual size. These were averaged over all 21 block sizes. For the 
LHTaped group, one-sample t-tests showed that ratios for the HV-left (0.85), HV-right 
(0.85), VV-left (0.93) and VV-right (0.94) conditions were all significantly lower than 1 
(t(14) = -4.65, t(14) = -4.83, t(14) = -2.15, and t(14) = -1.59 respectively, all p < .001). 
Similarly, for the RHTaped group, ratios for the HV-left (0.84), HV-right (0.83), VV-left 
(0.90) and VV-right (0.89) conditions were all significantly lower than 1 (t(14) = -3.19, 
p = 0.007, t(14) = -4.75, t(14) = -4.29, and t(14) = -4.03 respectively, all p < .001). 
 A mixed ANOVA with grasping hand (left/right) and task (HV/VV) as within-
participants factors and tape group (LHTaped/RHTaped) as a between-participants factor 
was conducted. This revealed that ratios for the HV task (0.84) were significantly lower 
than ratios for the VV task (0.92), F(1, 28) = 10.37, p = .003, ηp2 = .27. There was no 
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significant difference between ratios for the left (0.88) and right (0.88) grasping hands, 
F(1, 28) = 0.09, p = .8, ηp2 = .003, and no effect of prime group, F(1, 28) = 0.67, p = .4, 
ηp2 = .02, task × prime group, F(1, 28) = 0.24,  p= .6, ηp2 =.01, grasping hand × tape 
group, F(1, 28) = 0.39, p = .6, ηp2 = .01, grasping hand × modality, F(1, 28) = 0.16, p = 
.7, ηp2 =.01 or grasping hand × task × tape group, F(1, 28) = 0.04, p = .8, ηp2 = .002. 
 
Appendix E: Results of the perceived object size tasks in Chapter 2, Experiment 4 
for only the blocks that were actually graspable, based on participants’ actual 
maximum grasp 
Ratios were calculated for the visually estimated size of each actually graspable 
block by dividing the estimated size by the actual size. For the LHTaped group, one-
sample t-tests showed that ratios for the HV-left (0.88) and HV-right (0.86) were 
significantly lower than 1 (t(14) = -2.56 and t(14) = -3.43 respectively, both p < .001). 
However ratios for the VV-left (1.02) and VV-right (1.03) conditions were not 
significantly different from 1 (t(14) = -0.39, p = .7 and t(14) = 0.43, p = .7 respectively). 
For the RHTaped group, ratios for the HV-left (0.81), HV-right (0.83), VV-left (0.89) and 
VV-right (0.89) conditions were all significantly lower than 1 (t(14) = -4.15, p = .001, 
t(14) = -4.00, p =.001, t(14) = -3.85, p = .002, and t(14) = -3.50, p = .004, respectively). 
Marks (1978) suggested that smaller objects may appear smaller when grasped between 
two fingers than when seen, but this difference diminishes as object size increases.  
A mixed ANOVA with grasping hand (left/right) and task (HV/VV) as within-
participants factors and tape group (LHTaped/RHandTaped) as a between-participants 
factor was conducted. Ratios for the HV task (0.85) were significantly lower than for the 
VV task (0.96), F(1, 28) = 16.62, p <. 001, ηp2 = .37. There was no significant effects of 
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grasping hand, F(1, 28) = 0.03, p = .9, ηp2 = 0.001, tape group, F(1, 28) = 2.43, p = .1, ηp2 
= .08, task × tape group, F(1, 28) = 2.42, p = .1, ηp2 = .001, taped hand × tape group, F(1, 
28) = 0.42, p = .5, ηp2 = .02, grasping hand × task, F(1, 28) = 0.02, p = .9, ηp2 = .01, or 
grasping hand × task × tape group, F(1, 28) = 0.86, p = .4, ηp2 = .001. 
 
Appendix F: Full instructions given to participants in Chapter 2, Experiment 54 
“Hi, so I'm coming to the end of my PhD which is all about how people use their 
body to perform actions and how they estimate the size of objects. Anyway, I'm 
getting pretty stressed because I'm running out of time to get my last bits of data 
so this experiment is really two separate studies rolled into one - I'm just telling 
you this now, because otherwise it might seem a bit strange that you’ll be doing 
two different tasks that don't really go together.  
The first thing I'm looking at is a control study for something I've already tested, 
where I'm checking how people grasp simple blocks with their right compared to 
their left hand. The second thing I'm after is your ability to match the size of 
objects to lines on a computer screen. I should really be testing the hand grasping 
task and the size matching task separately but it's hard finding participants after 
Easter and, like I said, I need to get this data collected really soon. 
OK, so here's what I want you to do. I want you to use your right [left] hand to 
grasp and pick up a block that I’ll put down here in front of you and then move it 
to here, to this marker. You should pick it up using your thumb on one side and 
any other finger on the other side, like this. If it is too big to grasp like this then 
you can pick it up in any way you wish, but you must try to grasp it with your 
thumb and finger first before you try anything else - is that clear? Once you’ve 
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grasped the block, I want you to move it to this marker here. I will be recording 
how you choose to grasp the blocks that you are unable to pick up in this way so 
sometimes you might have to wait a few seconds whilst I write something down. 
So that's the first part with the grasping done.  
Then, for the second task, you'll do the size matching. So for this one you will use 
the up and down arrow keys to move apart these two lines on the screen so that 
the distance between the inner sides of the black lines matches the width of the 
block – so that if you held the block up against the monitor you'd see the inner 
edges of the two black lines right up against the right and left edges of the block - 
is that clear? It’s important that you keep your body midline aligned with the 
block, so please don’t twist your body when you start the size matching task. In 
fact, if it’s comfortable, you can just keep your other hand on the correct keys all 
the time. Once you are happy you've got the lines in the right place, press Enter 
on the keyboard. Please try to be as accurate as you can. Then just give me the 
block back and I'll set up the next trial. You should close your eyes while I put 
down another block. This is because we are interested in how you grasp the 
blocks, and if you see how I pick them up to place them on each trial, this might 
influence how you then choose to grasp them. So I’ll tell you when to open your 
eyes and then you’ll start all over again – is that clear?  
After they completed the first block for either their left or right hand, they received further 
instructions before starting the second block for their other hand: 
“Right, that’s the first block finished. Remember that I said that one of the things 
I was looking at here was how you grasped simple blocks with your right 
compared to your left hand? Well we've finished with the trials where you pick 
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up blocks with your right [left] hand so now I'm going to swap things around and 
you're going to do the same thing again except that you'll be picking up blocks 
with your left [right] hand. You'll also keep going with the other study, the size 
matching study, so this second part will be very similar to the first – on each trial 
you'll pick up the block with your left [right] hand then you'll do the size matching 
study then hand me the block back. Is that all clear?  
Finally, after they had completed both left and right hand blocks, the fingers of one of 
their hands was taped in the same way as in Experiment 4, and they received further 
instructions: 
“Right, well done, that’s the second block finished. Now remember that I said 
that one of the things I was looking at here was how you grasped simple blocks 
with your right compared to your left hand? Well now I'm going to tape up your 
right [left] hand to see how this affects your grasping behaviour. You're then 
going to do just what you've been doing so far except you will use your taped 
right [left] hand to pick up the blocks. You'll also keep going with the other 
study, the size matching study, so again this third part will be very similar to the 
first two parts – you'll pick up the block with your taped hand then you'll do the 
size matching study then hand me the block back. Is that all clear?” 
 
Appendix G: Used of specified grasp in Chapter 2, Experiment 5 
We recorded whether participants performed the specific grasp required (thumb 
on one side and any other finger on the opposing side) without having to be reminded by 
the experimenter, see Table 5. If a participant did not spontaneously use the specified 
grasp the experimenter stopped them and told them to do this so the specified grasp was 
83 
 
attempted on 100% of trials. For consistency with the main results section, here we only 
show the results for graspable blocks.  
Table 5  
Mean (and standard deviation) of the percentage of trials performed using the specified 
grasp without first having to be reminded by the experimenter, for perceived and for 
actually graspable blocks.  
 Before size estimation 
task (first grasp) 
After size estimation task 
(second grasp) 
Hand Perceived 
graspable 
Actually 
graspable 
Perceived 
graspable 
Actually 
graspable 
Left 90% (6.6%) 93% (3.7%) 87% (7.9%) 91% (5.8%) 
Right 88% (6.8%) 92% (4.4%) 86% (7.7%) 91% (4.9%) 
Taped 86% (6.1%) 92% (3.5%) 83% (8.2%) 90% (5.5%) 
 
 
Appendix H: Results of the perceived object size tasks in Chapter 2, Experiment 5 
for all blocks (full dataset) 
Ratios were calculated for the visually estimated size of each block by dividing 
the estimated size by the actual size. These were averaged over all 21 block sizes. For the 
LHTaped group, one-sample t-tests showed that ratios for the left (0.83), right (0.84) and 
taped (0.82) hands were all significantly lower than 1, t(15) = -4.38, p = .001, t(15) = -
4.20, p = .001, and t(15) = -5.08, p < .001, respectively. Similarly, for the RHTaped group, 
ratios for the left (0.88), right (0.87) and taped (0.85) hands were all significantly lower 
than 1, t(15) = -4.80, t(15) = -4.72, and t(15) = -4.78, all p < .001, respectively.  
A mixed ANOVA with grasping hand (left/right/taped) as a within-participants 
factor and tape group (LHTaped/RHTaped) as a between-participants factor was 
conducted, There were no significant effects: grasping hand, F(2, 60) = 1.42, p = .2, ηp2 
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= .05; tape group, F(1, 30) = 0.73, p = .4, ηp2 = .02; interaction of grasping hand × tape 
group, F(2, 60) = 0.08, p = .9, ηp2 = .003. 
 
Appendix I: Results of the perceived object size tasks Chapter 2, Experiment 5 for 
only the blocks that were actually graspable, based on participants’ actual 
maximum grasp 
Ratios were calculated for the visually estimated size of each actually graspable 
block by dividing the estimated size by the actual size. For the LHTaped group, one-
sample t-tests showed that ratios for the left (0.85), right (0.85) and taped (0.84) hands 
were all significantly lower than 1, t(15) = -3.82, p = 0.002, t(15) = -3.80, p = 0.002, and 
t(15) = -4.45, p < .001, respectively. Similarly, for the RHTaped group, ratios for the left 
(0.90), right (0.91) and taped (0.88) hands were all significantly lower than 1, t(15) = -
2.30, p = .036, t(15) = -2.15, p = .048 and t(15) = -2.29, p = .037, respectively.  
A mixed ANOVA with grasping hand (left/right/taped) as a within-participants 
factor and tape group (LHTaped/RHTaped) as a between-participants factor was 
conducted. There were no significant effects: grasping hand, F(2, 60) = 0.24, p = .8, ηp2 
= .008; tape group, F(1, 30) = 0.95, p = .3, ηp2 = .03; interaction of grasping hand × tape 
group, F(2, 60) = 0.06, p = .9, ηp2 = .002. 
 
Appendix J: Post-experimental questionnaires for Chapter 2, Experiments 2, 3 and 
4. 
Prior to giving a formal debrief, in Experiments 2-4 all participants were asked the 
following three questions: 
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1. What did you think the experiment was testing? 
2. Did you notice anything particular about the first phase of the experiment, where 
I gave you practice with the stimuli? (In Experiment 4, we changed this question 
to “What did you think the purpose of the taping was?”) 
3. Do you have any ideas about why the instructions for the visual matching task 
were so specific? 
They were then asked whether they had any further comments to make about the 
experiment. These three questions were scored out of 5 by the first author, where a 
score of 0 reflected very little to no insight into the aims of the experiment, and 5 
reflected complete awareness. If the participant made any spontaneous comments about 
the experiment, these were also recorded.  
For Experiment 2, the mean score (out of 5) for Q1 was 0.5 (range = 0-4). The 
most commonly suggested experimental aims were that we were comparing size 
perception in vision and touch, and that there might be differences between the left and 
right hands as a result of laterality and hemispheric differences in the brain. One 
participant noted that they were aware that they felt that their right hand was larger than 
their left hand, but they did not spontaneously suggest that this may have influenced their 
perception of the size of objects. The mean score for Q2 was 0.1 (range = 0-1). Only three 
participants commented on the practice (priming) phase. They suggested that it seemed 
unnecessary or lengthy. The mean score for Q3 was 0 and none of our participants 
commented on why the instructions in the vision-to-vision (VV) task were very specific. 
For Experiment 3, the mean score (out of 5) for Q1 was 0.3 (range = 0-2). The 
most commonly suggested experimental aims were again the comparison between size 
perception in vision and touch, and that estimates for the left and right hands might be 
different because of hemispheric differences in the brain. The mean score for Q2 was 0.1 
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(range = 0-4). One participant noticed that larger objects were always being presented to 
their right hand during the practice (priming) phase but they did not suggest that this 
might have influenced their perceived grasping capacity. The mean score for Q3 was 0.03 
(range = 0-1). One participant suggested that the instructions in the vision-to-vision (VV) 
task were specific because of the shape of the visual field and another suggested that the 
blocks might look different depending on the side of the mouse it was placed but they did 
not specify why. No participants correctly identified that we were trying to ensure that 
the same hand they had acted with remain visible for the whole trial. 
For Experiment 4, the mean score (out of 5) for Q1 was 0.4 (range = 0-3). The most 
commonly suggested experimental aims were comparing size estimation in vision and 
touch, the influence of handedness and effects of laterality in the brain. The mean score 
for Q2 was 0.3 (range = 0-4). Three participants suggested that the taping might influence 
their perception of object size, however they did not spontaneously predict the direction 
of the effect. After prompting from the experimenter one of these participants predicted 
that taping might lead to objects appearing bigger, another one proposed the opposite and 
the third did not suggest a direction even after prompting. The mean score for Q3 was 0 
and no participants offered a reason for why the instructions in the VV task were very 
specific. 
 
Appendix K: Post-experimental questionnaires for Chapter 2, Experiment 5. 
Prior to giving a formal debrief, in Experiment 5 all participants were asked the 
following five questions: 
In Experiment 5, participants were asked the following five questions: 
1. What did you think the experiment was testing? 
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2. Did you notice anything particular about the instructions? 
3. Why do you think I asked you to do two separate tasks at the same time? 
4. Did you think that the two tasks were related? 
5. Why do you think I taped your fingers together in the last part of the 
experiment? 
The mean score (out of 5) for Q1 was 0.6 (range = 0-4). Participants rarely suggested an 
answer to this question, but one person suggested that the right hand would probably be 
better at grasping objects and so might be more accurate in the size estimation task. The 
mean score for Q2 was 0. Some participants commented that the specified grasp was 
strange, and that it was odd that they had to close their eyes. The mean score for Q3 was 
0.4 (range = 0-5). One participant suggested that estimates might be lower for the right 
hand than the left hand because right handers are more confident with their right hand 
(scored 5), but most participants did not provide an answer or suggested that one of the 
two tasks was a distractor task. The mean score for Q4 was 1 (range = 0-5). The most 
common response was that the tasks were likely related but participants generally 
struggled to explain how. Some suggested they were related simply because the same 
stimuli were used in both tasks. One participant (scored 5) suggested that objects would 
be estimated as smaller in the right hand because right handers are more confident with 
their right hand. The mean score for Q5 was 1.2 (range = 0-5). Participants frequently 
suggested that the tape was to make the grasping task harder, and some commented that 
this might affect their performance in the size estimation task. Specifically, they tended 
to suggest that graspable blocks might be estimated more accurately than ungraspable 
blocks, and so they may be less accurate when their hand was taped. However, they rarely 
elaborated on what they meant by ‘accurate’ or mentioned size. One participant said that 
they noticed they had a reduced maximum grasp with their hand taped but they didn’t 
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think this would affect their size estimates. Overall, only six participants thought we were 
interested in differences between the left and right hands, and four of these referred only 
to grasping capacity and not to estimates of object size. 
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2.10 Footnotes: Chapter 2
1 When included in the same ANOVA, where hand (hand/right) and estimate type 
(perceived/actual) were within-participants factors and prime group 
(LHFeelsSmallerObjects/RHFeelsSmallerObjects) was a between-participants factor, 
there was a marginally significant grasping hand × estimate type interaction, F(1, 28) = 
3.88, p = .059, ηp2 = .12. 
2 When included in the same ANOVA, where grasping hand (left/right) and estimate type 
(perceived/actual) were within-participants factors and tape group (LHTaped/RHTaped) 
was a between-participants factor, there was a significant grasping hand × estimate type 
× tape group interaction, F(1, 28) = 45.80, p < .001, ηp2 = .62. The nature of the grasping 
hand x tape group interaction was the same for both estimates types, see Figure 6, but the 
differences were greater for perceived than for actual grasping capacity. 
3 When included in the same ANOVA, where grasping hand (left/right/taped) and 
estimate type (perceived/actual) were within-participants factors and tape group 
(LHTaped/RHTaped) was a between-participants factor, there was no three-way 
interaction F (2, 60) = 0.016, p = .9, ηp2 = .001 
4 All data was collected by the first author, ESC, so variation in the verbal instructions 
was minimal. However, there was some deviation from this script, for example in terms 
of the exact words used. This was in part intentional in order to ensure that participants’ 
suspicions were not raised by the experimenter reading from a script, but also deviation 
sometimes arose if participants asked questions or did not understand the original 
wording. Deviation also sometimes arose in terms of the order that parts of the cover story 
were told. However, all participants were given the same core information: that the 
experiment involved two separate studies being tested in the same session, the specific 
grasp to be used, that we were recording how they grasped the blocks if this grasp was 
not possible, how to complete the size matching task, to use the opposite hand on the 
keyboard than the hand they grasped the blocks with, to be as accurate as possible when 
estimating block size, that they should hand the block back to the experimenter at the end 
of each trial, and that they should close their eyes between trials. Particular emphasis was 
given to the second paragraph which described the two tasks. 
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Chapter Three 
 
3. Effects consistent with the action-specific account 
only occur under narrow conditions 
 
*This chapter has been published as: 
Collier, E. S., & Lawson, R. (2017). Does grasping capacity influence object size 
estimates? It depends on the context. Attention, Perception & Psychophysics. DOI: 
10.3758/s13414-017-1344-3 
 
3.1 Abstract 
Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011, Experiment 2) reported that right handers 
estimated objects as smaller if they intended to grasp them in their right rather than their 
left hand. Based on the action-specific account, they argued that this scaling effect 
occurred because participants believed their right hand could grasp larger objects. 
However, Collier and Lawson (2017) failed to replicate this effect. Here, we investigated 
whether this discrepancy in results arose from demand characteristics. We investigated 
two forms of demand characteristics: altering responses following conscious hypothesis 
guessing (Experiments 1 and 2), and subtle influences of the experimental context 
(Experiment 3). We found no scaling effects when participants were given instructions 
which implied the expected outcome of the experiment (Experiment 1), but they were 
obtained when we used unrealistically explicit instructions which gave the exact 
prediction made by the action-specific account (Experiment 2). Scaling effects were also 
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found using a context in which grasping capacity could seem relevant for size estimation 
(by asking participants about the perceived graspability of an object immediately before 
asking about its size on every trial, as was done in Linkenauger, Witt & Proffitt, 2011; 
Experiment 2). These results suggest that demand characteristics due to context effects 
could explain the scaling effects reported in Experiment 2 of Linkenauger, Witt and 
Proffitt (2011), rather than either hypothesis guessing, or, as proposed by the action-
specific account, a change in the perceived size of objects. 
3.2 Introduction 
The term ‘action capacity’ refers to our ability to successfully perform actions. It 
is restricted by the morphology and capabilities of our bodies (Adolph & Berger, 2006; 
Proffitt & Linkenauger, 2013). Given the tight coupling between perception and action 
(Clark, 1999; Gibson, 1979), it has been suggested that action capacity can directly 
influence visual perception (Proffitt & Linkenauger, 2013; Witt, 2011a, 2017). 
Specifically, the action-specific account of perception suggests that our perception of the 
spatial properties of the environment scales according to our action capacity (Proffitt, 
2006a, 2006b; Proffitt & Linkenauger, 2013). For example, reaching with a tool that 
increases maximum reach can influence the estimated distance to a target (Witt et al., 
2005). Witt et al. (2005) found that targets which were out of reach without the tool were 
estimated as closer after reaching to them with the tool.  
Action-specific scaling effects suggest that perception may be cognitively 
penetrable – so perception can be directly influenced by higher-level cognition. If action-
specific scaling effects truly reflect changes in what is perceived in this strong sense, then 
this has major implications for standard, modular theories of vision, which hold that 
perception is encapsulated and separate from cognition (Pylyshyn, 1999; for a recent 
review see Firestone & Scholl, 2015). However, a major debate concerning the action-
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specific account is whether the observed scaling effects reflect judgement rather than 
perception (Collier & Lawson, 2017a; Durgin et al., 2009; Durgin et al., 2012; Firestone 
& Scholl, 2014; Zelaznik & Forney, 2016; for reviews see Firestone, 2013; Firestone & 
Scholl, 2015; Philbeck & Witt, 2015; Proffitt, 2013; Witt, 2011a, 2017). Specifically, 
participants’ responses may not reflect differences in what they actually perceive; rather, 
their spatial estimates may be affected by non-perceptual influences such as their beliefs 
about the purpose of the experiment.  
This possibility has been demonstrated experimentally. In a famous study 
supporting the action-specific account, hills were reported as steeper when observers 
wore a heavy backpack (Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999). However, Durgin et al. (2009) found 
that if participants were told that the backpack they wore contained equipment for 
monitoring their ankle muscles, their estimates of hill slant did not differ from participants 
who did not wear the backpack. This finding suggests that participants who were not 
given a reason for wearing the backpack may have deduced that the backpack was 
supposed to influence their estimates of hill slant and adjusted their responses 
accordingly. Similarly, Firestone and Scholl (2014) tested whether the finding that 
apertures were estimated as narrower when participants held a horizontal rod that was 
wider than their body (Stefanucci & Geuss, 2009) reflected a true perceptual change or 
demand characteristics. Firestone and Scholl (2014) found that when participants were 
given a convincing reason for holding the rod, their estimates of aperture width did not 
differ from participants who did not hold the rod. These results suggest that if participants 
are not given an explanation for a salient manipulation, they may attempt to figure out the 
experimental hypothesis and that this, in turn, can influence their responses. 
Together, the results of Durgin et al. (2009), Firestone and Scholl (2014; see also 
Woods et al., 2009) suggest that demand characteristics could explain a number of action-
specific scaling effects. Demand characteristics broadly refer to factors in an experimental 
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setting which affect participants’ responses (Orne, 1962). We will term the form of 
demand characteristics investigated by these authors hypothesis guessing, where 
participants try to work out the expected results of the experiment and consciously adjust 
their responses accordingly.  
Such demand characteristics cannot, though, easily explain all action-specific 
effects (for some recent reviews see Philbeck & Witt, 2015; Witt, 2017). For example, 
Taylor-Covill and Eves (2016) found that overweight individuals estimated staircases as 
steeper than healthy-weight individuals. These results are difficult to explain in terms of 
hypothesis guessing (see also Witt & Sugovic, 2013). Although participants probably 
knew their own weight, they were unlikely to intuit that this was expected to influence 
what they perceived spatially, particularly given that Taylor-Covill and Eves (2016) 
recorded the participant's weight only after they had made their estimates of slant.  
Another form of demand characteristics could, though, influence performance 
without participants necessarily realising it, namely context effects due to the 
experimental setting or procedure. For example, performing two tasks in quick succession 
could create a context which implies that the two tasks are related in some meaningful 
way. In an example from the action-specific literature, Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt 
(2011, Experiment 2) reported that objects to-be-grasped in the right hand were estimated 
as smaller than objects to-be-grasped in the left hand. They claimed that this occurred 
because right handers perceive their right hand as larger than their left hand, and so 
objects appear more graspable, and therefore smaller, when they intend to grasp them 
with their right hand. However, participants in Experiment 2 of Linkenauger, Witt and 
Proffitt (2011) estimated both the graspability and size of objects on every trial. Asking 
participants about an object's graspability immediately before asking about its size may 
have created a context in which the two measures appeared related or became confused 
with each other. This could occur because the dimensions of graspable-to-ungraspable 
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and small-to-big are conceptually linked. This could lead participants to estimate easily 
graspable objects as smaller, even if the visual representation of the object is unchanged. 
This possibility is supported by evidence from the literature on cross-sensory 
correspondences whereby properties of one perceptual domain are linked to properties in 
another (e.g. Walker, 2012). For example, heavy objects are rated as darker than light 
objects (Walker, Scallon & Francis, 2016). 'Graspability’ is not a perceptual feature like 
those studied in the cross-sensory correspondence literature. Nevertheless, a similar issue 
could have arisen in Experiment 2 of Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011) if the 
experimental context implied a conceptual relation between grasping capacity and object 
size. If so, then the results of Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011, Experiment 2) could 
be explained by demand characteristics associated with performing two conceptually 
linked tasks on the same trial, as opposed to reflecting a change in what participants 
perceived in the strongest sense. Only the latter interpretation is consistent with the 
action-specific account. 
We recently failed to replicate Experiment 2 of Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt 
(2011). In addition to testing for an effect of hand dominance, as was done in the original 
study, we directly manipulated grasping capacity by taping together the fingers of one 
hand (Collier & Lawson, 2017). This powerful manipulation restricted both actual (by 
~1.2 cm) and perceived (by ~3.2 cm) grasping capacity. According to the action-specific 
account taping should have influenced estimates of object size. However, although 
participants appropriately estimated the grasping capacity of their taped hand as less than 
that of their untaped hand, objects grasped in the taped hand were not estimated as larger 
than objects grasped in the untaped hand. We did not resolve why we failed to replicate 
Experiment 2 of Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011), but we suggested that this could 
have been due to reduced context effects in our studies. This was achieved in two ways. 
First, in our initial experiments, participants completed the size estimation task before 
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starting the grasping capacity task, so their size estimates were unlikely to be biased by 
considering the graspability of the objects. Second, the design of our final experiment 
was similar to that of Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011, Experiment 2) in that 
participants were explicitly told that we were interested in their grasping behaviour, and 
the grasping task immediately preceded the size estimation task on each trial. However, 
our instructions emphasised that the grasping task and the size estimation task were part 
of two unrelated experiments.  
In the present studies, we investigated whether we (Collier & Lawson, 2017) 
previously failed to replicate Experiment 2 of Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011) 
because we reduced demand characteristics. In the present studies, participants had the 
fingers of one of their hands taped together and we compared their estimates of object 
size for objects they had grasped in their taped versus their untaped hand. This taping 
manipulation has a number of advantages over the methods used by Linkenauger, Witt 
and Proffitt (2011, Experiment 2). In their second experiment, Linkenauger, Witt and 
Proffitt (2011) took advantage of the finding that right handers perceive the grasping 
capacity of their right hand as greater than that of their left hand (Collier & Lawson, 
2017a; Linkenauger et al., 2009; Linkenauger, Witt & Proffitt, 2011). However, this only 
produces quite a small difference in perceived grasping capacity. Furthermore, there is 
no evidence for a difference in the actual grasping capacity of the right and left hands 
(Collier & Lawson, 2017a; Linkenauger, Witt & Proffitt, 2011). In contrast, our taping 
manipulation alters both perceived and actual maximum grasp. In their final experiment, 
Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011) manipulated perceived grasping capacity by 
magnifying the hand. However, as Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011) discussed (see 
also Witt, 2017), magnification could have induced a size-contrast illusion whereby 
objects may appear smaller next to a visually larger hand. It is therefore unclear whether 
the scaling effect they found in this experiment occurred because object size was scaled 
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according to grasping capacity, or if it resulted from a size-contrast effect. In contrast, 
taping the hand directly reduces grasping capacity (Collier & Lawson, 2017a) while 
minimising the possibility of inducing a size-contrast illusion.  
The action-specific account predicts that a change in grasping capacity due to 
taping the hand should influence perceived object size. Specifically, blocks grasped in the 
taped hand should be estimated as larger than blocks grasped in the untaped hand because 
the taped hand has a reduced grasping capacity. In Experiments 1 and 2 we tested whether 
previously reported effects of graspability on size estimates could instead be explained 
by hypothesis guessing by investigating whether participants were sensitive to demand 
characteristics arising from leading instructions. In Experiment 3, we examined the 
influence of demand characteristics due to context effects by having participants estimate 
both how difficult a block was to grasp and its size on every trial. We expected that this 
would create a context which made grasping capacity seem relevant for estimating object 
size.  
3.3 Experiment 1  
Experiment 1 was designed to test whether participants would figure out the 
predicted influence of taping on estimated object size from the instructions they were 
given and then change their estimates accordingly. We reasoned that, depending on their 
instructions, hypothesis guessing could lead to two opposite effects (see Figure 1). First, 
participants could be led to believe that objects grasped in their taped hand should look 
larger because taping reduces both the perceived and the actual maximum size of objects 
that can be grasped (Collier & Lawson, 2017a). Here, hypothesis guessing would produce 
an effect in the direction predicted by the action-specific account. Alternatively, 
participants could be led to believe that objects seen near to their taped hand should look 
smaller because taping the hand makes it look smaller, by reducing the maximum spread 
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of the fingers (see Figure 2), and because the taped hand could be used to anchor size 
estimates. In the latter case, using leading instructions which imply the opposite effect to 
that predicted by the action-specific account provides a strong way to test whether the 
effect reported in Experiment 2 by Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011) was the result 
of hypothesis guessing. If participants are sensitive to leading instructions in this task then 
they would be expected to comply with their instructions regardless of the outcome they 
imply. We therefore tested both alternatives. In the action capacity group, the instructions 
implied that objects grasped by the taped hand should appear larger because the grasping 
capacity of the taped hand is reduced, consistent with the action-specific account. In the 
body size group, the instructions implied that objects near to the taped hand should appear 
smaller because that hand appears smaller, and this could cause the object to be scaled 
down in size. In the third, objective size group, the instructions did not suggest that taping 
would influence size estimation and participants were explicitly told to ignore non-visual 
factors when estimating object size. Here, taping was not expected to influence object 
size estimates due to hypothesis guessing. 
In Experiment 1 participants actually grasped each object they estimated the size 
of. In contrast, on each trial of Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011, Experiment 2), 
participants only stated whether they thought they could grasp it. They did not grasp the 
blocks until the end of the experiment. Here, we tested actual grasping because we believe 
that the task used by Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt has low ecological validity. In 
everyday life, we often perform simple actions without explicitly attending to them 
(Goodale & Haffenden, 1998) whereas we rarely repeatedly decide whether we could act 
without actually acting. Also, action-specific scaling effects have been reported even 
when, as in our experiments, participants performed a relevant action without being 
explicitly asked if they could do it (e.g., Witt & Dorsch, 2009). Finally, Franchak and 
Adolph (2014) showed that participants only updated their perceived action capacity 
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following a change to their body after they had actually performed the action. This 
suggests that, for our taping manipulation to be effective, participants needed to try to 
grasp the objects with their taped hand.  
In Experiment 1, we tested whether participants were sensitive to leading 
instructions which implied the desired experimental outcome. On each trial, participants 
first grasped and moved a block with either their taped hand or untaped hand, then placed 
that block next to a laptop. They then used the same hand to adjust the horizontal gap 
between two lines on the laptop screen to match the perceived width of the block they 
had just moved. If hypothesis guessing influences performance then we predicted that, 
relative to objects moved by the untaped hand, objects moved by the taped hand should 
be estimated as larger in the action capacity group, smaller in the body size group and the 
same size in the objective size group, see Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: The predicted effects of instructions on perceived object size in Experiment 1. 
Left: Perceived object size decreases with a decrease in hand size due to taping (body 
size account). Right: Perceived object size increases with a decrease in perceived 
grasping capacity (action-specific account).  
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3.3.1 Method 
 Ethical approval was granted for all of the experiments presented in this paper by 
the relevant local ethics committee at the University of Liverpool.  
3.3.1.1 Participants 
Fifty-four participants (mean age = 18.7 years, 7 males; n = 18 per group) were 
recruited for this study. Participants all self-reported as right handed, and either 
volunteered or were rewarded with course credit for their time.  
3.3.1.2 Design 
 Participants were allocated to one of three instruction groups (action 
capacity/objective size/body size). Throughout the experiment, participants had the 
fingers of one of their hands taped together. Half of the participants in each instruction 
group had their left hand taped (LHTaped group) and the remaining half had their right 
hand taped (RHTaped group). The middle and ring fingers were first taped together above 
the proximal interphalangeal (middle) finger joint, then all four fingers were taped 
together just underneath the same joint, see Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2: Photograph showing how the taping manipulation restricted the maximum 
grasp of one hand relative to the other. Image shows a participant in the RHTaped group 
following taping of their right hand. The hands are shown next to the largest (13 cm) 
block. 
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3.3.1.3 Apparatus, stimuli and procedure 
All participants received the following, general verbal instructions: 
“In this experiment, we will ask you to estimate the size of square stimuli. There 
are many possible interpretations of this instruction, so we want to make it clear what it 
is we want you to estimate. Imagine standing at one end of a road and looking at a house 
at the other end – the house may appear closer or further away than it really is, depending 
on a variety of factors. For example, if you are very tired, hungry or in a rush, the distance 
to the house may appear greater than it really is. In contrast, if you are feeling very 
energetic, the distance to the house may appear shorter than it really is. These non-visual 
factors have been previously suggested to influence spatial perception. The same logic 
applies to objects we can act on in our nearby environment. For example, if you are 
looking at a mug on a table, there may be things in the environment that make it visually 
appear closer to or further away than its actual physical distance from you (that is, the 
distance measured by a tape measure).” 
Following this, they received group-specific instructions. The sentences 
highlighted in bold differed across the groups: 
Action capacity group 
“Similarly, this logic can be applied to the size of objects that we act on. For 
example, being able to grasp bigger objects may affect our perception of the size of 
objects we intend to grasp. In this experiment, we will tape together the fingers of one 
of your hands. This is to restrict the grasping capacity of one of your hands. You will 
then be presented with a series of square stimuli and asked to visually match their width 
on a screen. You will be asked to put either your left or right hand through the curtain to 
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pick up the stimulus, take it out from behind the curtain and place it on the table in front 
of you. Use the same hand you picked up the stimulus with to use the arrow keys to move 
the lines on the screen apart and visually match the width of the stimulus on the screen. 
Base your answer on what size you feel the object is, taking all relevant non-visual 
factors into account, including whether having your fingers taped together makes it 
harder for you to grasp big objects.” 
Body size group 
“Similarly, this logic can be applied to the size of objects that we act on. For 
example, thinking that our hand has decreased in size may affect our perception of the 
size of objects which we see near or hold in our hand. In this experiment, we will tape 
together the fingers of one of your hands. This is to simulate a shrinkage in the size of 
that hand. You will then be presented with a series of square stimuli and asked to visually 
match their width on a screen. You will be asked to put either your right or left hand 
through the curtain to pick up the stimulus, take it out from behind the curtain and place 
it on the table in front of you. Use the same hand you picked up the stimulus with to use 
the arrow keys to move the lines on the screen apart and visually match the width of the 
stimulus on the screen. Base your answer on what size you feel the object is, taking all 
relevant non-visual factors into account, including whether having your fingers taped 
together makes your hand feel smaller.” 
Objective size group 
“Similarly, this logic can be applied to the size of objects that we act on. However, 
if during this task you think that the objects appear to be different in size than how big 
you think they really are – for whatever reason – ignore these things and base your 
estimation only on how big you think the object really is. In this experiment, we will 
tape together the fingers of one of your hands. You will then be presented with a series 
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of square stimuli and asked to visually match their width on a screen. You will be asked 
to put either your left or right hand through the curtain to pick up the stimulus, take it out 
from behind the curtain and place it on the table in front of you. Use the same hand you 
picked up the stimulus with to use the arrow keys to move the lines on the screen apart 
and visually match the width of the stimulus on the screen. Base your answer only on 
how big you think the object really is – imagine there’s a tape measure stretched across 
the object and you’re reading off its size”. 
 
After being given their instructions, participants completed a visual size matching 
task. The stimuli were 10 foamboard blocks (0.5 cm thick). The blocks were square with 
sides ranging in size from 4 cm – 13 cm in 1 cm increments. In previous work (Collier & 
Lawson, 2017a) this range was found to be graspable for most participants, even when 
their hand was taped. We only used graspable blocks because, according to the action-
specific account, scaling effects are only expected if the relevant action is actually 
performable (Linkenauger, Witt & Proffitt, 2011). 
On each trial, one block was presented on a table behind a curtain. A laptop 
(screen diagonal = 25 cm) was placed in front of the curtain. Two black lines (0.2 cm x 
1.3 cm) were displayed on the screen. The lines were initially 0.9 cm apart. The 
participant reached behind the curtain to grasp and pick up the block, see Figure 3A. The 
experimenter told the participant which hand they should use on each trial. The participant 
then moved the block onto the table in front of the curtain on the same side of the laptop 
as the hand they picked it up with, see Figure 3B. Participants were instructed to always 
first try to grasp the block with their thumb on one side and any other finger on the 
opposing side, see Figure 3A. If the block was too big to grasp in this way, they were then 
allowed to pick it up and move it in any way they wished. To maximise the likelihood of 
104 
 
participants using the hand they had just acted with as a perceptual ruler, they pressed the 
response keys with the same hand they had just used to grasp the block and they kept their 
other hand out of sight, by their side. This ensured that they only saw the action-relevant 
hand while making their response. After responding, they used the same hand to place the 
block back behind the curtain. The experimenter then replaced the block with another 
block and the next trial began.  
 
Figure 3: Trial procedure in Experiment 1 for an untaped right hand trial (the procedure 
was identical for the taped hand). A: The participant has reached behind the curtain with 
their right hand to grasp and move the block (size shown here = 13 cm). The inset shows 
that the participant has successfully grasped the block using the specified grasp – the 
thumb on one side and any other finger on the opposite side. B: The participant has moved 
the block to the right side of the laptop and placed it flat on the table. They are using their 
right hand to move the lines on the screen to visually match the width of the block. The 
experimental procedure was identical in Experiment 2. The experimental procedure was 
identical in Experiment 3, except that participants verbally rated how difficult the block 
had been to grasp before visually matching its size on the screen. 
 
Before starting the experimental trials, all participants were given two practice 
trials which used the smallest (4 cm) and largest (13 cm) blocks. The 4 cm block was 
presented to their untaped hand, and the 13 cm block was presented to their taped hand. 
This was to try to highlight the difference in grasping capacity following taping. During 
the experimental trials participants estimated the size of each block once for each hand, 
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giving 20 experimental trials in total (10 blocks × 2 hands). Trials were presented in a 
different, random order for each participant. To minimise forgetting, participants were 
reminded of their group specific instructions after ten trials. Specifically, the action 
capacity group was told to consider their grasping capacity, the body size group was told 
to consider whether taping made their hand feel smaller, and the objective size group was 
told to ignore all non-visual factors while making their estimates.  
After completing the size estimation task, participants drew around their hands 
with their thumb and fingers spread as far apart as possible. They first drew around their 
taped hand (still taped), then their taped hand (with tape removed) and finally their 
untaped hand. They then completed a questionnaire on a computer. This asked what they 
believed the main manipulations of the experiment were, and whether they believed that 
their responses were influenced by having their fingers taped together and the 
experimental instructions. After this, the experimenter asked participants specifically 
whether they thought that having their fingers taped together had made objects appear 
bigger, smaller or about the same size in their taped hand relative to their untaped hand. 
The entire procedure took about 20 minutes.  
3.3.2 Results 
Object size estimation task 
We excluded six trials where the participant was unable to grasp the block in the 
manner specified using their taped hand (one 12 cm trial and five 13 cm trials) plus the 
six corresponding trials for that participant for their untaped hand. In addition, a further 
16 trials were excluded due to invalid responses, e.g. pressing the Enter key without 
adjusting the distance between the lines. To test whether size estimates differed for taped 
versus untaped hands, we calculated perceived block size as a proportion of actual block 
size then averaged these proportions for all block sizes tested for a given participant. 
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These ratios were used as the dependent variable in a mixed ANOVA1 with taping 
(taped/untaped) as a within-participants factor and instruction group (action 
capacity/objective size/body size) and tape group (LHTaped/RHTaped) as between-
participants factors. There were no significant effects. For the main effects: taping, F(1, 
48) = 0.416, p = .5, ηp2 = .01, instruction group, F(2, 48) = 0.754, p = .5, ηp2 = .03, and 
tape group, F(1, 48) = 2.136, p = .2, ηp2 = .04. For the interactions: taping × instruction 
group, F(2, 48) = 0.517 , p = .5, ηp2 = .02, taping × tape group, F(1, 48) = 0.037, p = .8, 
ηp2 = .001, instruction group × tape group, F(2, 48) =1.817, p =.2, ηp2 =.07, and taping × 
instruction group × tape group, F(2, 48) =0.309, p = .7, ηp2 = .01, see Figure 4. 
We also checked whether participants estimated block size in a way that was 
consistent with their beliefs about their own biases on this task, based on their post-
experiment responses. To do this we analysed size estimates only for participants who 
chose the action-specific prediction (collapsing over instruction group and tape group, n 
= 26, see Table 4). If their post-hoc beliefs were consistent with their experimental 
responses then they should have estimated blocks as larger for their taped hand. However, 
a paired-samples t-test for this subgroup revealed no difference between their size 
estimates for their taped and untaped hand, t(25) = 1.419, p = .2.  
We ran Bayesian analyses to test the strength of evidence for the null effects 
revealed by the ANOVA, see Table 1. We used the procedure described by Masson 
(2011), which determines the posterior probabilities for both the null and alternative 
hypothesis based on the Type III Sum of Squares values for the effect. This method can 
provide confidence that a null effect is not simply the result of a Type II error. We used 
the descriptive terms for strength of evidence suggested by Raftery (1995).  
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Table 1  
Posterior probabilities for the null [pBIC(H0|D)] and alternative [(pBIC(H1|D)] hypotheses 
for the main effects and interactions in Experiment 1. 
Effect pBIC(H0|D) pBIC(H1|D) ηp2 
Taping .853** .147 .01 
Instruction group .959*** .041 .03 
Tape group .694** .306 .04 
Taping × instruction group .968*** .032 .02 
Taping × tape group .878** .122 .001 
Instruction group × tape group .883** .117 .07 
*** strong evidence, **positive evidence 
 
Hand span as an estimate of action capacity  
We used participants' drawings around their outspread finger to estimate their 
maximum hand span to check whether this was reduced by taping. A mixed ANOVA was 
conducted with hand (still-taped / was-taped-but-tape-removed / untaped) as a within-
participants factor and tape group (LHTaped / RHTaped) as a between-participants factor. 
Hand was significant, F(2, 104) = 212.766, p < .001, ηp2 = .80. Maximum hand span was 
lower for the still-taped hand than for either the hand that was taped but with tape removed 
or the untaped hand, see Table 2. There was no effect of tape group, F(1, 52) = 1.012, p 
= .3, ηp2 = .02, or a hand × tape group interaction, F(2, 104) = 0.026, p = .9, ηp2 < .001. 
Thus, the taping manipulation significantly reduced maximum hand span by ~4 cm 
regardless of which hand was taped. 
Post-experiment questions 
The number of participants across all groups in Experiments 1-3 who agreed that 
taping or instructions influenced their estimates of object size (questions 6 and 8 in the 
questionnaire) is given in Table 3. The number of participants who responded that that 
objects appeared bigger, the same size or smaller for trials using their taped relative to 
their untaped hand (asked verbally by the experimenter at the end of the experiment) is 
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given in Table 4. Detailed responses to further open-ended questions can be found in the 
supplementary material (available in the online publication of Collier & Lawson, 
2017b). 
3.3.3 Discussion 
 We did not find scaling effects on object size estimates as would be predicted by 
the action-specific account. In addition, estimates of object size did not differ between 
the taped and untaped hands in any of the three groups, so participants were not sensitive 
to leading instructions. We therefore found no evidence that differences in demand 
characteristics due to hypothesis guessing could explain why Collier and Lawson (2017a) 
failed to replicate Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011, Experiment 2). We re-examined 
this issue in Experiment 2. 
 
Table 2 
Mean (and standard deviation) of the maximum span of the still-taped hand, the taped 
hand without tape, and the untaped hand, in each group in Experiments 1, 2 and 3. 
 Action 
Capacity 
group  
(Expt 1,  
n=18) 
Objective 
Size 
group 
(Expt 1,  
n=18) 
Body 
Size 
group 
(Expt 1, 
n=18) 
Direction 
Specified 
group 
(Expt 2,  
n=18) 
Report 
Graspability 
group 
(Expt 3,  
n=18) 
 
Grand 
Mean 
(n=90) 
Taped hand 
(still taped, 
cm) 
13.5 
(1.8) 
13.3 
(1.9) 
13.5 
(1.7) 
13.1  
(1.6) 
13.9  
(1.9) 
13.5  
(1.8) 
Taped hand 
(with tape 
removed, cm) 
17.9 
(1.2) 
17.4 
(1.8) 
18.0 
(1.3) 
18.1  
(1.2) 
17.2  
(1.8) 
17.7 
 (1.5) 
Untaped hand 
(cm) 
17.6 
(1.9) 
17.0 
(2.0) 
17.9 
(1.3) 
17.6  
(1.3) 
17.5  
(1.7) 
17.5  
(1.6) 
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Table 3 
The number (and %) of participants in each group in Experiments 1, 2 and 3 who agreed 
in a post-experiment questionnaire that taping or instructions influenced their estimates 
of object size. 
 Action 
Capacity 
group  
(Expt 1,  
n=18) 
Objective 
Size  
group 
(Expt 1,  
n=18) 
Body 
Size  
group 
(Expt 1, 
n=18) 
Direction 
Specified 
group 
(Expt 2,  
n=18) 
Report 
Graspability 
group 
(Expt 3,  
n=18) 
 
Total 
(n=90) 
Agreed that 
taping 
influenced 
size 
estimates 
15 (83%) 16 (89%) 14 (78%) 8 (44%) 14 (78%) 67 (74%) 
Agreed that 
instructions 
influenced 
size 
estimates 
9 (50%) 14 (78%) 8 (44%) 15 (83%) 9 (50%) 55 (61%) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Mean estimated object size, shown as a proportion of actual object size, for 
the LHTaped and RHTaped groups in Experiments 1-3. Error bars show one standard 
error of the mean. 
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Table 4 
The number (and %) of participants in each group in Experiments 1, 2 and 3 who agreed 
in a post-experiment questionnaire that objects appeared bigger, the same size or smaller 
for trials using their taped relative to their untaped hand. 
 Action 
Capacity 
group  
(Expt 1,  
n=18) 
Objective 
Size 
group 
(Expt 1,  
n=18) 
Body 
Size 
group 
(Expt 1, 
n=18) 
Direction 
Specified 
group 
(Expt 2,  
n=18) 
Report 
Graspability 
group 
(Expt 3,  
n=18) 
 
Total  
(n=90) 
Block appeared 
bigger in taped 
hand (Action-
specific 
prediction) 
 
9 (50%) 
 
8 (44%) 
 
9 (50%) 
 
11 (61%) 
 
9 (50%) 
 
46 
(51%) 
Block appeared 
no different  
in taped hand 
(Objective size 
prediction) 
 
6 (33%) 
 
8 (44%) 
 
4 (22%) 
 
7 (39%) 
 
8 (44%) 
 
33 
(37%) 
Block appeared 
smaller in 
taped hand 
(Body size 
prediction) 
 
3 (17%) 
 
2 (11%) 
 
5 (28%) 
 
0 (0%) 
 
1 (6%) 
 
11 
(12%) 
 
3.4 Experiment 2 
 In Experiment 1, the instructions given to the three groups may not have been 
sufficiently explicit to influence performance. For example, although the instructions for 
the action capacity group implied that grasping capacity might matter for size estimation, 
the expected direction of its effect still had to be inferred by participants. In Experiment 
2, we investigated whether hypothesis guessing could influence performance if we 
directly told participants the results that we expected to obtain. We adapted the 
instructions from the action capacity group in Experiment 1 to explicitly tell participants 
that their estimates of object size were expected be greater for their taped hand than for 
their untaped hand.  
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3.4.1 Method 
3.4.1.1 Participants 
Eighteen participants (mean age = 18.5 years, 0 male, mean Edinburgh 
Handedness Inventory score = 87.5, range = 50-100) were recruited for this study. 
Participants all self-reported as right handed, and either volunteered or were rewarded 
with course credit for their time. 
3.4.1.2 Apparatus, stimuli and procedure 
 The apparatus, stimuli and procedure were identical to Experiment 1, except for 
the following changes. First, participant’s fingers were taped before the instructions were 
read to them. This was to maximise the likelihood that, as they were given their 
instructions, participants would consider the relationship between grasping capacity and 
perceived object size that was being described to them. Second, only one set of 
instructions was used, which was adapted from the action capacity group of Experiment 
1, as follows.  
Action capacity - direction specified group 
 “In this experiment, we will ask you to estimate the size of square stimuli. There 
are many possible interpretations of this instruction, so we want to make it clear what it 
is we want you to estimate. Imagine looking at a mug on a table: there may be things in 
the environment that make it visually appear closer to or further away than its actual 
physical distance from you – that is, the distance measured by a tape measure. For 
example, if it appears difficult to reach, you may perceive the distance to the mug as 
greater than it really is. 
 Similarly, this logic can be applied to the size of objects that we act on. For 
example, the same thing might happen when we estimate the size of objects that we are 
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going to pick up. In this experiment we have taped together the fingers of one of your 
hands whilst your other hand has not been taped. Previous research has suggested that 
taping your hand makes it harder to pick up objects and that this makes objects grasped 
in or seen near to your taped hand appear bigger to you. Basically, because we are 
clumsier when our hand is taped, objects we might pick up with it appear larger to us 
so that we are more careful when picking them up. 
In this experiment, you will be asked to estimate the size of objects that you have 
just picked up with either your taped hand or your untaped hand. Take all relevant 
non-visual factors into account when you estimate object size, including whether 
having your fingers taped together makes the objects appear bigger compared to your 
untaped hand.” Participants were reminded that they should consider whether the 
blocks appeared larger in their taped hand after 10 trials, and the entire procedure lasted 
around 20 minutes. 
3.4.2 Results 
Object size estimation task 
We excluded four trials due to invalid responses, e.g. pressing the Enter key 
without adjusting the distance between the lines. We calculated perceived block size 
ratios as in Experiment 1. These ratios were the dependent variable in a mixed ANOVA 
with taping (taped/untaped) as a within-participants factor and tape group 
(LHTaped/RHTaped) as a between-participants factor. Taped hand estimates (m = 0.83, 
se = 0.03) were greater than untaped hand estimates (m = 0.78, se = 0.03), F(1, 16) = 
7.282, p = . 016, ηp2 = .31, see Figure 4. There was also a significant effect of tape group, 
F(1, 16) = 5.977, p = . 026, ηp2 = .27, where LHTaped group estimates (m = 0.88, se = 
0.10) were greater than RHTaped group estimates (m = 0.73, se = 0.16). There was no 
taping × tape group interaction, F(1, 16) = 0.194, p = .7, ηp2 = .01. As in Experiment 1, 
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we ran Bayesian analyses to check the strength of evidence for the effects revealed by the 
ANOVA, see Table 5.  
Table 5  
Posterior probabilities for the null [pBIC(H0|D)] and alternative [(pBIC(H1|D)] hypotheses 
for the main effects and interaction in Experiment 2. 
Effect pBIC(H0|D) pBIC(H1|D)  ηp2 
Taping .127 .873*** .31 
Tape group .196 .804** .27 
Taping × tape group .792** .208 .01 
*** strong evidence, **positive evidence 
 
Hand span as an estimate of action capacity  
We used participants' drawings around their outspread finger to estimate their maximum 
hand span to check whether this was reduced by taping. A mixed ANOVA was 
conducted with hand (still-taped / was-taped-but-tape-removed / untaped) as a within-
participants factor and tape group (LHTaped / RHTaped) as a between-participants 
factor. Hand was significant, F(2, 32) = 102.715, p < .001, ηp2 = .87. Maximum hand 
span was lower for the still-taped hand than for either the hand that was taped but with 
tape removed or the untaped hand, see Table 2. There was no effect of tape group, F(1, 
16) = 0.037, p = .9, ηp2 = .002, or a hand × tape group interaction, F(2, 32) = 2.912, p = 
.07, ηp2 = .15. Thus, the taping manipulation significantly reduced maximum hand span 
by ~ 4 cm regardless of which hand was taped.  
3.4.3 Discussion 
 In Experiment 2, participants estimated blocks as larger when they grasped them 
using their taped rather than their untaped hand. Thus when, unlike in Experiment 1, the 
desired outcome was clearly and explicitly stated in the pre-experimental instructions, 
participants produced scaling effects averaging ~ 4%. This effect is modest, but is 
comparable to the original effect reported in Experiment 2 of Linkenauger, Witt and 
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Proffitt (2011), where objects to-be-grasped in the right hand were estimated as ~3% 
smaller than objects to-be-grasped in the left hand. More generally, Firestone noted that 
many effects demonstrated by the action-specific account are only modest in size. He 
wrote “Paternalistic perceptual effects are the wrong size for the job” (Firestone, 2013, p. 
458).  
Our results are consistent with previous work suggesting that hypothesis guessing 
can influence performance to produce the effects reported in the action-specific literature 
(Durgin et al., 2012; Firestone & Scholl, 2014; Woods et al., 2009). The results of 
Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that in the size estimation task used both here, and by 
Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011, Experiment 2), participants may respond to demand 
characteristics from hypothesis guessing. However, this required instructions to be explict 
and overtly biased. Such extreme demand characteristics seem unlikely to explain the 
perceptual scaling effects reported in Experiment 2 of Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt 
(2011). In our final experiment, we tried to resolve why scaling effects were obtained in 
Experiment 2 of Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011) but not in Experiment 3 of Collier 
and Lawson (2017a). We did this by examining the influence of a different type of 
demand characteristics on object size, namely context effects.  
3.5 Experiment 3 
When action capacity and spatial properties are estimated in quick succession, and 
on every trial, as in Experiment 2 of Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011), the 
experimental context may subtly imply that the two estimates are related or the two types 
of estimates may be confused. Importantly, participants may not need to be aware of such 
context effects for them to occur, unlike explicit hypothesis guessing. Nevertheless, and 
importantly, scaling effects on spatial estimates arising from either type of demand 
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characteristic are not genuine perceptual effects because the participant's visual 
representation of the environment is not altered (Firestone, 2013). 
On every trial in Experiment 2 of Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011), 
participants estimated the graspability of an object immediately before estimating its 
apparent size. The dimensions of graspable-to-ungraspable and small-to-large may be 
conceptually linked, in a way similar to cross-sensory correspondences between sensory 
modalities (e.g. Walker, 2012; Walker et al., 2016). If so, then people may find it hard to 
assess them independently in a context where they are asked about both. We discussed 
this possibility in Collier and Lawson (2017a), and referred to it as conflation. However, 
in our previous study we did not test whether we could replicate Linkenauger, Witt and 
Proffitt's (2011, Experiment 2) scaling effect by introducing a context in which measures 
of spatial perception were likely to be combined or confused with estimates of action 
capacity. This was done in Experiment 3. Here, on every trial, participants rated how 
difficult the block had been to grasp (graspability) and then its size. Note that we were 
not interested in the results of this task. The purpose of this graspability task was to test 
whether drawing attention to the graspability of an object immediately before estimating 
its size would induce conflation between estimates of graspability and estimates of size. 
We reasoned that, in this conflation context, participants might estimate objects grasped 
in their taped hand as bigger than objects grasped in their untaped hand. 
3.5.1 Method 
3.5.1.1 Participants 
 Eighteen participants (mean age = 19.6 years, 2 males) were recruited for this 
study. Participants all self-reported as right handed and were rewarded with course credit 
for their time.  
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3.5.1.2 Apparatus, stimuli and procedure 
 The apparatus, stimuli and procedure were identical to those of the action capacity 
group in Experiment 1 apart from the following change. Participants completed an 
additional object graspability task on each trial. For this task, participants verbally rated 
the difficulty of grasping each block on a scale of 1 (very easy) to 10 (very difficult) after 
they had picked it up and placed it on the table. They then estimated the size of the block 
as in Experiment 1.  
3.5.2 Results 
Object graspability task 
We first tested whether participants rated blocks they had grasped in their taped 
hand as harder to grasp than blocks they had grasped in their untaped hand. Mean 
difficulty ratings were used as the dependent variable in a mixed ANOVA where taping 
(taped/untaped) was a within-participants factor and tape group (LHTaped/RHTaped) 
was a between-participants factor. Participants rated objects they had grasped in their 
taped hand (m = 3.4, sd = 1.2) as more difficult to grasp than objects they had grasped in 
their untaped hand (m = 2.4, sd = 0.8), F(1, 16) = 21.519, p < .001, ηp2 = .57. There was 
no effect of tape group, F(1, 16) = 0.814, p = .4, ηp2 = .05, or a taping × tape group 
interaction, F(1, 16) = 1.202, p = .3, ηp2 = .07.  
Object size estimation task 
We excluded two trials where the participant was unable to grasp the block in the 
manner specified using their taped hand (both were 13 cm trials) plus the two 
corresponding trials for that participant for their untaped hand. A further three trials were 
excluded due to invalid responses, e.g. pressing the Enter key without adjusting the 
distance between the lines. Perceived block size ratios were calculated as in Experiments 
1 and 2. These ratios were the dependent variable in a mixed ANOVA with taping 
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(taped/untaped) as a within-participants factor and tape group (LHTaped/RHTaped) as a 
between-participants factor. Taped hand estimates (m = 0.84, se = 0.03) were greater than 
untaped hand estimates (m = 0.82, se = 0.03), F(1, 16) = 4.936, p = . 041, ηp2 = .24. There 
was no effect of tape group, F(1, 16) = 0.771, p = . 4, ηp2 = .05, or a taping × tape group 
interaction, F(1, 16) = 1.208, p = . 3, ηp2 = .07, see Figure 4. As in Experiments 1 and 2, 
we ran Bayesian analyses to check the strength of evidence for the effects revealed by the 
ANOVA, see Table 6.  
Table 6  
Posterior probabilities for the null [pBIC(H0|D)] and alternative [(pBIC(H1|D)] hypotheses 
for the main effects and interaction in Experiment 3. 
Effect pBIC(H0|D) pBIC(H1|D)  ηp2 
Taping .274 .726** .24 
Tape group .735* .265 .05 
Taping × tape group .688** .312 .07 
**positive evidence, *weak evidence 
 
Hand span as an estimate of action capacity  
We used participants' drawings around their outspread finger to estimate their 
maximum hand span to check whether this was reduced by taping. A mixed ANOVA was 
conducted with hand (still-taped / was-taped-but-tape-removed / untaped) as a within-
participants factor and tape group (LHTaped / RHTaped) as a between-participants factor. 
Hand was significant, F(2, 32) = 48.980, p < .001, ηp2 = .75. Maximum hand span was 
lower for the still-taped hand than for either the hand that was taped but with tape removed 
or the untaped hand, see Table 2. There was no effect of tape group, F(1, 16) = 0.497, p 
= .5, ηp2 = .03, or a hand × tape group interaction, F(2, 32) = 0.596, p = .5, ηp2 = .04. Thus 
the taping manipulation significantly reduced maximum hand span by ~4 cm regardless 
of which hand was taped. 
3.5.3 Discussion 
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 In Experiment 3 participants rated objects as harder to grasp in their taped hand 
than in their untaped hand. They then went on to estimate blocks that they had grasped in 
their taped hand as larger than blocks they had grasped in their untaped hand. These 
results provide evidence for the suggestion by Collier and Lawson (2017a) that the scaling 
effect reported by Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011, Experiment 2) occurred because 
action capacity estimates were conflated with size estimates. This likely occurred because 
participants were asked to estimate graspability immediately before estimating object size 
on every trial. This influence of context would only need to occur occasionally to produce 
the modest scaling effects that have been observed (~3% in both Experiment 3 here and 
in Experiment 2 of Linkenauger, Witt & Proffitt, 2011). In Experiment 3 here, 11 out of 
18 participants estimated blocks as larger for their taped hand than their untaped hand. 
Furthermore, participants appear able to independently estimate object graspability and 
size if care is taken to distinguish between them. For example, Collier and Lawson 
(2017a) found that when participants were explicitly instructed that grasping and size 
estimates were being collected for separate, unrelated experiments, there was no influence 
of grasping capacity on estimated object size. Together these results indicate that the 
scaling effect reported by Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011, Experiment 2) was not 
truly perceptual.  
3.6 General Discussion 
In the present studies, we were interested in understanding the basis of biases that 
have previously been reported in the perception of object size and that have been 
interpreted as supporting the action-specific account. Specifically, Linkenauger, Witt and 
Proffitt (2011) argued that apparent grasping capacity can influence perceived object size. 
However, we subsequently found no evidence to support this claim (Collier & Lawson, 
2017a). In the present studies, we sought to understand whether scaling effects were 
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obtained by Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011, Experiment 2), but not by Collier and 
Lawson (2017a), because of demand characteristics. 
In Experiment 1, we investigated whether leading instructions would bias 
estimates of object size due to participants explicitly hypothesis guessing. We reasoned 
that estimated object size could increase if perceived hand size increased (on a body size 
scaling account), or could scale in the opposite direction based on changes in perceived 
grasping capacity (consistent with the action-specific account), see Figure 1. Neither of 
these predictions were supported: we found no evidence that participants adjusted their 
responses after inferring the desired outcome of the experiment based on the instructions 
they were given. We re-examined this issue in Experiment 2 using a more powerful 
manipulation. Here, the instructions clearly and explicitly specified the direction of the 
expected effect based on the action-specific account. Now participants produced results 
consistent with the expectations arising from their instructions: blocks that were harder 
to grasp because they were picked up in the taped hand were estimated as larger than 
blocks that had been grasped in the untaped hand. Taken together, these results suggest 
that hypothesis guessing is an unlikely explanation for the results of Linkenauger, Witt 
and Proffitt (2011, Experiment 2) because scaling effects were only obtained in 
Experiment 2, when we used unrealistically directive instructions. 
Orne (1962, p. 779) stated that “response to the demand characteristics is not 
merely conscious compliance” and that other, subtler, forms of demand characteristics 
can also influence participants’ responses. Based on this suggestion, and our own 
proposal (Collier & Lawson, 2017a) that conflation might explain Linkenauger, Witt and 
Proffitt’s (2011, Experiment 2) results, in Experiment 3 we investigated whether the 
experimental context could implicitly influence performance. This was manipulated by 
having participants report an object’s graspability immediately before estimating its size. 
Now we found the predicted scaling effect: participants estimated blocks as larger after 
120 
 
grasping them with their taped relative to their untaped hand. This suggests that 
Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt’s (2011, Experiment 2) scaling effect likely arose as a 
result of asking participants to report graspability before object size on every trial. We 
propose that their task encouraged a conflation between estimates of action capacity and 
spatial extent, so that the scaling effects that they observed did not reflect a change in 
perception in the strong sense, as proposed by the action-specific account.  
Our results expand on what is already known about demand characteristics in the 
action-specific literature by showing that these demand characteristics can take multiple 
forms. In Durgin et al. (2009) and Firestone and Scholl (2014), participants produced 
action-specific effects if no reason for a salient experimental manipulation was given, 
whereas participants who were given an explanation for the manipulation showed no 
effect. In these studies action-specific effects seemed to occur only when participants 
guessed the experimental prediction. In contrast, the results of Experiment 1 here suggest 
that participants may not have explicitly guessed the experimental hypothesis in the object 
size estimation task used by Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011, Experiment 2). 
Nevertheless, the results of Experiment 3 here suggest that the scaling effect reported by 
Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011, Experiment 2) could still reflect post-perceptual 
demand characteristics due to an implicit context effect. The context effect, like 
hypothesis guessing, is inconsistent with the explanation of scaling results provided by 
the action-specific account, namely that participants actually see stimuli differently if 
their action capacity changes. 
We previously demonstrated that context effects can be overridden using 
instructions which carefully distinguish between estimates of action capacity and 
estimates of spatial qualities. The final experiment reported in Collier and Lawson 
(2017a) was similar to Experiment 3 here in that we asked participants to first grasp and 
then estimate the size of blocks on the same trial. Unlike Experiment 3 here, the 
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experimenter emphasised that they were interested in participant's grasping behaviour and 
said that they would record how participants grasped blocks on each trial. However, using 
a cover story about time constraints on data collection, participants were also told that the 
grasping task was producing data for a separate study to the size estimation task. In 
contrast to Experiment 3 here, we found no difference between size estimates made for 
objects grasped in taped compared to untaped hands. Thus context effects were eliminated 
by telling participants that the tasks were separate, similar to the way in which hypothesis 
guessing was controlled for by Durgin et al. (2009), by giving participants a reason for 
wearing the backpack while estimating hill slant.  
Thus previous work has found that providing a convincing cover story can 
eliminate action-specific scaling effects (Collier & Lawson, 2017a; Durgin et al., 2009: 
2012; Firestone & Scholl, 2014) and that the use of leading instructions can induce these 
scaling effects (Woods et al., 2009). In contrast, we found no evidence that explicit 
hypothesis guessing influenced estimated object size in Experiment 1 here. We suggest 
that this may have been because the experimental hypothesis was relatively hard to infer 
in this task, particularly since the group-specific instructions did not specify the direction 
of the predicted effect. Consistent with this interpretation, we did obtain scaling effects 
in Experiment 2, when participants were directly told the expected results of the study.  
We have argued that scaling effects on estimates of object size may arise if these 
estimates are conflated with those of grasping capacity. Scaling effects were obtained in 
both Experiment 3 here and Experiment 2 of Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011), when 
participants were actively and explicitly encouraged to think about and report their 
grasping capacity on every trial. It is important to emphasise that this context is unusual 
and does not reflect everyday life. Scaling effects were not obtained in the first four 
experiments reported by Collier and Lawson (2017a), when participants were not 
encouraged to think about their grasping behaviour or capacity, even though they actually 
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grasped blocks on every size estimation trial. Thus, scaling effects consistent with the 
action-specific account seem to be context-dependent, such that they only appear under 
narrow, non-ecological conditions.  
Not all studies which have reported an influence of grasping capacity on estimated 
object size required participants to explicitly report their grasping capacity. For example, 
in Experiment 1 of Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011), a disc was placed in the palm 
of the left and right hands of right-handed participants and they were asked which disk 
appeared larger. Participants also visually matched the size of the discs. In both tasks, the 
disks in the right hand were estimated as smaller than the disks in the left hand. Since 
participants did not have to report their grasping capacity, these results cannot be 
explained by context effects. There is though, an alternative explanation for these results 
which does not assume that action-specific scaling occurred. Right handers have 
repeatedly been shown to believe that their right hand is larger than their left hand (Collier 
& Lawson, 2017a; Linkenauger, Witt & Proffitt, 2011), so the discs surrounded by a 
perceptually larger object (the right hand) may have appeared smaller than the discs 
surrounded by a perceptually smaller object (the left hand). In fact, Linkenauger, Witt 
and Proffitt (2011, Experiment 1) themselves suggested that such a size-contrast effect 
could have caused the results they obtained, rather than that perceived object size was 
scaled according to grasping capacity.  
One reason that participants are asked to estimate their grasping capacity in 
studies supporting the action-specific account is to check perceived action capacity, since 
action-specific scaling effects are only predicted if people think that the action can be 
performed (Linkenauger, Witt & Proffitt, 2011; Witt, 2017). For example, only objects 
that people think they can grasp should be scaled; no effect should be found for objects 
larger than perceived maximum grasp (Linkenauger, Witt & Proffitt, 2011). One 
interesting issue, that has not yet been addressed, is whether scaling effects should be 
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expected when objects are so small that they could be easily grasped regardless of whether 
they are grasped in the left or right hand, or indeed in a taped or untaped hand. Cañal-
Bruland and van der Kamp (2015) suggested that distortions in spatial perception as a 
result of action capacity should be strongest at the critical boundaries for action. 
Investigating this hypothesis would be a valuable route for future research to pursue. 
In order to produce a large, robust, yet reversible effect on both perceived and 
actual grasping capacity we used a taping manipulation in the experiments reported here. 
This differed from the manipulation of perceived grasping capacity investigated in 
Experiment 2 of Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011). They took advantage of the bias 
for right handers to overestimate both the size and the grasping capacity of their right 
hand relative to their left hand. This bias existed prior to the start of the experiment and 
may arise from a lifetime of experience using their right hand more than their left hand. 
There is also greater representation for the right hand than the left hand in the 
somatosensory cortex of right handers (Sörös et al., 1999). Such differences could be 
argued to explain why our results differed from those of Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt 
(2011). However, we think this is unlikely. First, Experiment 3 of Linkenauger, Witt and 
Proffitt (2011) manipulated hand size by magnifying the hand. Like our taping 
manipulation, this is a short-term, within-experiment manipulation. Nevertheless, they 
reported differences in estimated object size when objects were placed next to the 
magnified, compared to the unmagnified, hand. Second, in our previous work, we found 
that participants rapidly updated their perceived grasping capacity after attempting to 
grasp objects with their taped hand (Collier & Lawson, 2017a). This suggests that, 
although taping is a short-term manipulation, it is effective in influencing perceived 
grasping capacity. Thus, although our manipulation of grasping capacity differed to that 
used in Experiment 2 of Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011), we believe our method is 
appropriate for investigating the effect they reported. 
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Modular theories of perception claim that perception is cognitively impenetrable, 
meaning that it is not affected by higher-level cognition (Firestone, 2013; Firestone & 
Scholl, 2015). The action-specific account challenges cognitive impenetrability by 
suggesting that perception can be directly influenced by action capacity. However, here 
we only found effects consistent with the action-specific account when the experimental 
instructions explicitly stated the expected outcome (consistent with hypothesis guessing), 
or when participants estimated object size in a context which implied that their grasping 
capacity was relevant (consistent with context effects). If apparent grasping capacity can 
directly influence perceived object size, as the action-specific account claims (e.g. 
Linkenauger, Witt & Proffitt, 2011), then we should also have found scaling effects when 
hypothesis guessing and context effects were controlled for (e.g., in Collier & Lawson, 
2017a) but we did not. The effects we observed in the present studies therefore seem to 
reflect biases at the level of judgement as opposed to true perceptual changes. By 
extension, our results are consistent with the idea of cognitive impenetrability. 
In conclusion, the results of the present studies do not support the strong claim of 
the action-specific account that what we see is directly influenced by our action capacity. 
Our results instead suggest that the scaling effects on estimated object size that were 
interpreted as supporting the action-specific account by Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt 
(2011, Experiment 2) are more likely to have arisen from participants responding to 
subtle, easily overlooked cues within their experimental procedure. We are in agreement 
with Firestone and Scholl (2015) who observed: “If there is one unifying message running 
through our work on this topic, it is this: The details matter.” (p. 59). 
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3.7 Footnotes: Chapter 3
1 For each experiment reported here we also tested for the original effect reported by 
Linkenauger et al. (2011) that objects grasped by the right hand would be estimated as 
smaller than those grasped by the left hand: 
In Experiment 1, a mixed ANOVA where grasping hand (left/right) was a within-
participants factor and instruction group (action capacity/objective size/body size) and 
tape group (LHTaped/RHTaped) were between-subjects factors was conducted. There 
were no significant effects. For the main effects: grasping hand F(1, 48) = 0.037, p = .8, 
ηp2 = .001, instruction group, F(2, 48) = 0.754, p = .5, ηp 2 = .03, and tape group, F(1, 48) 
= 2.136, p = .2, ηp2 = .04. For the interactions: grasping hand × instruction group, F(2, 48) 
= 0.309, p = .7, ηp 2 = .01, grasping hand × tape group, F(1, 48) = 0.416, p = .5, ηp2 = .01, 
instruction group × tape group, F(2, 48) = 1.817, p = .2, ηp2 = .07, and grasping hand × 
instruction group × tape group, F(2, 48) = 0.517, p = .6, ηp2 = .02.  
In Experiment 2, a mixed ANOVA where grasping hand (left/right) was a within-
participants factor and tape group (LHTaped/RHTaped) was a between-subjects factor 
was conducted. There was no effect of grasping hand, F(1,16) = 0.194, p =.6, ηp2 = .01. 
There was a main effect of tape group, F(1, 16) = 5.977, p = .026, ηp2 = .27; the LHTaped 
group had greater estimates (m = 0.88, se = 0.10) than the RHTaped group (m = 0.73, se 
= 0.16). There was also a significant grasping hand × tape group interaction, F(1, 16) = 
7.282, p = .016, ηp2 = .31. Bonferroni corrected pairwise comparisons showed that for the 
RHTaped group, estimates were greater for the right hand than the left hand (mean 
difference = 0.05, p = .04), whereas there was no significant difference for the LHTaped 
group (mean difference = 0.04, p = .1). 
In Experiment 3, a mixed ANOVA where grasping hand (left/right) was a within-
participants factor and tape group (LHTaped/RHTaped) was a between-subjects factor 
was conducted. There were no significant main effects: grasping hand, F(1, 16) = 1.208, 
p = .3, ηp2 = .07, and tape group, F(1, 16) = 0.771, p = .4, ηp2 = .05. There was a significant 
grasping hand × tape group interaction, F(1, 16) = 4.936, p = .041, ηp2 = .24. Bonferroni 
corrected pairwise comparisons showed that for the LHTaped group estimates for the left 
hand were greater than for the right hand (mean difference = 0.26, p = .032) but for the 
RHTaped group there was no difference between estimates for the left and right hands 
(mean difference = -0.009, p = .4). 
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Chapter Four 
4. Size-contrast effects could explain at least one action-
specific effect 
 
4.1 Abstract 
 The action-specific account of perception proposes that what we see is directly 
affected by our action capacity. For example, Linkenauger et al. (2013, Experiment 1) 
used virtual reality to manipulate the apparent size of participants’ right hand. They 
reported that objects seen near the hands were estimated as larger when the hand was 
rendered as smaller, and vice versa when the hand was rendered as larger. However, this 
effect was not found when the visual size of a virtual avatar’s hands was manipulated 
(Linkenauger et al., 2013, Experiment 2). The authors claimed that these experiments 
provided evidence that perceived object size scales according to grasping capacity. Since 
no effect was found when the visual size of the avatar’s hands was manipulated, 
Linkenauger et al. (2013) claimed their effect could not be due to size-contrast effects. 
However, in Linkenauger et al. (2013, Experiment 2), participants could see their own 
hand. Critically, their hand did not change apparent size across trials. This means they 
could have used their own hand, instead of the avatar’s hands, as an anchor for object 
size. In the present study, we tested whether participants would estimate objects seen near 
their own hand (but not a fake hand) as smaller when the hand was visually enlarged using 
magnification. This manipulation has been used by proponents of the action-specific 
account in previous studies (e.g., Linkenauger, Witt & Proffitt, 2011). Participants who 
saw the fake hand kept their own hand out of sight so that it could not be used as an anchor 
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for object size. We found a magnification effect on estimated object size in both cases. 
This suggests that the results of studies where apparent grasping capacity was 
manipulated by changing visual hand size, such as Linkenauger et al. (2013), could arise 
from size-contrast effects. 
4.2  Introduction 
 The action-specific account of perception suggests that what we perceive is scaled 
according to our action capacity (for some recent reviews see Collier & Lawson, under 
review; Firestone, 2013; Philbeck & Witt, 2015; Proffitt, 2013; Proffitt & Linkenauger, 
2013; Witt, 2011a, 2017). This account proposes that we literally see the world in terms 
of our ability to act. Specifically, proponents of this account claim that the visual 
representation of the environment is scaled according to, for example, bioenergetics and 
energy expenditure (e.g., Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999; Schnall, Zadra & Proffitt, 2010; Zadra, 
Weltman & Proffitt, 2016) and performance variability (e.g., Witt & Sugovic, 2010; Witt 
et al., 2008). Action-specific scaling is also claimed to occur according to the functional 
morphology of the body (e.g., Linkenauger, Witt & Proffitt, 2011; Witt et al., 2005). For 
example, observers estimated targets that were out of reach to be nearer after reaching to 
them with a tool which expanded their maximum reach (Witt et al., 2005) and apertures 
were estimated as narrower when observers held a horizontal rod that was wider than their 
body (Stefanucci & Geuss, 2009). In another example, Linkenauger, Witt & Proffitt 
(2011, Experiment 2) reported that right handers underestimated the size of objects they 
intended to grasp with their right hand relative to objects they intended to grasp with their 
left hand. The authors claimed that this effect occurred because right handers perceive 
their right hand as having a greater grasping capacity than their left hand, and so objects 
appear more graspable – and therefore smaller – when they intend to grasp with their right 
hand. 
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We (Collier & Lawson, 2017a) failed to replicate Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt 
(2011, Experiment 2). Although we replicated the finding that right handers estimate the 
grasping capacity of their right hand to be greater than that of their left hand, this did not 
modulate estimates of object size (Collier & Lawson, 2017a, Experiments 2 & 3). 
However, the bias for right handers to estimate the grasping capacity of their right hand 
as greater than their left hand is a relatively small effect (~0.5 cm). Furthermore, neither 
Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011, Experiment 2) nor Collier and Lawson (2017a, 
Experiments 2 and 3) found evidence that, on average, the right hand actually can grasp 
larger objects than the left hand. Directly manipulating grasping capacity is a stronger 
way to test the claim that grasping capacity causally affects perceived object size. To this 
end, in Collier and Lawson (2017a, Experiments 4 & 5), we taped together participants’ 
fingers, which restricted both actual and perceived grasping capacity. In these 
experiments, participants estimated the size of blocks that they grasped in either their 
taped or untaped hands. We found that participants did not estimate objects as larger after 
grasping them in their taped hand than in their untaped hand, despite reporting that their 
grasping capacity was significantly reduced when their hand was taped. Thus, in Collier 
and Lawson (2017a) we found no evidence in support of the action-specific account of 
perception. 
Linkenauger and colleagues (Linkenauger, Witt & Proffitt, 2011, Experiment 3; 
Linkenauger et al., 2013) have taken a different approach to manipulating apparent 
grasping capacity, by changing visual hand size. For example, in their third experiment, 
Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011) used magnification to increase the visual size of 
participants’ right hand. On each trial, a block was placed next to the participant’s right 
hand. Participants were first asked whether they thought they could grasp the block and 
then they visually matched its size on a screen. They completed one subblock of trials 
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while their right hand was magnified, and another subblock while it was not. Blocks that 
were within perceived grasp were estimated as smaller when placed next to the magnified 
hand than the unmagnified hand. However, blocks that were beyond perceived maximum 
grasping capacity showed no effect. Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011) interpreted this 
as evidence for action-specific scaling, as the magnified hand may have been perceived 
as having a greater grasping capacity and so objects may have appeared smaller1. In a 
subsequent study with a similar motivation, Linkenauger et al. (2013) used virtual reality 
to manipulate the apparent size of participants’ right hand. They found that objects seen 
near the hand were estimated as larger when the hand was rendered as smaller, and vice 
versa when the hand was rendered as larger. Linkenauger et al. (2013) argued that this 
result also demonstrated action-specific scaling according to grasping capacity.  
However, the results of both Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011, Experiment 3) 
and Linkenauger et al. (2013) could have been driven by a size-contrast effect, where an 
object may appear smaller when placed next to a bigger object as a result of visual 
relativity (e.g., Obonai, 1954). To counter the possibility that their effect was driven by a 
size-contrast effect, Linkenauger et al. (2013) ran a series of other experiments. For 
example, in their second study, the hand size of a virtual avatar, which was positioned 
opposite the participant in the virtual environment, was manipulated. No effect was found 
in this experiment. The authors argued that this demonstrated that the effect they found 
when the size of the participants’ own hand was manipulated could not have been due to 
a size-contrast effect. If this were the case, they argued, then the same effect should have 
been found when the hands of the virtual avatar were manipulated. Linkenauger et al. 
(2013) also argued that, consistent with the action-specific account, their result showed 
that scaling effects are specific to one’s own body. 
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However, as we discussed in a recent review article (Collier & Lawson, under 
review), the participant’s own hand was also visible in Linkenauger et al. (2013, 
Experiment 2). This is problematic because it is possible that participants used their own 
hand as an anchor for object size rather than the hands of the avatar. There are at least 
two reasons why participants might employ this strategy. First, their own hand is a more 
familiar cue for object size than the hands of a virtual avatar. Second, their own hand 
remained a constant size throughout the experiment, making it a more stable anchor than 
the avatar’s hands, which changed in size on every trial. This means that Linkenauger et 
al.’s (2013) second experiment may not, in fact, provide strong evidence that the effect 
of manipulating participants’ own hand size was not simply a size-contrast effect.  
  In the present experiment, we tested whether visual changes in hand size produce 
effects consistent with the action-specific account because of true scaling according to 
grasping capacity, or a size-contrast effect. The combined results of Linkenauger, Witt 
and Proffitt (2011, Experiment 3) and Linkenauger et al. (2013) suggest that there are 
specific conditions under which changes in visual hand size should influence estimates 
of object size. Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011, Experiment 3) asked participants on 
every trial whether they believed they could grasp the presented block before they made 
their size estimates. This was done because action-specific effects are only expected when 
participants intend to act (Linkenauger, Witt & Proffitt, 2011; Witt et al., 2005). In 
addition, Linkenauger et al. (2013) claimed that action-specific effects are only expected 
when the size of one’s own hands changes. No effect is predicted when the size of another 
person’s hands changes. This means that changes in visual hand size should only affect 
estimates of object size when (1) participants intend to grasp an object, and (2) the size 
of participants’ own hand is manipulated. In the present experiment, we therefore tested 
four groups of participants: OwnHand-Estimate-Only, OwnHand-Graspability-and-Size, 
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FakeHand-Estimate-Only, and FakeHand-Graspability-and-Size. The only hand visible 
to participants was their own right hand for the OwnHand groups and a fake, plastic hand 
for the FakeHand groups. On every trial, participants in all groups visually matched the 
width of blocks placed next to the visible hand. They completed one set of trials while 
the visible hand was magnified and one where it was not. The Graspability-and-Size 
groups additionally judged whether they thought the block could be grasped (either by 
their own right hand or the fake hand) before making their size estimate. The action-
specific account predicts that only those in the OwnHand-Graspability-and-Size group 
should estimate blocks as smaller when the visible hand is magnified. This is because 
only this group satisfies both criteria for finding this effect. Obtaining the predicted effect 
in the other groups would be inconsistent with the action-specific account, and would 
instead suggest that both the results of both Linkenaguer, Witt and Proffitt (2011, 
Experiment 3) and Linkenauger et al. (2013) could be explained by a size-contrast effect. 
4.3 Method 
Ethical approval for this experiment was granted by the relevant local ethics 
committee at the University of Liverpool. 
4.3.1 Participants 
 Sixty-four participants2 (mean age = 24.6 years, 18 males) were recruited for this 
experiment. Participants either volunteered or were given course credit for their time. All 
but one self-reported as right handed. Ethical approval for this experiment was granted 
by the relevant local ethics committee at the University of Liverpool. 
4.3.2 Design 
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 Participants were assigned to one of four groups (n = 16 per group): OwnHand-
Estimate-Only, OwnHand-Graspability-and-Size, FakeHand-Estimate-Only, or 
FakeHand-Graspability-and-Size. Those in the own hand conditions viewed their own 
hand, while those in the fake hand conditions kept their hands out of sight and viewed a 
fake, plastic hand (lifelike colour, width at widest point = 8.7 cm, length at longest point 
= 14.2 cm). At the start of each trial, all participants were asked to rate the similarity 
between the length of the presented block and the length of the visible hand in the box. 
This ensured that all participants looked at both the hand and the block, which in provided 
confidence that all participants were equally likely to use the hand in the box as an anchor 
for object size. We also reasoned that this task reduced demand characteristics associated 
with providing no explanation for why the (either own or fake) hand was visible 
throughout the experiment. Those in the Graspability-and-Size groups additionally 
judged whether they thought the block could be grasped (either by their own right hand 
or by the fake hand if it could move; yes/no forced choice response) after making their 
similarity in size ratings. They were asked to make their graspability judgements based 
on placing the thumb on one side of the block and any other finger on the opposite side. 
Finally, participants in all groups estimated the width of the block. 
4.3.3 Apparatus and stimuli 
 The stimuli were 5 foamboard square blocks (0.5 cm thick) which were 5, 10, 20, 
30 and 40 cm in width. This range encompassed two blocks (5 & 10 cm) that were deemed 
to definitely be graspable, two blocks (30 & 40 cm) which were deemed to be definitely 
ungraspable and one block (20 cm) which was near the threshold of perceived maximum 
grasping capacity for the right hand based on Collier and Lawson (2017a, Experiment 33). 
Two boxes were constructed (dimensions = 28 × 21 × 9.8 cm). The top of one box was 
made from a transparent magnification sheet (which made objects placed in the box 
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appear ~50% larger than outside the box) while the top of the second box was made from 
clear plastic so the visible hand was not magnified. One of the boxes was placed on the 
table in front of the participant, on their right side (see Figure 1).  
4.3.4 Procedure 
 Participants sat at the table and placed their right hand inside one of the boxes, see 
Figure 1. On each trial, they closed their eyes while the experimenter placed one of the 
blocks flat on the table beside the box. Participants then opened their eyes to look at the 
block. They were asked how similar in length the block appeared relative to the visible 
hand as it appeared inside the box. Responses were made on a scale of 1 (very different) 
to 10 (the same length).  The OwnHand-Graspability-and-Size and FakeHand-
Graspability-and-Size groups then judged whether they thought the block could be 
grasped by the hand as it appeared in the box by verbally responding yes or no. 
Participants then estimated the width of the block. The experimenter slowly pulled out a 
tape measure, with the numbers facing away from the participant. The participant verbally 
guided them by saying “bigger” or “smaller” until they thought that the visible length of 
tape measure matched the width of the block. The tape measure was pulled out vertically 
to minimise the use of landmark matching strategies, and the experimenter looked away 
from the tape measure while pulling it so that they could not see participants’ estimates 
until the end of the trial. To ensure that responses were as accurate as possible, after the 
participant said “stop”, the experimenter encouraged them to make minor adjustments to 
their response. After any minor adjustments were made and the participant was satisfied 
with their response, the experimenter recorded their estimate. The participant then closed 
their eyes and the block was exchanged for the next block. The visible hand was not 
removed from the box between trials. Participants estimated the width of each block in 
two subblocks of trials: one with the visible hand inside the magnifying box and one with 
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the visible hand inside the non-magnifying box, see Figure 1. Subblock order was 
counterbalanced across participants within each group, and block presentation order was 
randomised within each subblock for each participant.  
 
 
Figure 1: The experimental set-up for the OwnHand (A, top) and FakeHand (B, bottom) 
groups for a non-magnifying, control box trial (left) and a magnifying box trial (right). 
The experimenter (E) and participant (P) are represented by circles next to a rectangle 
representing the table with a square block stimulus on it and the control or magnifying 
box. Participants in the OwnHand conditions kept their left hand only out of sight, while 
participants in the FakeHand conditions kept both of their hands out of sight. 
 
4.4 Results   
 Table 1 shows the mean width and length of the visible hand in the OwnHand and 
the FakeHand groups. Table 2 shows the mean estimated size of each block for each 
group.  
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Table 1 
Actual mean (and standard deviation, for the real right hands only) for the visible hand 
width and length. The same fake hand was used in both FakeHand groups. 
 Unmagnified Magnified 
Group Width 
(cm) 
Length 
(cm) 
Width 
(cm) 
Length 
(cm) 
OwnHand-Estimate-Only 9.6 (0.9) 17.1 (1.2) 14.4 (1.4) 25.7 (1.7) 
Own-hand-Graspability-and-Size 9.7 (0.7) 17.2 (1.3) 14.5 (1.1) 25.8 (2.0) 
Fake hand (both groups) 8.7 14.2 13.1 21.3 
 
Table 2 
Mean (and standard deviation) estimated block width, as a ratio of actual block width, 
for each block in all groups. M = magnified condition, UM = unmagnified condition. 
 OwnHand 
Estimate-Only 
OwnHand 
Graspability- 
and-Size 
FakeHand 
Estimate-Only 
FakeHand 
Graspability-
and-Size 
Block 
Width 
(cm) 
M UN M UN M UN M UN 
5 1.01 
(0.14) 
1.09 
(0.19) 
1.08 
(0.22) 
1.14 
(0.28) 
1.04 
(0.11) 
1.14 
(0.12) 
1.04 
(0.20) 
1.11 
(0.15) 
10 0.98 
(0.11) 
0.99 
(0.12) 
1.01 
(0.16) 
1.06 
(0.16) 
0.99 
(0.13) 
1.07 
(0.11) 
1.00 
(0.16) 
1.03 
(0.15) 
20 0.94 
(0.11) 
1.01 
(0.16) 
0.96 
(0.14) 
0.96 
(0.12) 
0.98 
(0.10) 
0.99 
(0.07) 
0.94 
(0.13) 
0.98 
(0.14) 
30 0.91 
(0.11) 
0.93 
(0.11) 
0.93 
(0.11) 
0.96 
(0.12) 
0.98 
(0.10) 
1.01 
(0.09) 
0.92 
(0.14) 
0.91 
(0.13) 
40 0.93 
(0.12) 
0.96 
(0.09) 
0.99 
(0.11) 
0.94 
(0.13) 
0.98 
(0.14) 
1.01 
(0.14) 
0.92 
(0.11) 
0.92 
(0.11) 
 
For each block for each participant, perceived block size was calculated as a ratio 
of actual block size by dividing estimated by actual block size. These ratios were used as 
the dependent variable in a repeated measures ANOVA with magnification 
(Magnified/Unmagnified) as a within-participants factor, and visible hand (Own/Fake) 
and task (SizeOnly/GraspabilityThenSize) as between-participants factors. This revealed 
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that blocks were estimated as smaller when placed next to the magnified hand (m = 0.98, 
se = 0.01) than the control, unmagnified hand (m = 1.01, se = 0.01), F(1, 60) = 16.882, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .22. There were no other significant effects. For the main effects: hand, F(1, 
60) = 0.347, p = .6, ηp2 = .006; task, F(1, 60) = 0.048, p = .8, ηp2 = .001. For the 
interactions: magnification × hand, F(1, 60) = 0.261, p = .6, ηp2 = .004; magnification × 
task, F(1, 60) = 1.576, p = .2, ηp2 = .003; hand × task, F(1, 60) = 2.367, p = .2, ηp2 = .04; 
magnification × hand × task, F(1, 60) < 0.001, p = .9, ηp2 < .001, see Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2: Mean ratio (estimated/actual) of block size for the unmagnified and magnified 
hands in each group. A ratio of 1 (highlighted in bold) represents perfect accuracy. Error 
bars show one standard error of the mean.  
 
 
4.5 Discussion 
 Participants estimated the width of blocks placed next to a magnified hand as 
smaller than blocks placed next to an unmagnified hand. This effect occurred regardless 
of whether the hand was the participants’ own hand or a fake hand, and regardless of 
whether or not participants were asked to report the graspability of the blocks before they 
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estimated block width. The direction of this effect on size estimates for the OwnHand 
groups is consistent with the prediciton of the action-specific account of perception. 
However, this account cannot explain these results because it claims that magnification 
should only affect estimates of the size of a nearby object when the participant's own hand 
(and not a fake hand) appears to change size (Linkenauger et al., 2013) and when 
participants intend to grasp that object (Linkenauger, Witt & Proffitt, 2011). Given that 
we found that neither of these factors affected performance, we propose that our results 
and those of Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011, Experiment 3) and Linkenauger et al. 
(2013) may arise from a different effect, namely a  size-contrast effect. Specifically, 
objects may appear relatively smaller when placed next to a larger object (e.g., Obonai, 
1954). The Ebbinghaus illusion (e.g., Roberts, Harris & Yates, 2005) is one example of 
this, where the estimated size of a central disc is affected by the size of the discs that 
surround it: when surrounded by larger discs, the central disc is perceived as smaller, and 
when surrounded by smaller discs, the central disc is perceived as larger. A similar 
mechanism may have caused the blocks in this experiment to appear smaller when placed 
next to a magnified compared to an unmagnified hand.  
Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011, Experiment 3) did consider whether their 
results arose from a size-contrast effect. They ultimately rejected the possibility because 
they found an effect of magnification only for objects that were within perceived grasping 
capacity which, they argued, was only consistent with an action-specific account and not 
a size-contrast explanation. However, in our own work, we have found no evidence that 
the perceived graspability of objects influences whether estimates of object size show 
effects consistent with the action-specific account or not. For example, in Collier and 
Lawson (2017a), we did not find effects consistent with the action-specific account 
whether we analysed the data for only objects that were within perceived maximum grasp, 
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only objects within actual maximum grasp, or for all objects including those that were too 
large to grasp. Thus, we are unconvinced by Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt’s (2011, 
Experiment 3) argument. An alternative explanation for why seeing a magnified hand 
reduced estimates of the size of a nearby object, but only for graspable objects, as reported 
by Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011, Experiment 3) is that size-contrast effects have 
been shown to be asymmetrical. For instance, the Ebbinghaus illusion was found to be 
stronger when the central disc was surrounded by larger discs than when it was 
surrounded by smaller discs (Ehrenstein & Hamada, 1995; see also Roberts et al., 2005). 
In Ehrenstein and Hamada (1995), participants estimated the size of the central disc of an 
Ebbinghaus illusion configuration relative to the size of a comparator disc which was 
equal in size to the central disc and had no surrounding discs. They found that when the 
surrounding discs were larger than the central disc, participants reliably estimated the 
central disc as smaller than the comparator disc. In contrast, when the central discs were 
smaller than the surrounding disc, participants often estimated the central disc as larger 
than the comparison disc, but less reliably and not to the same magnitude (Ehrenstein & 
Hamada, 1995). Applied to Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011, Experiment 3), this 
means that objects which were smaller than the magnified-or-not hand (which were also, 
presumably, more likely to be reported as graspable) may have produced a strong size-
contrast effect, whereas objects which were larger than the magnified-or-not hand (which 
were, presumably, more likely to be reported as ungraspable) may have produced a 
weaker size-contrast effect. 
Witt (2017) acknowledged that studies which manipulate apparent grasping 
capacity by changing the visual size of the hands could be problematic as they risk 
inducing size-contrast effects. She claimed that these methods are used because it is not 
straightforward to directly manipulate grasping capacity. We disagree with Witt (2017) 
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that it is difficult to directly manipulate grasping capacity (see Collier & Lawson, under 
review, for a discussion). For example, we have used a simple taping manipulation to 
change grasping capacity. The taping manipulation is more appropriate than using 
magnification because unlike magnification, taping is a direct manipulation of grasping 
capacity and it minimises the possibility of size contrast effects since the taped hand does 
not, itself, shrink in size, rather maximum finger spread is reduced.  
In addition, not all experiments investigating the apparent effect of grasping 
capacity on estimated object size which have found effects consistent with the action-
specific account have manipulated visual hand size. For example, Linkenauger, Witt and 
Proffitt (2011, Experiment 2) instead took advantage of the bias for right handers to 
overestimate the grasping capacity of their right hand relative to their left hand (Collier 
& Lawson, 2017a; Linkenauger, Witt & Proffitt, 2011). However, this bias is relatively 
weak. For example, in Collier and Lawson (2017a, Experiment 3), we found that right 
handers believed the grasping capacity of their left hand was only, on average, 0.5 cm 
lower than that of their right hand.  In contrast, when we taped the fingers of one hand 
together, the perceived reduction in grasping capacity was, on average, ~3 cm (Collier & 
Lawson, 2017a, Experiments 4 and 5). Furthermore, for hand dominance, neither 
Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011, Experiment 2) nor Collier and Lawson (2017a, 
Experiments 2 & 3) found a difference in the actual grasping capacity of the left and right 
hands. In contrast, the taping manipulation has been shown to reduce actual as well as 
perceived grasping capacity (Collier & Lawson, 2017a, Experiments 4 & 5). We suggest 
that taping, which produces a strong effect on both perceived and actual grasping capacity 
whilst minimising visual differences in hand size is a superior means to magnification to 
alter grasping capacity and investigate the claims of the action-specific account. 
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One limitation of the present study is that participants did few trials as it was 
originally designed as a pilot study to investigate whether magnification would have any 
effect on estimates of object size. Since effects consistent with the action-specific account 
have proven difficult to replicate in the past (e.g. Collier & Lawson, 2017a; de Grave et 
al., 2011; Woods et al., 2009; see Firestone, 2013, for a discussion), we reasoned that 
running a pilot study to investigate the reliability of the effect reported by Linkenauger, 
Witt and Proffitt (2011, Experiment 3) would be valuable. In future work, we intend to 
repeat this experiment with more trials per participant and a wider array of block sizes. 
Nevertheless, the present work provides preliminary evidence that the effects reported by 
Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011, Experiment 3) and Linkenauger et al. (2013) could 
have arisen from size-contrast effects rather than demonstrating an influence of grasping 
capacity on estimates of object size. Participants estimated blocks placed next to a 
magnified hand as smaller than blocks placed next to an unmagnified hand, regardless of 
whether the hand was the participants’ own hand or a fake hand, and regardless of whether 
participants were asked to report the graspability of the blocks or not. The action-specific 
account cannot explain these results. Therefore, we conclude that the results of 
experiments manipulating grasping capacity by changing visual hand size do not provide 
strong evidence for the action-specific account.  
  
  
142 
 
4.6 Footnotes: Chapter 4
1 Sixty-seven participants were tested, but the data from three participants was not 
analysed (two from the OwnHand-SizeOnly group and one from the OwnHand-
GraspabilityThenSize group). Two of these participants correctly guessed the purpose of 
the study during debrief, and one was replaced because of experimenter error. 
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Chapter Five:  
5. The action-specific account lacks predictive power 
 
*This chapter has been accepted for publication as: 
Collier, E. S., & Lawson, R. (in press). Trapped in a tight spot: scaling effects 
occur when, according to the action-specific account, they should not, and fail to 
occur when they should. Attention, Perception & Psychophysics. 
 
5.1 Abstract 
The action-specific account of perception claims that what we see is perceptually scaled 
according to our action capacity. However, it has been argued that this account has relied 
on an overly confirmatory research strategy – predicting the presence of, and then finding, 
an effect (Firestone & Scholl, 2014). A comprehensive approach should also test 
disconfirmatory predictions, where no effect is expected. In two experiments, we tested 
one such prediction based on the action-specific account, namely that scaling effects 
should occur only when participants intend to act (Witt et al., 2005). All participants wore 
asymmetric gloves, where one glove was padded with extra material so one hand was 
wider than the other. Participants visually estimated the width of apertures. The action-
specific account predicts that apertures should be estimated as narrower for the wider 
hand, but only when participants intend to act. We found this scaling effect when it should 
not have occurred (Experiment 1, for participants who did not intend to act), and no effect 
when it should have occurred (Experiment 2, for participants who intended to act but who 
were given a cover story for the visibility and position of their hands). Thus the cover 
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story used in Experiment 2 eliminated the scaling effect found in Experiment 1. We 
suggest that the scaling effect observed in Experiment 1 likely resulted from demand 
characteristics associated with using a salient, unexplained manipulation (e.g., telling 
people which hand to use to do the task). Our results suggest that the action-specific 
account lacks predictive power. 
 
5.2 Introduction 
Given the tight coupling between action and perception (e.g., Clark, 1999; 
Franchak et al., 2010; Gibson, 1979), the action-specific account of perception proposes 
that what we perceive is scaled according to our action capacity (Proffitt, 2013; Proffitt 
& Linkenauger, 2013; Witt, 2011, 2016; Witt, et al., 2016). One of the earliest findings 
that suggested that visual perception scales according to participants’ action capacity was 
that participants estimated hills as steeper after vigorous exercise than before exercising 
(Proffitt et al., 1995, Experiment 5). Subsequently, Bhalla and Proffitt (1999) reported 
that hills were also estimated as steeper by participants who wore a heavy backpack, were 
elderly or in ill health, or had low physical fitness. Many later studies have reported 
effects consistent with the action-specific account (for reviews, see Proffitt, 2013; Proffitt 
& Linkenauger, 2013; Witt, 2011a, 2017). Proffitt and Linkenauger (2013) suggested that 
perception can be scaled according to three components of action capacity: the 
bioenergetic cost of acting, performance variability and action capacity pertaining to the 
functional morphology of the body. For example, for bioenergetics, Witt et al., (2004) 
reported that distances to a target were estimated as greater after participants threw a 
heavy ball than a light ball. For scaling according to performance variability, Witt and 
Dorsch (2009) found that goalposts were estimated as higher by participants with worse 
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kicking performance. For functional morphology, Linkenauger, Leyrer, Bülthoff and 
Mohler (2013) used virtual reality to alter participants’ perceived hand size. They found 
that objects seen near the hand were estimated as larger when the hand was rendered as 
smaller, and vice versa when the hand was rendered as larger. In short, the action-specific 
account proposes that we literally perceive the world as scaled in terms of our ability to 
perform actions (for reviews, see Firestone, 2013; Linkenauger, 2015; Philbeck & Witt, 
2015). 
However, there are a number of concerns with the action-specific account (e.g., 
Collier & Lawson, 2017a, 2017b; Durgin et al., 2009; Firestone, 2013). For example, 
Firestone and Scholl (2014; see also Firestone & Scholl, 2015) argued that this account 
has relied on an overly confirmatory research strategy – that is predicting, and then 
finding, a given effect. A comprehensive account of a phenomenon should also be able 
to predict the absence of an effect. Firestone and Scholl (2014) suggested employing the 
El Greco fallacy to test disconfirmatory predictions of the action-specific account. 
According to this fallacy, if perception of both the stimulus and the means of reproducing 
the stimulus are expected to show the same distortion following some manipulation, then 
the two distortions should cancel each other out and no overall distortion should be 
perceived. Firestone and Scholl (2014) applied this logic to the finding that apertures were 
estimated as narrower when participants held a horizontal rod that was wider than their 
body (Stefanucci & Geuss, 2009). For example, participants in Stefanucci and Geuss’ 
(2009) second experiment estimated the width of apertures by verbally guiding the 
experimenter to adjust the length of a tape measure until the length matched the width of 
an aperture that they were told to imagine walking through. There were four groups of 
participants. The hold group held a long rod horizontally in front of their body, with their 
arms wide apart. The hands only group positioned their arms in the same way as the hold 
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group, but did not hold the rod. The wear group wore a backpack to which the rod was 
attached, so the rod was positioned as for the hold group but participants kept their arms 
by their sides. Finally, the control group kept their arms by their sides and had no rod. 
Participants in the hold and hands only groups estimated apertures as narrower than those 
in the wear and control groups. Stefanucci and Geuss (2009) interpreted this as evidence 
that participants who had their body widened in a functionally meaningful way perceived 
apertures as less passable, and therefore narrower. Participants in Firestone and Scholl’s 
(2014) replication of this study either held or did not hold a rod and verbally guided the 
experimenter to make adjustments to visually match the width of apertures that they 
imagined walking through. However, instead of a tape measure, the experimenter 
adjusted the width of a second aperture (the matching aperture) that was placed 
perpendicular to, but was otherwise identical to, the aperture that participants imagined 
walking through (the stimulus aperture). Firestone and Scholl (2014) found that 
participants who held the rod estimated apertures as wider than participants who did not 
hold the rod. Importantly, holding a rod should have influenced both the stimulus aperture 
and the matching aperture in the same way, by making it appear less passable. Thus, 
according to the El Greco fallacy, this should have made it impossible to detect a scaling 
effect and so, although the scaling effect reported by Stefanucci and Geuss (2009) was 
replicated by Firestone and Scholl (2014), this in fact provides evidence against, not for, 
action-specific scaling. 
If effects consistent with the action-specific account occur when they should not, 
what instead explains their occurrence? Firestone and Scholl (2014) showed that the 
scaling effect on apertures that they observed disappeared if participants were given a 
convincing cover story for holding the rod. This suggests that the effect originally 
reported by Stefanucci and Geuss (2009) could have resulted from demand characteristics 
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due to being asked to hold a rod without any explanation. Demand characteristics (Orne, 
1962) can also explain other scaling effects that had originally been interpreted as 
supporting the action-specific account (Collier & Lawson, 2017b; Durgin et al., 2009). 
For example, in some of the first studies to provide evidence for the action-specific 
account, hills were estimated as steeper when observers wore a heavy backpack (Proffitt, 
et al., 1995; Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999). However, Durgin et al. (2009) found that if 
participants were provided with a cover story for wearing the backpack, their slant 
estimates were no different to participants who did not wear the backpack. This suggests 
that participants who were not given a reason for the backpack manipulation may have 
figured out that it was intended to influence their slant estimates and adjusted their 
responses accordingly. Therefore at least some scaling effects could result from demand 
characteristics associated with a salient, unexplained manipulation.  
The reason that action-specific researchers often ask participants to imagine 
performing a relevant action, as in Stefanucci and Geuss (2009) and Firestone and Scholl 
(2014), is that scaling effects are only expected when participants intend to act (Witt, 
Proffitt & Epstein, 2005). The role of intention to act in the representation of space was 
first investigated in electrophysiological studies on monkeys by Iriki, Tanaka and 
Iwamura (1996). These authors identified neurons which fired when a raisin was placed 
within the monkey’s reach, but did not fire when the raisin was placed beyond reach. 
Furthermore, after the monkeys were taught to reach with a tool, these neurons adapted 
and now fired when raisins were placed out of arm’s reach, but still within reach using 
the tool. However, this adaptation did not occur when the monkeys held, but never 
reached with, the tool (Iriki et al., 1996). This was interpreted by Witt et al. (2005) as 
evidence that intention to act may be critical for changes in the representation of near 
space to occur.  
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Based on Iriki et al.’s (1996) findings, Witt et al. (2005) tested whether intention 
to act modulated perception of near space in humans. Witt et al. (2005) found that 
participants estimated the distance to targets that were out of arm's reach as shorter after 
reaching to them with a tool which increased maximum reach and made the targets 
reachable. However, this effect was only found for participants who actually reached with 
the tool. No effect was found for participants who held the tool, but never reached with 
it. The authors interpreted this as support for their claim that action-specific effects only 
occur when people intend to act. Intention to act has been argued as critical for finding 
scaling effects in a number of subsequent studies (e.g., Lessard, Linkenauger & Proffitt, 
2009; Linkenauger, Witt & Proffitt, 2011; Stefanucci & Geuss, 2009; Witt & Proffitt, 
2008). We therefore tested here whether scaling effects due to changes in action capacity 
occurred if, and only if, participants intend to act. 
To summarise, a comprehensive theoretical account should be able to predict both 
the presence and absence of an effect. Although the action-specific account has largely 
relied on a confirmatory research strategy (Firestone & Scholl, 2014, 2015), this account 
makes the disconfirmatory prediction that scaling effects should only be found when 
participants intend to act. In the present studies, we tested this prediction for the task of 
estimating aperture width. 
5.3 Experiment 1 
The passability of aperture width is a good candidate for testing the claims of the 
action-specific account. People’s perception of whether they can walk through an aperture 
is dependent on their body size (Franchak, Celano & Adolph, 2012) and can rapidly be 
recalibrated following an increase in body girth (Franchak & Adolph, 2014). Similarly, 
Ishak, Adolph and Lin (2008) reported that people recalibrate whether their hand can fit 
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through a variable-width aperture following an increase in hand width. Specifically, when 
participants wore a prosthesis on their hand which increased their hand width, they 
appropriately judged the minimum passable aperture width for that hand as wider. The 
results of Franchak and colleagues and of Ishak et al. (2008) demonstrate that people are 
sensitive to changes to their action capacity following a change in the functional 
morphology of their body. However, crucially, these results are not relevant to the claims 
of the action-specific account. This account predicts that estimates of spatial properties 
of action-relevant stimuli should be affected by changes in functional morphology. 
Specifically, here, the action-specific account predicts that people should perceive 
apertures that they intend to move their wider hand through as narrower, but only when 
they intend to act in this way (e.g., Witt et al., 2005; Linkenauger, Witt & Proffitt, 2011). 
No scaling effect on estimates of aperture size should be found if participants do not 
intend to act on the aperture.  
In Experiment 1, in separate tasks, we tested both whether participants’ estimates 
of the narrowest aperture they could fit their hand through (action capacity task) and their 
estimates of aperture width (perceptual task) were affected by wearing a padded glove. 
The aperture apparatus, gloves, and method for measuring perceived aperture passability 
in the action capacity task were closely based on the methods of Ishak et al. (2008). The 
visual matching method used in the perceptual task was the same as that used in other 
work investigating the action-specific account (e.g., Collier & Lawson, 2017a, 2017b; 
Linkenauger, Witt & Proffitt, 2011).  
5.3.1 Method 
Ethical approval was granted for all of the experiments presented in this paper by 
the relevant local ethics committee at the University of Liverpool. 
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5.3.1.1 Participants 
Thirty-six participants (23 females, mean age = 21.8 years) were recruited from 
the University of Liverpool. All participants self-reported as right handed and were 
rewarded with course credit for their participation.  
5.3.1.2 Design 
 Participants were assigned to either the Intention-To-Act group or the No-
Intention group. All participants completed two tasks: a perceptual task where they 
estimated the width of apertures, and an action capacity task where they judged whether 
they could fit their hand through apertures of different widths. These tasks are described 
in detail below. The Intention-To-Act group (n = 18) completed the action capacity task 
before the perceptual task and, on each trial of the perceptual task, they were asked 
whether they thought they could fit their hand through the aperture before estimating its 
width. This is a technique used by proponents of the action-specific account to ensure that 
participants intend to act in the way that the experimenter is interested in (e.g., 
Linkenauger, Witt & Proffitt, 2011). The No-Intention group (n = 18) completed the 
perceptual task before the action capacity task and they were not asked whether they 
thought they could fit their hand through the aperture during the perceptual task. 
Therefore, only the Intention-To-Act group intended to act while estimating aperture 
width1. 
5.3.1.3 Apparatus, stimuli and procedure 
An aperture apparatus was created using a metal frame which held two wooden 
boards, see Figure 1. One board was fixed and the other could move to vary the width of 
a diamond-shaped aperture between 0 cm (minimum) and 30 cm (maximum). A mug was 
placed on a small table behind the aperture apparatus, with the handle facing the 
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participant. A laptop was placed in front of the aperture apparatus. Two black lines were 
displayed on its screen. The lines began at a default distance of 1.75 cm apart. Each press 
of the up arrow on the laptop keyboard moved the lines 1 mm further apart and each press 
of the down arrow moved the lines closer together by 1 mm.  
 
Figure 1: Diagram showing the aperture apparatus used in Experiment 1. The same 
apparatus was used in Experiment 2 except that the laptop was placed at 90o to the 
aperture.  
 
 Participants wore a pair of gloves throughout the experiment. The left (Padded) 
glove had additional woollen material sewn into the little finger-side of the glove2. The 
right (Unpadded) glove had no padding. Here, we refer to the hands as Padded or 
Unpadded but the experimenter always referred to the “left” or “right” hand when 
communicating with participants, and participants were not informed about the padding.  
Action capacity task 
On every trial of the action capacity task, participants were asked whether they 
thought they could fit their hand through the aperture in order to touch the mug on the 
other side, see Figure 1. If, and only if, they thought they could fit their hand though the 
aperture did they then attempt to actually do so. If they thought they could not fit their 
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hand through, they verbally responded “no”. They were told to judge passability based 
on their hand being held flat and oriented horizontally with their fingers close together 
and their thumb tucked under their fingers. They were told not to twist their hand, screw 
their fingers into a fist or bunch their fingers together. On each trial, the experimenter told 
them to use either their left (Padded) or right (Unpadded) hand. Responses were coded as 
“success” (participant could reach through the aperture), “failure” (participants attempted 
to reach through but their hand did not fit) or “refusal” (participants said that their hand 
would not fit through the aperture), see Figure 2. Aperture width ranged from 4 cm to 14 
cm in 0.5 cm increments. Participants judged whether they could fit their left (Padded) or 
right (Unpadded) hand through each aperture width 3 times, giving 126 trials in total (2 
hands × 21 aperture widths × 3 repeats) with trials presented in a different random order 
for each participant.  
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Figure 2: Diagram showing a participant completing the action capacity task in 
Experiment 1. The experimenter (E) first asked the participant (P) whether they could fit 
their hand through the aperture. The participant responded by either attempting the action 
(no verbal response given) or by verbally responding “no” and refusing to attempt. 
Responses were coded as “success” (participant successfully reached through the 
aperture, top), “failure” (participants attempted to reach through but their hand did not fit, 
middle) or “refusal” (participants said that their hand would not fit through the aperture, 
bottom). 
 
Perceptual task 
In this task participants were asked to use the arrow keys on the keyboard to move 
the lines on the screen until the distance between them matched the width of the aperture. 
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Participants in the No-Intention Group were only told to match the width of the aperture 
on each trial, see Figure 3 (top). In contrast, on every trial in the perceptual task, before 
matching aperture width, participants in the Intention-To-Act Group were asked whether 
they thought they could fit one of their hands through the aperture, see Figure 3 (bottom). 
Unlike in the action capacity task, here participants did not actually attempt to move their 
hand through the aperture.  
On each trial of the perceptual task, the experimenter told the participant which 
hand they should use to respond. For the Intention-To-Act Group, this was always the 
same hand that they had just judged aperture passability for. Participants were told to 
keep their other hand by their side so that it was out of sight. Between trials, they kept 
both hands by the sides of their body and closed their eyes until the experimenter had 
adjusted the width of the aperture. The aperture widths used were the same as in the action 
capacity task. Participants matched each aperture width once using each hand, giving a 
total of 42 trials (2 hands × 21 aperture widths) with trials presented in a different random 
order for each participant.  
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Figure 3: Diagram showing participants in the No-Intention group (top) and in the 
Intention-To-Act group (bottom) completing the perceptual task in Experiment 1. For 
both groups the experimenter asked the participant (P) to use the arrow keys to move the 
lines on the laptop screen to match the width of the aperture. In the Intention-To-Act 
group the participant was also asked whether they could fit their left (or right) hand 
through the aperture immediately before matching its width. 
 
Actual aperture passability task 
After participants had completed both the perceptual and action capacity tasks, 
the experimenter measured the actual narrowest aperture that they could fit their hands 
through. The experimenter opened the aperture to 15 cm and asked participants to place 
their hand inside it with their hand held flat and horizontally with their fingers close 
together and their thumb tucked under their fingers. The experimenter then closed the 
aperture around the participant’s hand and asked the participant to move their hand in and 
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out of the aperture. The experimenter adjusted the aperture until it was at the narrowest 
width that still allowed the participant to fit their hand through without getting it trapped. 
Participants were only told to move their hand during this task; they were not asked about 
aperture passability. The minimum passable aperture was measured for each hand both 
with and without the gloves.  
5.3.2 Results 
Effect of wearing gloves on actual aperture passability 
To check that the glove manipulation was effective, we tested whether wearing 
the gloves changed the actual minimum passable aperture for each hand. We conducted 
a mixed ANOVA where hand (Padded/Unpadded) and gloves (With/Without) were 
within-participants factors and group (Intention-To-Act/No-Intention) was a between-
participants factor. There was a significant main effect of gloves, F(1, 34) = 38.351, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .53, which was modulated by a hand × gloves interaction, F(1, 34) = 40.090, 
p < .001, ηp2 = .54. Bonferroni corrected pairwise comparisons showed that, with gloves, 
the minimum passable aperture was greater for the Padded hand (m = 10.4 cm, se = 0.14 
cm) than the Unpadded hand (m = 9.6 cm, se = 0.15 cm), whereas there was no significant 
difference between the Padded and Unpadded hands without gloves (m = 9.8 cm, se = 
0.12 cm; m = 9.5 cm, se = 0.13 cm, respectively). There was no effect of group, F(1, 34) 
= 0.038, p = .8, ηp2 = .001. There were no other significant interactions: gloves × group, 
F(1, 34) = 1.060, p = .3, ηp2 = .03; hand × group, F(1, 34) = 0.708, p = .4, ηp2 = .02; gloves 
× hand × group, F(1, 34) = 0.216, p = .6, ηp2 = .01. Wearing a padded glove therefore 
significantly increased hand width, as we had intended.  
Action capacity task: perceived aperture passability 
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We tested whether participants appropriately recalibrated their perception of 
aperture passability to reflect the asymmetry in hand width caused by wearing the gloves. 
For each width tested, for each hand, for each participant, we calculated the proportion of 
times that participants said that they could not fit their hand through that aperture in the 
action capacity task. Cumulative Gaussians were then fitted, from which we calculated 
the predicted width at which participants believed they could not fit each hand through 
50% of the time (the point of subjective equality, PSE; the mean Cumulative Gaussians 
can be found in Appendix A). These PSEs provided an estimate of the minimum aperture 
width participants perceived they could fit their hand through.  
PSEs were used as the dependent variable in a mixed ANOVA where hand 
(Padded/Unpadded) was a within-participants factor and group (Intention-To-Act/No-
Intention) was a between-participants factor. Participants perceived the minimum 
passable aperture width for their Padded gloved hand (m = 10.6 cm, se = 0.16 cm) to be 
greater than that for their Unpadded gloved hand (m = 9.9 cm, se = 0.14 cm), F(1, 34) = 
76.113, p < .001, ηp2 = .70. There was no effect of group, F(1, 34) = 0.067, p = .8, ηp2 = 
.002, or a hand × group interaction, F(1, 34) = 1.579, p = .2, ηp2 = .04. Thus participants 
appropriately recalibrated their perception of the minimum aperture width that each 
gloved hand could fit through during the action capacity task by increasing their estimates 
for the Padded hand. 
Perceptual task: estimated aperture width 
Finally, we tested the critical action-specific prediction that apertures would be 
estimated as narrower for the Padded hand by the Intention-To-Act group but not by the 
No-Intention group. Ratios were calculated by dividing estimates of aperture width by 
actual aperture width and then averaging over all widths for a given hand of a participant. 
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These ratios were used as the dependent variable in a mixed ANOVA where hand 
(Padded/Unpadded) was a within-participants factor and group (Intention-To-Act/No-
Intention) was a between-participants factor. Ratios for the Padded hand (m = 0.68, se = 
0.02) were significantly lower than for the Unpadded hand (m = 0.69, se = 0.02), F(1, 34) 
= 6.557, p = .015, ηp2 = .16, see Figure 4. Although the effect we observed is small, this 
is common in the action-specific literature (see Firestone, 2013, for a discussion). There 
was no effect of group, F(1, 34) = 0.058, p = .8, ηp2 = .002, or a hand × group interaction, 
F(1, 34) = 0.027, p = .9, ηp2 = .001. Figure 5 shows the ratios for the Padded and Unpadded 
hand given by each individual participant. 
 
Figure 4: Results of the perceptual task in Experiment 1. Mean ratio of aperture size 
(estimated/actual) for each hand for each group. Error bars represent one standard error 
of the mean. 
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Figure 5: Individual estimates of aperture width (as a ratio of actual aperture width) for 
the Padded and Unpadded hands in the Intention-to-Act (top) and No-Intention (bottom) 
groups. The bold and dashed vertical lines show the mean ratios for the Padded and 
Unpadded hands respectively. Participants are ordered by increasing ratio of aperture 
width for the Unpadded hand. Cases where only one data point are shown indicate no 
difference between ratios for the Padded and Unpadded hand. 
 
5.3.3 Discussion 
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Padding one hand increased the minimum passable aperture for that hand. 
Furthermore, this change was perceived by participants: in the action capacity task, 
participants estimated the minimum passable aperture for their Padded hand as wider than 
for their Unpadded hand. This latter result is consistent with previous results (Collier & 
Lawson, 2017a; Ishak et al., 2008), showing that participants appropriately recalibrate 
their perceived action capacity following a change in the functional morphology of their 
hands. Of most interest theoretically was the perceptual task. Participants estimated 
apertures as narrower when they estimated with their Padded compared to their Unpadded 
hand (see Figure 4) but, importantly, this was effect was not just due to estimates by the 
Intention-To-Act group. The action-specific account claims that intention is necessary for 
finding the scaling effects predicted by this account (e.g. Linkenauger, Witt & Proffitt, 
2011; Stefanucci & Geuss, 2009; Witt, 2017; Witt et al., 2005). Therefore, this account 
cannot explain the results of the perceptual task since participants in the No-Intention 
group were not asked to report aperture passability, and therefore they did not intend to 
act.  
An alternative explanation of our results is that demand characteristics could have 
arisen from explicitly telling participants whether to use either their left (Padded) or their 
right (Unpadded) hand to respond when they estimated aperture width. No explanation 
was provided for this manipulation, and participants may have deduced that we expected 
to find a hand-dependent effect. As a consequence some participants may, for example, 
have decided that they should use their visible hand as an anchor for estimating aperture 
width. Since right handers believe that their right hand is larger than their left hand 
(Collier & Lawson, 2017a; Linkenauger, Witt & Proffitt, 2011), this strategy could 
explain the results that we obtained.  
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5.4 Experiment 2 
The action-specific account cannot explain the results of Experiment 1, since we 
found a scaling effect when participants did not intend to act. Instead, it is possible that 
this effect arose because of demand characteristics associated with telling participants 
whether to use the left or the right hand on each trial of the perceptual task. Previous work 
has suggested that demand characteristics associated with an unexplained manipulation 
can be reduced by using a cover story (Collier & Lawson, 2017a; Durgin et al., 2009, 
2012; Firestone & Scholl, 2014). Therefore, if the effects found in Experiment 1 were the 
result of demand characteristics, then they might be eliminated by providing a cover story. 
In Experiment 2, we tested this possibility using a similar perceptual task as in Experiment 
1. Participants in Experiment 2 always intended to act during the perceptual task. 
However, they were given a cover story for why their hand was visible near the aperture 
while they estimated its width. If no effect of hand padding occurs when participants are 
given a cover story for the presence and location of their hands, this would support the 
argument that the effects obtained in Experiment 1 were the result of demand 
characteristics.  
We also made some changes to the experimental procedure in Experiment 2 to 
improve the design and to make it more consistent with previous studies in the action-
specific literature. These changes included placing the laptop at 90o to the participant (as 
was done in Linkenauger, Witt & Proffitt, 2011, Experiment 2). This ensured that 
participants could not use landmark matching strategies while making their estimates. 
Also, half of the participants wore the padded glove on their left hand, while the other 
half wore it on their right hand. Finally, all participants were alerted to the difference in 
their hand width resulting from wearing the gloves. This was done by asking participants 
to squeeze their hand through a padded tube, which was hidden by a curtain, in order to 
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reach the aperture on the other side. Since it is harder to squeeze wider hands through a 
tight space, we reasoned that haptic feedback from this task would alert participants to 
the fact that one of their hands was wider than the other. Completing this haptic feedback 
phase also served to motivate our cover story manipulation in the main perceptual task. 
Specifically, participants were told that, as a control measure, their hands should be in a 
similar position in the perceptual task as they were in the haptic feedback phase. The 
cover story did not explicitly mention the use of both the left and the right hands. This 
was because, when using a cover story to minimise demand characteristics, it is critical 
that the cover story used does not simply introduce a new set of demand characteristics 
(Proffitt, 2013) or further solidify demand characteristics that may already exist. Thus, 
we opted for a cover story which explained the position and location of the hands on each 
trial. We reasoned that this would alleviate any demand characteristics associated with 
specifying which hand to use in the task, without explicitly drawing attention to the fact 
that both hands were used. 
In summary, in Experiment 2 we tested whether the results of Experiment 1 could 
be explained by demand characteristics. This was achieved by providing a cover story for 
why the participant's hand was visible near the aperture while they estimated its width in 
the perceptual task. At the start of the experiment, participants were told that we were 
interested in how well they could perform basic actions while wearing thick gloves and 
that they would first complete a haptic task involving moving their hands through tight 
spaces. Then, after the haptic feedback phase and before beginning the main perceptual 
task, participants were given a cover story for the presence and location of their hands. 
We predicted that hand padding would have no effect on estimates of aperture width in 
Experiment 2, because participants were given a cover story in the perceptual task which 
reduced demand characteristics. 
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5.4.1 Method 
 
5.4.1.1 Participants 
Thirty-six new participants (23 females, mean age = 25.9 years) were recruited 
from the University of Liverpool. All participants self-reported as right handed and were 
rewarded with course credit or a shopping voucher for their participation.  
5.4.1.2 Design 
 Two new pairs of asymmetric gloves were made. In both pairs, the Padded glove 
had 1.5 cm of foam on the little finger-side and 0.5 cm of foam on the thumb-side and the 
Unpadded glove had 0.25 cm of foam on each side. Participants in the LHBigger group 
(n = 18) wore the Padded glove on their left hand and the Unpadded glove on their right 
hand, and vice versa for participants in the RHBigger group (n = 18). 
5.4.1.3 Apparatus, stimuli and procedure 
 All participants completed the haptic feedback phase, then the perceptual task, 
then the action capacity task and finally the actual aperture passability task. The stimuli 
and set-up were identical to Experiment 1, except where described below.  
Haptic feedback phase 
For this task, a padded plastic tube (outer circumference = 26 cm, length = 30 cm) 
was placed in front of the aperture. The aperture and tube were hidden from the participant 
by a black curtain, see Figure 6. Participants sat at the table and reached under the curtain 
to put on the gloves. They could not see that the gloves were different sizes but we 
intended that participants would believe their Padded hand was wider than their 
Unpadded hand as it was harder to squeeze their Padded hand through the tube. On each 
trial, participants were told which of their hands they were to push through the tube to the 
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aperture. They were told to place their thumb just inside one corner of the aperture and 
any other finger just inside the opposite corner so that they could feel the horizontal width 
of the aperture between their thumb and finger. They then removed their hand from the 
tube3 but kept their hands under the curtain. The experimenter then adjusted the width of 
the aperture for the next trial. In total, participants completed 42 trials (2 hands x 21 
aperture widths). The widths were the same as those used in Experiment 1 and were 
presented in a random order.  
 
Figure 6: Diagram showing the setup and procedure of the haptic feedback phase in 
Experiment 2.  The experimenter (E) has instructed the participant (P) to push their hand 
through the padded tube to reach the aperture on the other side. 
 
Perceptual task 
This task was identical to the perceptual task used in Experiment 1, except where 
described below. The experimenter removed the curtain and tube apparatus used in the 
haptic feedback phase so that the participant could see the aperture. The laptop that was 
used in Experiment 1 was moved so that it was at 90o to the participant. On each trial 
participants placed their visible hand flat on the small table in front of the aperture, see 
Figure 7. Critically, participants were told that placing their hand in front of the aperture 
was a control measure that ensured that their hands were in a similar position as in the 
haptic feedback phase. To ensure that they still intended to act, on every trial participants 
were also told to imagine moving their hand through the aperture (in the same way as in 
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Experiment 1) as they made their width estimates. Thus although all participants intended 
to act (they imagined performing the action on every trial), they were given a cover story 
for why they were asked to place their hand near the aperture. Width estimates were made 
by verbally guiding the experimenter to move the lines on the laptop screen closer or 
further apart. The experimenter used the mouse wheel of a wireless mouse to control the 
distance between the lines, see Figure 7. One click of the mouse wheel moved the lines 1 
mm apart. Participants were told to say ‘stop’ when they believed the distance between 
the lines matched the horizontal width of the aperture. To ensure estimates were as 
accurate as possible, participants were encouraged to request minor adjustments to the 
distance between the lines even after they said ‘stop’. The experimenter stood behind the 
aperture apparatus so they could not see the lines on the screen, see Figure 7.  
 
Figure 7: Diagram showing a participant completing the perceptual task in Experiment 
2. The Experimenter (E) first told the participant (P) to imagine moving their left (or right) 
hand through the aperture. Then the participant verbally guided the experimenter to move 
the lines on the laptop screen closer or further apart until they thought the distance 
between the lines matched the width of the aperture.  
 
Action capacity task 
After completing the haptic feedback and perceptual tasks participants estimated 
the narrowest aperture they thought they could fit each gloved hand through. Participants 
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were told to imagine they were going to move their left hand through the aperture in the 
same way as in Experiment 1. The experimenter then opened the aperture to a width of 
15 cm and slowly closed the aperture. Participants were instructed to say ‘stop’ when they 
believed the aperture was the narrowest width they could fit their left hand through. They 
were not permitted to look at their hands during the task and were asked to keep them by 
their sides4. To ensure an accurate estimate, the experimenter encouraged participants to 
request small adjustments even after they said ‘stop’. The task was then repeated for the 
right hand.  
Actual aperture passability task 
Finally, the actual minimum passable aperture for each hand was measured, first 
with then without the gloves, as in Experiment 1. 
5.4.2 Results 
Effect of wearing gloves on actual aperture passability 
To check that the glove manipulation was effective, we tested whether wearing 
the gloves changed the actual minimum passable aperture for each hand. We conducted 
a mixed ANOVA where hand (Padded/Unpadded) and gloves (With/Without) were 
within-participants factors and group (LHBigger/RHBigger) was a between-participants 
factor. There was a significant main effect of gloves, F(1, 34) = 588.183, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.95, which was modulated by a hand × gloves interaction, F(1, 34) = 317.151, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .90. Bonferroni corrected pairwise comparisons showed that, with gloves, the 
minimum passable aperture was greater for the Padded hand (m = 11.5 cm, se = 0.11 cm) 
than the Unpadded hand (m = 10.3 cm, se = 0.09 cm) whereas there was no significant 
difference between the Padded and Unpadded hands without gloves (m = 9.1 cm, se = 
0.12 cm; m = 9.1 cm, se = 0.11 cm, respectively). There was no effect of group, F(1, 34) 
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= 0.004, p = .9, ηp2 < .001. There were no other significant interactions: hand × group, 
F(1, 34) = 2.967, p = .09, ηp2 = .08; gloves × group, F(1, 34) = 1.029, p = .3, ηp2 = .03; 
hand × gloves × group, F(1, 34) = 0.912, p = .4, ηp2 = .03. Wearing the padded glove 
therefore significantly increased hand width relative to the unpadded, gloved hand, as we 
had intended.  
Action capacity task: perceived aperture passability 
  We tested whether participants appropriately recalibrated their perception of 
aperture passability to reflect the asymmetry in hand width caused by wearing the gloves. 
Perceived minimum passable aperture by the gloved hand was calculated as in 
Experiment 1. This was used as the dependent variable in a mixed ANOVA where hand 
(Padded/Unpadded) was a within-participants factor and group (LHBigger/RHBigger) 
was a between-participants factor. Participants perceived the minimum passable aperture 
for their Padded gloved hand (m = 11.1 cm, se = 0.19 cm) to be greater than that for their 
Unpadded gloved hand (m = 10.8 cm, sd = 0.20 cm), F(1, 34) = 9.523, p = .005, ηp2 = .22. 
Also the perceived minimum passable aperture was greater for the RHBigger group (m = 
11.4 cm, se = 0.26 cm) than for the LHBigger group (m = 10.5 cm, se = 0.26 cm), F(1, 
34) = 5.912, p = .02, ηp2 = .15. There was no hand × group interaction, F(1, 34) = 0.135, 
p = .7, ηp2 = .004. 
Perceptual task: estimated aperture width 
 Finally, we tested the critical action-specific prediction that apertures would be 
estimated as narrower for the Padded hand. Ratios were calculated as in Experiment 1 
and used as the dependent variable in a mixed ANOVA where hand (Padded/Unpadded) 
was a within-participants factor and group (LHBigger/RHBigger) was a between-
participants factor. There were no significant effects: hand, F(1, 34) = 0.690, p = .4, ηp2 
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= .02; group, F(1, 34) = 0.082, p = .8, ηp2 = .002; hand × group, F(1, 34) = 0.180, p = 0.7, 
ηp2 = .01, see Figure 8. Thus, unlike Experiment 1, participants in Experiment 2 did not 
estimate apertures as narrower for their Padded hand than their Unpadded hand. Figure 9 
shows the ratios for the Padded and Unpadded hand given by each individual participant. 
 
Figure 8: Results of the perceptual task in Experiment 2. Mean ratio of aperture size 
(estimated/actual) for each hand for each group. Error bars represent one standard error 
of the mean. 
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Figure 9: Individual estimates of aperture width (as a ratio of actual aperture width) for 
the Padded and Unpadded hands in the LHBigger (top) and RHBigger (bottom) groups. 
The bold and dashed vertical lines show the mean ratios for the Padded and Unpadded 
hands respectively. Participants are ordered by increasing ratio of aperture width for the 
Unpadded hand. Cases where only one data point are shown indicate no difference 
between ratios for the Padded and Unpadded hand. 
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5.4.3 Discussion 
 Replicating Experiment 1, padding one hand increased the minimum passable 
aperture for that hand. This change was perceived by participants: in the action capacity 
task, participants estimated the minimum passable aperture for their Padded hand as wider 
than for their Unpadded hand. Most importantly, using a cover story in the perceptual 
task eliminated the effect of altering action capacity on perceived aperture width which 
we had found in Experiment 1. Participants in Experiment 2 were told that their hands 
had to be placed near the aperture in the perceptual task as a control measure to ensure 
that their hands were in a similar position as in the haptic feedback phase. Our results are 
consistent with previous findings that have demonstrated that, even when participants 
intend to act, providing a cover story for a salient experimental manipulation can 
eliminate effects that appeared consistent with the action-specific account (Firestone & 
Scholl, 2014). Our present results suggest that the scaling effects found in Experiment 1 
were not true perceptual changes, as proposed by the action-specific account, but were 
instead more likely due to demand characteristics (Orne, 1962). 
It is important to emphasise that the action-specific account predicts a scaling 
effect in the perceptual task in Experiment 2 despite the use of a cover story. This is 
because, on every trial of the perceptual task, we asked participants to imagine whether 
they could fit their hand through the aperture before they made their width estimates. If 
action capacity directly influences what is perceived, as proposed by the action-specific 
account, then scaling should have occurred since we directly manipulated both actual and 
perceived action capacity, and participants intended to act on every trial. 
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5.5 General Discussion 
 In the present studies we were interested in biases in size perception and the role 
of intention to act in producing these biases. We investigated whether visual estimates of 
aperture width would be influenced by increases in hand size which altered action 
capacity. The action-specific account predicts that if a participant intends to move a wider 
hand through an aperture they should perceive the aperture as narrower, but that this 
scaling effect should not occur when participants do not intend to move their hand through 
the aperture (i.e. when they intend to act, Witt et al., 2005). However, we found that 
participants estimated apertures as narrower when the width of their hand was increased 
by wearing a padded glove even when they did not intend to act (Experiment 1)5. We then 
successfully eliminated this effect by providing a cover story for the presence of the hand 
near to the aperture, even though participants intended to act (Experiment 2). Both of 
these results suggest that the scaling effects that we observed were not true perceptual 
changes, as the action-specific account claims. Our results suggest that intention to act 
does not influence biases in spatial perception in the way predicted by the action-specific 
account. Instead our results support previous work that has shown that the action-specific 
account lacks predictive power (Firestone & Scholl, 2014).  
Providing a cover story can reduce the demand characteristics associated with an 
otherwise unexplained manipulation (Collier & Lawson, 2017a; Durgin et al., 2009; 
Firestone & Scholl, 2014). Bhalla and Proffitt (1999; see also Proffitt et al., 1995) 
reported that hills were reported as steeper when observers wore a heavy backpack. 
However, Durgin et al. (2009) found that if participants were told that the backpack 
contained equipment for monitoring their ankle muscles, their slant estimates did not 
differ from estimates made by participants who did not wear a backpack. This finding 
suggests that participants who were not given a reason for wearing the backpack deduced 
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that the backpack was supposed to influence their estimates of slant and changed their 
responses accordingly. Proponents of the action-specific account have rejected claims 
that their effects can be explained by demand characteristics (e.g. Witt & Sugovic, 2013; 
Linkenauger, Witt & Proffitt, 2013; Taylor-Covill & Eves, 2014). For example, Proffitt 
(2009; see also Proffitt & Linkenauger, 2013) argued that Durgin et al.’s (2009) study 
was not comparable to the original backpack studies because it used a 2 m ramp instead 
of a real hill and the energy required to ascend such a small ramp may not be sufficient 
to influence perception. However, Durgin, Klein, Spiegel, Strawster and Williams (2012) 
subsequently reproduced the results of Durgin et al. (2009) using a real hill, consistent 
with the claim that demand characteristics, rather than differences in energy requirements, 
produced the scaling effect on estimating hill slopes. In Experiment 1, we found an effect 
consistent with the action-specific account for participants who did not intend to act. 
Thus, our results suggest that intention to act is not critical in producing effects consistent 
with the action-specific account. Intention to act has been claimed as central to obtaining 
the scaling effects predicted by the action-specific account. For example, Witt et al. 
(2005) reported that increasing participants’ maximum reach by providing them with a 
tool (a baton) influenced distance estimates, but only for participants who intended to 
reach with the tool. There is, however, an alternative interpretation of Witt et al.’s (2005) 
results. Franchak and Adolph (2014) showed that changes to the body are not necessarily 
sufficient to recalibrate perceived action capacity. They reported that pregnant women 
were able to accurately estimate the narrowest aperture they could walk through as this 
increased throughout their pregnancy. In contrast, participants who were temporarily 
fitted with a pregnancy prosthesis were initially inaccurate in estimating the narrowest 
aperture they could walk through, but after attempting the task their estimates were 
appropriately recalibrated. Thus, short-term changes to the body may not be sufficient to 
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change observers’ perceived action capacity, but it can be rapidly recalibrated through 
acting. Based on this conclusion, distance estimates by participants who held - but never 
reached with - a tool in Experiment 3 of Witt et al. (2005) may not have been affected by 
holding the tool because they had not yet recalibrated their perception of their maximum 
reach through acting. Thus Witt et al.’s (2005) results may not have been driven by 
intention to act. Instead their results may have arisen because only participants who acted 
with the tool recalibrated their perceived reaching capacity. Note, furthermore, that this 
does not mean that their perception of distances changed. Instead it may only have been 
their judgements of the distances that changed because they were aware that targets were 
easier to reach with the tool than without it (see Firestone, 2013; Firestone & Scholl, 
2015, for discussions of whether action-specific effects reflect changes in visual 
perception or in post-perceptual judgement). 
A further point is that, although intention to act is often argued to be necessary for 
the scaling effects predicted by the action-specific account to occur (e.g. Linkenauger, 
Witt & Proffitt, 2011; Witt, 2017; Witt et al., 2005), intention was not present in several 
studies that have been argued to support the action-specific account. For example, Bhalla 
and Proffitt (1999) did not mention walking up the slope to their participants, and 
Linkenauger et al., (2013) did not ask participants to consider or estimate the graspability 
of objects they estimated the size of. Therefore, even proponents of the action-specific 
account are not consistent about whether intention to act is needed to induce scaling 
effects. Given this, one possible critique of the present work is that we focused on 
intention to act as a test of when scaling effects should be found and when they should 
not. However, countering this critique, note that the action-specific account predicts an 
effect for the perceptual task in Experiment 2 even if participants did not intend to act. 
Linkenauger and colleagues (Linkenauger et al., 2010; Linkenauger, Mohler & Proffitt, 
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2011; Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt, 2013) have reported that just placing the 
participant's hand next to an object can influence estimates of that object's size. For 
example, Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2013) used virtual reality to manipulate 
perceived hand size. Participants were not asked to imagine grasping the object in this 
study, yet the authors reported that objects that appeared near the apparently larger hand 
were estimated as smaller (because, on the action-specific account, the objects were easier 
to grasp), and vice versa when the hand appeared smaller.  
Another possible limitation of the present work is that, by providing a cover story 
in Experiment 2, we may have reduced not only demand characteristics, but also reduced 
participants’ intention to act. However, on every trial in the perceptual task, participants 
were told to imagine moving their hand through the aperture while making their width 
estimates. This manipulation has been used in studies which have been claimed to show 
evidence for the action-specific account based on scaling effects (e.g. Linkenauger, Witt 
& Proffitt, 2011; Stefanucci & Geuss, 2009). Thus we would argue that there was no less 
intention to act in Experiment 2 than in other action-specific studies.  
Our results suggest that intention to act is not critical in finding scaling effects. 
This is important because, if intention to act induces scaling effects, as the action-specific 
account proposes, this would suggest that visual perception is cognitively penetrable 
(Firestone & Scholl, 2015). This, in turn, would be inconsistent with modular theories of 
vision, which assume that perception cannot be influenced by higher-level cognitive 
factors such as intention, emotion or motivation (e.g. Pylyshyn, 1999; Firestone & Scholl, 
2015). If we had found that intention to act was a driving factor in eliciting biases 
consistent with the action specific account, this would challenge cognitive impenetrability 
and it would necessitate a drastic change in our understanding of how perception works 
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(Firestone, 2013; Firestone & Scholl, 2015). Our results instead support cognitive 
impenetrability. 
In conclusion, the results of the present studies suggest that the action-specific 
account of perception lacks predictive power. We found a scaling effect consistent with 
the action-specific account when one should not have been found (Experiment 1, when 
participants did not intend to act) and we failed to find this scaling effect when it should 
have been present (Experiment 2, when participants did intend to act). In Experiment 2 
we were able to eliminate effects found in Experiment 1 that appeared to be consistent 
with the action-specific account by using a cover story, suggesting that these effects were 
likely the result of demand characteristics rather than true perceptual changes. Our 
observers were sensitive to changes in their action capacity to act following changes in 
their hand size due to wearing padded gloves. However, changes in both their actual and 
perceived action capacity did not affect their visual spatial perception in the strong sense 
proposed by the action-specific account.  
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5.6 Appendices: Chapter 5 
Appendix A: Mean Cumulative Gaussian curves for the Padded and Unpadded 
hands in the Intention-To-Act (top) and No-Intention (bottom) groups in Chapter 
5, Experiment 1. Error bars show +/- one standard error of the mean. 
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5.7 Footnotes: Chapter 5
1 It is possible that at least some of the No-Intention group intended to act on the 
aperture given that they were seated directly in front of it. However, this group was not 
explicitly asked about their action capacity and they never acted on the aperture during 
the perceptual task. Thus few of them were likely to have explicitly considered acting 
by moving their hand through the aperture and any intention to act in this way in this 
group would likely to be weak, implicit and infrequent. In summary, an intention to put 
their hand through the aperture should have been stronger, explicit and universal in the 
Intention-To-Act group even if intention was not entirely absent in the No-Intention 
group. 
2 All participants wore the Padded glove on their left hand because right handers have 
been shown to believe that their right hand is larger than their left hand (Collier & 
Lawson, 2017a; Linkenauger, Witt & Proffitt, 2011) so if participants estimated 
apertures as narrower while wearing the glove on their right hand, this could be because 
their judgements were affected by the change in hand size caused by the glove, or 
because of the underlying bias in perceived hand size. Having participants always 
wearing the Padded glove on the left hand avoided this confound. However, it 
introduced a second confound, namely that the same hand always wore the Padded 
glove, so in Experiment 2 we counterbalanced which hand wore the Padded glove. 
3 During the haptic feedback phase participants estimated the width of the apertures 
they felt between their fingers. This was done in the same way as described for the main 
perceptual task. These results are not reported here because participants actually acted 
in this task but not in the perceptual task, making it difficult to compare the results of 
the two tasks. In addition, the action-specific account does not offer specific predictions 
for haptic spatial perception (though see Collier & Lawson, 2017a, and Linkenauger, 
Witt & Proffitt, 2011, for a discussion of the different biases that might be expected for 
visual and haptic perception). The main purpose of this task was to alert participants to 
the difference in the width of their Padded and Unpadded hands through haptic 
feedback, and to ensure that the cover story used in the subsequent perceptual task was 
persuasive. 
4 Most participants did, though, look at their hands before the task began, while the 
experimenter was explaining the task. 
5 It might be argued that our results in Experiment 1 arose from a confound. The Padded 
glove was always worn on the left hand and our right-handed participants might, for 
example, have been less confident about their ability to pass their non-dominant hand 
through the aperture. However, in other, similar, studies (e.g., Collier & Lawson, 
2017a), we have found no evidence for a baseline difference in spatial estimates 
depending on whether participants intended to use their dominant versus their non-
dominant hand. Furthermore, in Experiment 2 here this confound was removed and 
there was no effect of whether our right-handed participants wore the Padded glove on 
their left or their right hand. Instead, we suggest the critical difference between the 
design of Experiments 1 and 2 was the use of a cover story. 
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Chapter Six  
6. Hunger does not affect perceived size of food 
products 
 
6.1 Abstract 
The action-specific account of perception suggests that we see the world in terms 
of our ability to act. Although most of the research in this area has focussed on the 
implications of action-specific scaling effects for theories of visual perception, recently 
Witt et al. (2016) suggested that such effects could have important real-world 
applications. One possibility they discussed was the role of action-specific scaling effects 
in perpetuating unhealthy behaviours which may contribute to obesity. For example, 
heavier individuals tend to estimate staircases as steeper than healthy weight individuals 
(Taylor-Covill & Eves, 2014). As a result, they may be less likely to take the stairs, 
despite the health benefits of doing so. Here, we investigated another prediction, based 
on the action-specific account, in this area. Namely, we tested whether hungry 
participants would perceive food items as smaller because they believe they can eat more 
than satiated individuals. This may explain why people who have fasted, and are hungry, 
tend to eat more than people who have not fasted when food becomes available (Wansink, 
Tal & Shimizu, 2012).  Hungry people may eat more because the same amount of food 
seems like a smaller portion to them. We compared hungry and satiated participant’s 
verbal estimates of the width and height of food and non-food products. Both groups of 
participants estimated food products as taller than non-food products, but there was no 
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effect of hunger on size estimates. Our results provide no support for the idea that the 
action-specific account can provide insights into understanding why people overeat.  
6.2 Introduction 
The action-specific account of perception suggests that perceivers see the world 
in terms of their ability to act (for reviews see Collier & Lawson, under review; Firestone, 
2013; Philbeck & Witt, 2015; Linkenauger, 2015; Proffitt & Linkenauger, 2013; Witt, 
2011a, 2016). Evidence claimed to support this account includes the finding that 
participants who drank a sugary beverage estimated distances as shorter than participants 
who drank an artificially sweetened drink (Schnall, Zadra & Proffitt, 2010). In addition, 
hills were estimated as steeper by participants who were fatigued, had poor physical 
fitness, or wore a heavy backpack (Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999; Eves, Thorpe, Lewis & 
Taylor-Covill, 2014; Taylor-Covill & Eves, 2013), and stairs were estimated as steeper 
(Taylor-Covill & Eves, 2014) and distances to targets were estimated as greater (Sugovic 
et al., 2016) by heavier participants.  
By suggesting that what we see is directly influenced by our action capacity, the 
action-specific account of perception may challenge the long-held, modular perspective 
that vision is cognitively impenetrable (Firestone & Scholl, 2015). As a result, most 
research in this area has focussed on the theoretical implications of the action-specific 
account for our understanding of how visual perception works (e.g., Bhalla & Proffitt, 
1999; Collier & Lawson, 2017a, 2017b, in press; Firestone & Scholl, 2014, 2015; 
Linkenauger, Witt & Proffitt, 2011; Taylor-Covill & Eves, 2014; Witt, 2017). Recently, 
though, Witt et al. (2016) suggested that action-specific effects may impact our everyday 
life because changes in our action capacity may influence our behavioural decisions, as 
these are largely based on visual information from the environment. For example, Taylor-
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Covill and Eves (2014) found that overweight individuals estimated staircases as steeper 
than healthy-weight individuals and Eves et al. (2014) reported that people who estimated 
staircases as steeper were more likely to use an escalator than take the stairs. Taken 
together, these results imply that overweight and obese individuals may be less likely to 
choose energetically demanding options, such as taking the stairs, despite the health 
benefits of doing so (Witt et al., 2016). This could create a positive feedback loop 
whereby unhealthy lifestyle choices are repeated. 
In the present work, we investigated another possible application of the action-
specific account, namely whether hunger affects the perceived size of food products. This 
may provide important insight into whether people sometimes overeat because food 
appears smaller to them when they are hungry. It has been suggested that repeated dieting 
to lose weight often results in long-term weight gain (Dulloo, Jacquet, Montani & Schutz, 
2015), and dietary restraint is associated with increased food intake in the long-term 
(Hawkins & Clement, 1980; Polivy & Herman, 1985). Similar effects are found for short-
term fasting. For example, people who have fasted, and are therefore hungry, tend to eat 
more than people who have not fasted when food becomes available. Wansink, Tal and 
Shimizu (2012) compared the calorie intake from a buffet of participants who had fasted 
for 18 hours and participants who had not fasted. During the experiment, participants 
selected foods to eat from a buffet. Participants who had fasted ate ~47% more calories 
than those who had not fasted. According to the action-specific account, increased food 
consumption following fasting could occur because hungry people may also believe they 
can eat more and, in turn, may perceive food items as smaller. This could lead them to 
eating more, since – to them – it appears that there is less on their plate.  
Evidence from anorexia nervosa patients also suggests that estimates of food size 
may be affected by how much people think they can eat. For example, Yellowlees, Roe, 
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Walker and Ben-Tovim (1988) found that anorexia patients estimated food products as 
larger than healthy individuals. In addition, Milos et al. (2013) found that anorexia 
nervosa patients estimated the size of prepared meals (presented as images on a screen) 
as larger than healthy controls (though see Vinai et al., 2007, who found no difference in 
food volume perception between anorexia nervosa patients and healthy controls). The 
action-specific account suggests that these effects may have arisen because anorexia 
patients do not think they can, or should, eat a lot of food and so food products appear 
larger to them to deter them from eating. If this were the case, then the action-specific 
account may provide important insight into why the recovery rates for anorexia nervosa 
are so poor (e.g., Herzog, Deter, Fiehn & Petzold, 1997).  
However, there is an alternative account for these effects, namely a bias in visual 
attention. It has been shown that attended items appear closer (Cole, Riccio & Balcetis, 
2014) and larger (Anton-Erxleben, Henrich & Treue, 2007) than non-attended items. A 
characteristic of anorexia nervosa is the tendency to obsess over food (Garner & 
Garfinkel, 1980; Hesse-Biber, Marino & Watts-Roy, 1999; Hesse-Biber, Leavy, Quinn 
& Zoino, 2006) and these patients also show an attentional bias towards food- and eating-
related stimuli (Channon, Hemsley & Silva, 1988; Shafran, Lee, Cooper, Palmer & 
Fairburn, 2007). Thus, anorexia patients’ overestimations of food size could instead 
reflect their increased attention to food stimuli. Such an attentional bias would be 
consistent with the modular account of perception that proposes that vision is cognitively 
impenetrable, whereas an influence of thoughts or beliefs on perception would not 
(Firestone & Scholl, 2015).  
In the present study, we were interested in whether healthy, but hungry, 
individuals would show biases in estimated food product size similar to those found for 
anorexia nervosa patients. Analogous to the two competing explanations for the 
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perceptual biases found for anorexia nervosa patients, there are two competing 
predictions for the present experiment. On the one hand, hungry participants may estimate 
food products as smaller than satiated participants, since they may think they can eat 
more. This is the prediction made based on the action-specific account. On the other hand, 
hungry participants may estimate food products as larger than satiated participants, 
because their increased attentional focus to food products may make them appear larger. 
This is the prediction made based on a visual attention account. This experiment is among 
the first to investigate whether hunger directly affects estimates of food product size in 
healthy individuals, and it may also shed light on the nature of the biases found for 
anorexia nervosa patients. If healthy, but hungry, individuals estimate food products as 
smaller than satiated individuals, this would provide evidence for an action-specific 
account of the clinical data. In contrast, if healthy, but hungry, individuals estimate food 
products as larger than satiated individuals, this would provide evidence for a visual 
attention account of the clinical data. 
In the present experiment, we tested whether hungry individuals showed biases in 
the perceived size of food relative to non-food products. We tested one group of 
participants who were tested in the morning and who were asked to miss breakfast, and 
another group who were tested in the afternoon and who were asked to eat a meal one 
hour before being tested. All participants verbally estimated the height and width of food 
and control, non-food products. Neither the action-specific nor the visual attention 
account predict a main effect of product type (food versus non-food). However, the 
action-specific account predicts that the Hungry group should estimate food products as 
smaller than the Not-Hungry group, with no difference for the non-food products. The 
visual attention account also predicts an effect only for the food products, but in the 
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opposite direction – the Hungry group should estimate food products as larger than the 
Not-Hungry group.  
6.3 Method 
Ethical approval for this experiment was granted by the relevant local ethics 
committee at the University of Liverpool. 
6.3.1 Participants 
Thirty-two participants (mean age = 18.9 years, 5 males) were recruited from the 
University of Liverpool. Participants self-reported as being non-dieters and having no 
history of eating disorders. 
6.3.2 Design 
Half of the participants were tested in the morning and were told to miss breakfast 
that morning (Hungry group, n = 16), whilst the other half were tested in the afternoon 
and were told to ensure that they ate a meal within an hour before arriving at the lab (Not-
Hungry group, n = 16). 
6.3.3 Apparatus, stimuli and procedure 
 Upon arrival, participants confirmed that they had adhered to their instructions 
about eating before the experiment. They then completed a verbal object size estimation 
task. Fifty-six real objects were used as stimuli. Half of the stimuli were containers of 
food, and the other half were non-food products (e.g., cleaning and skincare products). 
The mean height and width (at the product’s widest point) for the food and non-food 
products are given in Table 11.  Each food product was paired with a non-food product 
that was matched in size, shape and colour, see Figure 1.  
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Table 1  
Mean (standard deviation) and range (below) of the height and width of the food and 
non-food products used. 
Measure Food products  
(n = 28) 
Non-food products 
(n = 28) 
Height (cm) 15.4 (5.6) 
5.5 – 31.9 
16.1 (5.8) 
5.8 – 32.1 
Width (cm) 8.9 (4.0) 
4.5 – 23.3 
8.9 (3.7) 
4.9 – 22.5 
 
Participants sat at a table, in front of a curtain, see Figure 2. The experimenter 
stayed behind the curtain, and presented the objects, one at a time, by placing them on the 
table in front of the participant through the curtain. Participants verbally estimated the 
height and then the width of each object in centimetres (cm). After they had made both 
estimates, participants closed their eyes, and the object was replaced with the next object. 
The experimenter told the participant when to open their eyes for the next trial.  
Not all objects could be placed upright so all the objects were placed flat on the 
table with the base nearest the participant and the top furthest away from them, as shown 
in Figure 2. This ensured that that the terms “height” and “width” were constant across 
objects. Before the experimental trials began, the experimenter visually demonstrated 
what was meant by height and width using a foamboard cube. The height of the object 
referred to the length from the edge of the bottom of the object (nearest the participant) 
to the top of the object (nearest the curtain), see Figure 2. The width referred to the widest 
part of the object from one side to the opposite side. The experimenter asked whether 
participants understood what they had to estimate, and checked this in two practice trials 
using foamboard cubes (dimensions = 16cm2 and 24cm2). Participants were told the 
actual dimensions of these cubes after both trials were complete. Once the experimenter 
was satisfied that the participant understood the task, the experimental trials began. 
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Objects were presented in a fixed, quasi-random order to half of the participants, 
and in the reverse order to the remaining half of participants. There were no more than 
two successive food or non-food items, no feedback was given and participants were not 
allowed to touch the objects.  
Participants then completed a series of visual analogue scales which measured 
anxiety, happiness, sadness, hunger and how much participants believed they could eat 
(on a scale of 0 (not at all/none) to 100 (very much/a lot). Participants also reported when 
they last ate and what they had eaten.  
 
Figure 1: The matched pairs of food and non-food containers that were used as stimuli. 
The pairs were rated for visual similarity by five independent raters, who scored each pair 
on a scale from 1 (not at all similar) to 5 (extremely similar). The average similarly rating 
was 3.44, with a range of 2 – 5. The mean similarity ratings for each pair can be found in 
Appendix A. 
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Figure 2: Experimental setup. The participant sat at a table in front of a curtain. On each 
trial, the experimenter lifted the curtain, placed the object on the table in front of the 
participant, and put the curtain back in place until the participant made their verbal 
estimates of height (h) and width (w) in centimetres. After the participant made both 
estimates, the object was removed and replaced with the next object.  
 
6.4 Results 
 Table 1 shows the number of mean weight, height and body mass index (BMI) 
of participants in the Hungry and Not-Hungry groups. Table 1 also shows the amount of 
time since participants in each group reported eating a meal. 
Subjective ratings using the visual analogue scales (VAS) 
 Participants in the Hungry group reported feeling significantly hungrier than those 
in the Not-Hungry group, t(30) = 8.557, p < .001, see Table 3. They also reported that 
they could eat significantly more than the Not-Hungry group, t(30) = 5.978, p < .001. 
There were no differences between the Hungry and Not-Hungry groups on any other 
scale: anxiety, t(30) = -0.818, p = .4; happiness, t(30) = -0.149, p = .8; sadness, t(30) = -
0.447, p = .6.  
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Table 2  
Mean (and standard deviation) of the height, weight and BMI of participants in each 
group and the time since their last meal.  
Measure Hungry Group 
(n = 16) 
Not-Hungry Group 
(n = 16) 
Height (cm) 168.1 (11.4) 168.4 (11.8) 
Weight (kg) 54.6 (8.3) 58.8 (9.6) 
BMI 19.4 (2.9) 20.7 (2.8) 
Time since last meal 11 hrs (4.0 hrs) 52 mins (34 mins) 
 
Table 3  
Mean (and standard deviation) of visual analogue scale scores for measures of hunger, 
how much could be eaten, anxiety, happiness and sadness in the Hungry and Not-Hungry 
groups. Ratings were made on a scale of 0 (not at all/none) to 100 (very much/a lot).  
Measure Hungry Group 
(n = 16) 
Not-Hungry Group  
(n = 16) 
Hunger 74.0 (16.8) 19.8 (19.3) 
How much could you eat? 64.0 (15.0) 28.1 (19.0) 
Anxiety 12.9 (15.3) 19.4 (25.7) 
Happiness 66.0 (18.7) 67.4 (20.0) 
Sadness 9.8 (8.8) 12.3 (19.0) 
 
Object height and width estimation 
 Perceived object height and width were calculated as a ratio (estimated/actual) of 
actual height and width respectively. These ratios were then used as the dependent 
variable in two separate mixed ANOVAs (one for width estimates and one for height 
estimates)2, where product type (Food/Non-Food) was a within-participants factor and 
group (Hungry/Not-Hungry) was a between-participants factor, see Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: Mean ratio (estimated/actual) of the height and width of food and non-food 
products in the Hungry and Not-Hungry groups. Error bars show one standard error of 
the mean. 
  
For perceived width there were no significant effects: product type, F(1, 30) = 
1.503, p = .2, ηp2 = .05; group, F(1, 30) = 0.875, p = .4, ηp2 = .03; product type × group, 
F(1, 30) = 1.076, p = .3, ηp2 = .04. For perceived height, food products (m = 1.01, se = 
0.04) were estimated as taller than non-food products (m = 0.98, se = 0.04), F(1, 30) = 
16.959, p < .001, ηp2 = .36. However, group was not significant, F(1, 30) = 0.062, p = .8, 
ηp2 = .002, and, most importantly, product type × group was not significant, F(1, 30) = 
1.621, p = .2, ηp2 = .05. Thus, the only significant difference that we found was that, for 
both groups, height estimates for food products were greater than height estimates for 
non-food products. This finding suggests that the non-significant interaction which tested 
the main prediction of this experiment was not due to a lack of power. 
6.5 Discussion 
In this experiment, we were interested in testing whether the action-specific 
account of perception could provide insight into why people sometimes overeat. 
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Specifically, we tested whether being hungry affected the estimated size of food products 
but not visually matched control (non-food) products. The action-specific account claims 
that hungry individuals may perceive food products as smaller than satiated individuals 
because they may believe they can eat more. This may, in turn, lead them to actually eat 
more. Our hungry participants did report both feeling hungrier than our satiated 
participants, and believing that they could eat more than them. However, this did not 
modulate their estimates of the size of food products. Therefore, our results did not 
support our prediction based on the action-specific account. Interestingly, our results also 
did not support our prediction based on a visual attention account, which predicts that 
hungry individuals should estimate food products as larger than satiated individuals. 
Instead, we found that both groups estimated food products as slightly taller than non-
food products. However, this unexpected effect was small and occurred only for height 
and not for width.   
 In summary, although we found no evidence that hunger affects estimates of food 
products in the way predicted by the action-specific account, we also found no evidence 
that attention affected size estimates. Thus, our results do not provide evidence for either 
an action-specific or a visual attention account of previous findings that anorexia nervosa 
patients estimate food as larger than healthy controls (Milos et al., 2013; Yellowlees et 
al., 1988). However, there is a third explanation for the biases reported for anorexia 
nervosa patients that does not require appealing to changes in perception. Specifically, 
the overestimation of food products could reflect a cognitive strategy arising from 
anorexia nervosa patients’ belief that they should restrict the amount of food that they eat. 
Exaggerating the size of food products may reflect a self-justification for eating less 
(“there’s just too much food here, I really can’t finish it all”). This possibility is supported 
by evidence showing that biases in perceptual estimates can serve to justify a given 
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behaviour (Wesp & Gasper, 2012). In one experiment, Wesp et al. (2004) reported that 
less successful dart throwers estimated targets as smaller than more successful throwers. 
However, in a later study, Wesp and Gasper (2012) found that this association between 
success and estimated target size disappeared if participants were told that they were using 
low quality darts. This suggests that less successful throwers in the original Wesp et al. 
(2004) study may have estimated the targets as smaller to justify their poorer 
performance. In contrast, in Wesp and Gasper (2012), participants could attribute their 
poorer performance to the low-quality darts, so their size estimates were unaffected by 
performance because they did not need a further explanation of why they were failing to 
throw well. Consistent with this account, Vinai et al. (2007) found that when references 
to food intake were minimised, anorexia nervosa patients showed no difference to healthy 
controls in their estimation of the number of candies on a plate. 
The present experiment was motivated by the suggestion that action-specific 
effects could have applications in real life which affect behaviour (Witt et al., 2016). 
Observers make action decisions based on visual information from the environment and, 
according to the action-specific account, what they see is affected by their action capacity. 
However, Witt et al.’s (2016) reasoning may be problematic. In a commentary on Witt et 
al. (2016), Gray (2016) suggested that many of the examples given by Witt et al. (2016) 
did not, in fact, represent action-specific effects at all. For example, Witt et al. (2016) 
discussed the finding that using the Ebbinghaus illusion to change the apparent size of 
golf holes improved golfing performance (Chauvel, Wulf & Maquestiaux, 2015) and 
claimed that this provides evidence for the action-specific account and its application in 
real life. However, this in fact provides evidence for the reverse direction of effect that 
that proposed by the action-specific account. Specifically, in Chauvel et al. (2015), 
people’s perception of the layout of the environment (hole size) affected their golfing 
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performance rather than vice versa. Gray (2016) further argued that little is known about 
the mechanisms underlying action-specific effects and that, without this understanding, it 
is too early to try to apply the action-specific account in practice. Based on the results of 
the current study, we agree with Gray (2016), as we found no evidence that the action-
specific account can provide insight into behaviours such as overeating.   
This experiment was not without limitations. One important caveat to note is that 
the foods used were contained within packages, rather than being prepared and ready to 
eat. This may have limited the salience of these items as food products, although these 
results do replicate the experiences of choosing what to cook in a kitchen or supermarket 
shopping3. It might be expected that hunger would affect the estimated size of prepared 
meals more than packaged foods4. This possibility is supported by the findings of Milos 
et al. (2013) who reported that anorexia nervosa patients overestimated the size of images 
of prepared meals to a greater extent when they imagined eating the meals. Thus, it would 
be fruitful to retest the hypotheses investigated here using prepared meals which afford 
immediate eating rather than packaged food products which do not. It is worth noting that 
this limitation is not unique to the present study. For example, studies investigating the 
relationship between estimates of food size and diet success (e.g., van Koningsbruggen, 
Stroebe & Aarts, 2011) and studies comparing the estimates of meal size between 
anorexia nervosa patients and healthy controls (e.g., Milos et al., 2013) used images of 
food products or prepared meals instead of real objects or meals. One exception is 
Chandon and Wansink (2007), who investigated whether individuals with a higher body 
mass index (BMI) underestimated the calorie content of fast food meals more than 
individuals with a lower BMI. In this study, participants were presented with real fast 
food meals of varying portion size. It was found that, regardless of BMI, people 
underestimated the calorie content of large meals more than small meals (Chandon & 
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Wansink, 2007). However, as the authors acknowledged, calorie content is not a 
perceptual property and so this study did not directly test the relationship between body 
size and the visual perception of food.  
In conclusion, in this experiment, hunger did not directly affect people’s estimates 
of the size of food products. We agree with Gray’s (2016) comment that calls for the 
action-specific account to be applied in everyday life (Witt et al., 2016) are premature. 
First, as discussed by Gray (2016), some examples given by Witt et al. (2016) do not in 
fact reflect action-specific scaling. Second, it has not yet been established that action-
specific effects are true perceptual effects (Durgin et al., 2009, 2012; Collier & Lawson, 
2017a, 2017b, in press; Firestone, 2013; Firestone & Scholl, 2014; Woods et al., 2009). 
For example, it has been argued that several action-specific effects can be explained by 
demand characteristics resulting from participants guessing the experimental hypothesis 
(Durgin et al., 2009; 2012; Firestone & Scholl, 2014), or response biases associated with 
conflating estimations of action capacity and spatial properties (Collier & Lawson, 2017b; 
Woods et al., 2009). Therefore, the action-specific account faces both theoretical (Durgin, 
2016; Firestone, 2013; Gray, 2016) and methodological (Collier & Lawson, 2017a, 
2017b; Durgin et al., 2009; Firestone & Scholl, 2014; Woods et al., 2009) hurdles which 
it must overcome before attempts at employing its findings in real life are seriously 
considered. 
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6.6 Appendices: Chapter 6 
Appendix A: Similarity ratings for the pairs of food and non-food stimuli in 
chapter 6. 
Pair Food item Non-Food item Average 
rating 
(/5) 
Minimum 
rating 
Maximum 
rating 
1 Kellogg’s Frosties Bold Washing 
Powder 
4 3 5 
2 Rice cakes (white 
pack) 
Kitchen roll 3.2 2 4 
3 Rice cakes (blue 
pack) 
Cloths 3.6 3 4 
4 Walkers crackers Soda crystals 4.4 4 5 
5 Ritz Daz washing 
powder 
4.6 4 5 
6 Brunch bar Cura-heat pain 
relief pads 
3 2 4 
7 Dolmio lasagne mix Scented candle 3.2 2 4 
8 Cadburys Fingers Purple pillow 
case 
2.8 2 4 
9 Oreos Sanex anti-
persperant 
3.2 2 4 
10 Chocolate digestives Fresh bin 
powder 
3.8 3 4 
11 Poppets 2 in 1 mop refill 
(green) 
2.6 2 4 
12 Salt ‘n’ Shake crisps Nivea face 
wipes 
3.6 2 5 
13 Rowse honey Garnier hair oil 4 3 5 
14 Milky -Way 
chocolate spread 
V05 styling gel 4 3 5 
15 Mini mint 
matchmakers 
Green scourer 3.2 2 4 
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16 Mushy peas (can) Air-Wick air 
freshener spray 
4 3 5 
17 M&Ms Peanut Flash cleaning 
wipes 
3 2 4 
18 Fox's crunchy-cream 
ginger nuts 
Vaseline spray 
moisturiser 
3.4 3 4 
19 Glenrick's Pilchards 
can 
Imperial Leather 
soap bar 
2.6 2 4 
20 Cup Shotz Tomato 
& Herb 
Flash Wipe 'n go 
wipes 
4 3 5 
21 Hellmann's 
mayonnaise 
Pukka labels 2.6 2 3 
22 Hartlet's raspberry 
jelly cubes 
Vanish stain 
remover bar 
3.4 2 4 
23 Anchovy fillets (can) Asda brand stain 
remover bar 
2.6 1 5 
24 Pink Panther wafers Felight cat litter 
tray wipes 
3.2 2 4 
25 Rich Tea biscuit 
(single) 
George pressed 
face powder 
3.2 2 5 
26 Shortbread Yankee melter 
(small candle) 
4 3 5 
27 Shreddies (small 
box) 
Duck fresh toilet 
discs 
3.2 2 4 
28 Red leicester cheese 
block 
Postit notes 4 3 5 
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6.7 Footnotes: Chapter 6
1 The food products were not significantly wider than their matched non-food pairs, t(27) 
= -0.118, p = .9, but they were significantly shorter, t(27) = -2.256, p = .03. 
2 When included in the same ANOVA, there was a three-way interaction of product type 
(food/non-food) × group (Hungry/Not-Hungry) × dimension (height/width), F(1, 30) = 
7.7178, p = .012, ηp2 = .19. 
3 For example, our results suggest that the anecdotal idea of not shopping while hungry 
because we may buy more food than we need is unlikely to be motivated by perceptual 
factors such as changes in the perceived size of food products on the supermarket shelf. 
4 Though note that both Yellowlees et al. (1988) and Milos et al. (2013) reported that 
anorexia nervosa patients overestimated the size of food stimuli relative to healthy 
controls, despite the former using packaged foods and the latter using images of prepared 
meals. This suggests that stimulus choice may not be a critical consideration. 
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Chapter Seven 
7. The influence of grasping capacity on estimates of 
object size is not a true perceptual effect 
 
*This chapter has been submitted for publication as: 
Collier, E. S., & Lawson, R. Getting a grasp on action-specific scaling: A response 
to Witt (2017). (under review). 
 
7.1 Abstract 
Can higher level cognition directly influence visual spatial perception? Many recent 
studies have claimed so, on the basis that manipulating cognitive factors (e.g., morality, 
emotion or action capacity) seems to directly affect perception. However, Firestone and 
Scholl (2015) argued that such studies often fall prey to at least one of six pitfalls. They 
further argued that if an effect could be accounted for by any of these pitfalls, it is not a 
true demonstration of a top-down influence of cognition on perception. In response to 
Firestone and Scholl (2015), Witt (2017) discussed four action-specific scaling effects 
which, she argued, withstand all six pitfalls and thus demonstrate true perceptual changes 
caused by differences in action capacity. One of these effects was the influence of 
apparent grasping capacity on perceived object size. In this article, we provide new 
interpretations of previous findings and assess recent data which suggest that this effect 
is not, in fact, perceptual. Instead, we believe that many earlier studies showing this effect 
are subject to one or more of the pitfalls outlined by Firestone and Scholl (2015). We 
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substantiate our claims with recent empirical evidence from our laboratory which 
suggests that neither actual nor perceived grasping capacity directly influence perceived 
object size. We conclude that studies manipulating grasping capacity do not provide 
evidence for the action-specific account because variation in this factor does not directly 
influence perception. 
7.2 Introduction 
Understanding how the mind is organised is central to theories of spatial 
perception, and this involves understanding what factors contribute to what is perceived 
(Firestone & Scholl, 2015; Witt, 2017). In this article, we provide an independent 
contribution to the on-going debate concerning whether action capacity directly 
influences visual perception (for reviews see Firestone, 2013; Philbeck & Witt, 2015; 
Proffitt, 2013; Proffitt & Linkenauger, 2013; Witt, 2011, 2017; Witt & Riley, 2014). First, 
we would like to outline our position in the action-specific debate. When we began 
investigating the claims of the action-specific account, we were not active in the wider 
debate. Rather, we found the idea that action capacity could influence visual perception 
intriguing. We therefore investigated the mechanism purported to underlie these effects, 
and whether comparable effects to those obtained for vision would be found for our sense 
of active touch (haptics). In pursuit of this, we ran a series of studies (Collier & Lawson, 
2017a) based on the findings of Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011), which suggested 
that apparent grasping capacity directly influenced perceived object size. We failed to 
replicate the effect reported by Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011, Experiment 2) and 
we sought to understand why. As we further investigated the apparent influence of 
grasping capacity and hand size on perceived object size (Collier & Lawson, 2017b, 
2018), we became increasingly convinced that these effects are not caused by a true 
perceptual change as the action specific account claims. Instead, we now believe that this 
 199 
 
effect can be explained by other factors including experimental demand characteristics, 
strategies such as using the size of familiar objects to anchor estimates, and visual 
illusions. These alternative explanations are not compatible with the action-specific 
account (Firestone, 2013). 
The present paper is a direct response to a recent review paper by Witt (2017), a 
proponent of the action-specific account. In her review Witt provides a detailed discussion 
of four empirical case studies. She claimed that each case provided evidence for action-
specific effects that did not fall prey to any of the pitfalls outlined by Firestone and Scholl 
(2015) which could provide an alternative explanation of action-specific effects. Her third 
case study focussed on the claim that grasping capacity exerts a direct influence on 
perceived object size. In our response here, we discuss our own empirical data which 
provides evidence against this claim. We also offer a critical evaluation of the arguments 
made by Witt (2017) and new interpretations of previous results claiming to support the 
action-specific account. We conclude that this portion of the evidence that Witt (2017) 
used to support the action-specific account of perception is not reliable.  
Cognition and perception 
What is meant by perceiving something? Phenomenologically, this is relatively 
clear: we can see the yellowness of a banana, hear the melody in our favourite song, and 
feel a breeze against our skin. In each of these cases, incoming signals from external 
stimulation of the relevant sensory system give rise to a perceptual experience. These 
experiences seem distinct from, for example, knowing the price of a banana in your local 
shop, recalling when you first heard your favourite song, or imagining how pleasant a 
breeze might be on a warm day, all of which could be considered examples of cognition. 
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To borrow from Firestone and Scholl (2015), the distinction between perception and 
cognition usually seems “natural and robust” (p. 1).  
Despite the phenomenologically simple distinction between perception and 
cognition, there has been fierce debate as to whether our perceptual experiences are truly 
independent of cognitive influence (Firestone & Scholl, 2015; Proffitt & Linkenauger, 
2013; Pylyshyn, 1999; Vetter & Newen, 2014). Some evidence appears to support the 
idea that perception is directly influenced by cognitive factors in a non-trivial way. For 
example, it has been suggested that desires (e.g., Balcetis & Dunning, 2010; Stokes, 
2012), morality (e.g., Gantman & van Bavel, 2014) and emotions (e.g., Stefanucci & 
Proffitt, 2009) can literally change what is perceived. Such effects would indicate 
cognitive penetrability – the notion that what we perceive can be directly altered, top-
down, by cognitive states. This, in turn, would challenge the claim that perception is 
cognitively impenetrable (Pylyshyn, 1999; Firestone & Scholl, 2015). If cognition was 
found to be penetrable by cognitive factors then our current understanding of perception 
would need a drastic overhaul (Firestone, 2013; Firestone & Scholl, 2015) so this is an 
important issue to address.  
What kinds of effects count as examples of cognitive penetrability has also been 
debated (Firestone & Scholl, 2015; Stokes, 2012; Witt, 2017). Since it is difficult to 
convincingly state whether an effect demonstrates cognitive penetrability, Firestone and 
Scholl (2015) proposed that, instead, we should consider what does not constitute 
cognitive penetrability. They outlined six pitfalls which, they claimed, explained nearly 
all apparent examples of cognitive penetrability. They argued that if an effect could be 
explained by one or more of these pitfalls then it should not be considered to provide 
evidence for cognitive penetrability in its strongest sense. The pitfalls are: 
 201 
 
1. Only confirmatory predictions were tested; no attempt was made to produce 
disconfirmatory evidence. 
2. Post-perceptual judgements were measured, rather than online perception. 
3. Effects could be explained by experimental demand and response bias. 
4. Effects could be explained by variation in low level perceptual features. 
5. Effects could be caused by changes in the focus of attention. 
6. Effects could be due to changes in memory and recognition. 
  
The action-specific account of perception 
An increasing body of evidence has been claimed to support the hypothesis that 
what we see is scaled according to the action capabilities of our body. Proffitt and 
Linkenauger (2013) argued that this scaling may relate to variation in energetic 
expenditure and effort, as well as differences in performance success. Examples relating 
to energy expenditure and effort include the findings that hills were estimated as steeper 
when observers were fatigued or wore a heavy backpack (Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999; Proffitt, 
Bhalla, Gossweiler and Midgett, 1995), and after participants consumed a sugar-free 
compared to a sugary beverage (Schnall, Zadra & Proffitt, 2010). In addition, underwater 
targets were estimated as closer when people wore flippers which made swimming easier 
(Witt, Schuck & Taylor, 2011). Examples resulting from differences in performance 
ability include the findings that putting holes and softballs were estimated as larger (Witt 
et al., 2008; Witt & Proffitt, 2005) and tennis balls were estimated as slower (Witt & 
Sugovic, 2010) by more successful players of the relevant sport.  
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It has also been suggested that what we see may scale according to the functional 
morphology of our body (Linkenauger, Ramenzoni & Proffitt, 2010; Linkenauger, Witt 
& Proffitt, 2011; Proffitt & Linkenauger, 2013). For example, observers estimated targets 
to be nearer after reaching to them with a tool which increased their maximum reach and 
hence made the targets reachable (Witt, Proffitt & Epstein, 2005). Also, door-like 
apertures were estimated as narrower when observers held a horizontal rod that was wider 
than their body (Stefanucci & Geuss, 2009). In a final example that we will consider in 
depth in the present paper, Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011, Experiment 2) reported 
that right handers underestimated the size of objects they intended to grasp with their right 
hand relative to objects they intended to grasp with their left hand. Right handers perceive 
their right hand as larger than their left hand, and they also believe that it can grasp larger 
objects (Collier & Lawson, 2017a; Linkenauger, Witt, Bakdash, Stefanucci & Proffitt, 
2009; Linkenauger, Witt & Proffitt, 2011). Based on this finding, Linkenauger, Witt and 
Proffitt (2011, Experiment 2) argued that the bias in size estimates that they found 
occurred because objects appeared more graspable, and therefore smaller, when observers 
intended to grasp them with their right hand.  
 
The action-specific account: truly a challenge to cognitive impenetrability? 
As discussed by Firestone and Scholl (2015), the question of what constitutes a 
cognitive process is not straightforward to answer, making it difficult to determine 
whether action capacity should be considered truly cognitive in nature. Nevertheless, 
these authors suggested that action-specific effects do indeed challenge cognitive 
impenetrability. However, Witt (2017) argued that it is possible to accept that action-
specific effects are truly perceptual without rejecting cognitive impenetrability because 
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action-specific effects may not necessarily arise from cognitive processes. Witt (2017) 
also noted that Firestone and Scholl (2015) themselves rejected the strictest definition of 
cognitive impenetrability, which would entail that any influence on what is perceived 
visually by non-visual information constitutes cognitive penetrability. For example, 
Firestone and Scholl (2015) suggested that multimodal effects should not be considered 
examples of cognitive penetrability.  
Witt (2017) claimed that if top-down, cognitive influences on perception are 
restricted to those involving explicit knowledge affecting the visual representation of the 
environment, then action-specific effects should not be considered a challenge to 
cognitive impenetrability because these effects could be based on motor processes 
(Sugovic, Turk & Witt, 2016; Witt, 2017). Similarly, Sugovic et al. (2016) suggested that 
“an effect based on unconscious physical abilities rather than on conscious beliefs would 
preserve the idea that spatial vision is cognitively impenetrable because what is known 
(or thought or believed) would not exert an influence on vision” (p. 1). Although it is not 
clear exactly what these unconscious physical abilities might refer to, it seems reasonable 
to interpret this as referring to feedback from kinaesthetic, proprioceptive or interoceptive 
cues which may unconsciously specify information about the current action capabilities 
of the body (see Witt & Riley, 2014, for a discussion about the possible role of other 
sensory cues in driving action-specific effects). On this interpretation, action-specific 
effects may not be considered to directly challenge cognitive impenetrability. 
There is evidence for the reverse relation, namely that motor feedback from 
acting, such as kinaesthetic/proprioceptive cues, can affect perceived action capacity. For 
example, Franchak and colleagues have shown that we update and recalibrate our 
perceived action capacity through acting (Franchak, van der Zalm & Adolph, 2010; 
Franchak & Adolph, 2014). Franchak et al. (2010) showed that participants who had prior 
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experience of walking through apertures were subsequently more accurate at estimating 
whether apertures were passable. They suggested that motor feedback from performing 
the relevant action made participants more aware of the fit between the spatial properties 
of their body and that of the apertures. Extending this, it is possible that action-specific 
effects may result from an interaction between motor information, which may specify 
action capacity1, and vision. This, in turn, could mean that at least some action-specific 
effects may be compatible with cognitive impenetrability, since they are not necessarily 
driven by explicit knowledge or beliefs about the action capabilities of the body (Sugovic, 
et al., 2016; Witt, 2017; see also Witt & Riley, 2014). 
However, critically, some action-specific effects are argued to result from 
observers’ beliefs about their action capacity rather than from their actual action capacity. 
For example, Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011, Experiment 2) claimed that perceived 
object size was scaled according to the perceived grasping capacity of the left and right 
hands. Given that they reported no actual difference in the grasping capacity of the hands, 
the only available source of the scaling effect they reported, at least according to the 
action-specific account, was in participant's beliefs about their grasping capacity. This 
claim seems to challenge cognitive impenetrability by suggesting that the critical factor 
in producing the reported effect was the observer’s beliefs about the action capacity of 
their body. The focus of this article is the reported influence of grasping capacity on 
perceived object size. Notwithstanding the debate as to whether action capacity itself is a 
cognitive factor (Firestone & Scholl, 2015) we believe that testing the claims of the 
action-specific account is relevant for investigating the issue of cognitive impenetrability. 
The present article: a response to Witt (2017) 
1. The present article: a response to Witt (2017) 
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Witt (2017) responded to Firestone and Scholl’s (2015) challenge by identifying 
four action-specific scaling effects within the existing literature and arguing that each 
defied all six of their pitfalls. Here, we consider in detail one of the examples that she 
provided, namely that one’s “ability to grasp an object affects perceived size” (p. 13). 
Before discussing the reasons why we believe that grasping capacity does not, in fact, 
directly influence estimates of object size, we will briefly address some broader concerns 
with the evidence in favour of this idea.  
First, we believe that the way in which grasping capacity has been manipulated in 
studies supporting the action-specific account is problematic. Witt (2017) claimed that it 
is difficult to directly manipulate grasping capacity. We disagree. From our everyday 
experience, it is clear that it is more difficult to grasp objects when we have cold hands, 
or when we wear thick gloves. Furthermore, grasping capacity can be directly 
manipulated in a controlled way, for example by taping together participants’ fingers. We 
have employed this simple, yet effective, manipulation in our own work (Collier & 
Lawson, 2017a, 2017b) and, in several of our experiments, we used it to reliably reduce 
both perceived and actual grasping capacity, by ~2-3cm and by ~1-2cm respectively.  
Some of the methods used by proponents of the action-specific account to try to 
alter grasping capacity may be weak or unreliable. For example, Witt (2017) suggested 
that changing apparent hand size is a viable alternative to directly manipulating grasping 
capacity. However, as acknowledged by Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011, see also 
Linkenauger et al., 2013), changing visually perceived hand size risks inducing a size-
contrast effect whereby objects may appear smaller when placed next to a larger hand 
than when placed next to a smaller hand due to visual relativity (Obonai, 1954). Any such 
size-contrast effect would mean that the scaling effect on perceived object size could be 
explained by Firestone and Scholl’s (2015) fourth pitfall, namely variation in visual 
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features. In contrast, the visual change in hand size following taping is minimal, and so 
the chances of inducing a size-contrast effect is also minimised. Other studies reporting 
evidence in support of the action-specific account action-specific account have taken 
advantage of the fact that right handers both perceive their right hand as larger than their 
left hand, and believe that it can grasp larger objects (e.g., Linkenauger, Witt & Proffitt, 
2011). However, this effect of handedness on perceived grasping capacity is small and it 
does not necessarily influence actual grasping capacity (Collier & Lawson, 2017a; 
Linkenauger, Witt & Proffitt, 2011).   
Second, there are concerns with the issue of replicability and reliability within the 
action-specific literature. Firestone (2013) noted that many of the frequently cited 
findings from the action-specific account have proven difficult to replicate (e.g., De 
Grave, Brenner & Smeets, 2011; Hutchison & Loomis, 2006; Woods, Philbeck & Danoff, 
2009). Indeed, our investigation into the reported effect of grasping capacity on object 
size began when we (Collier & Lawson, 2017a) failed to replicate Linkenauger, Witt and 
Proffitt (2011, Experiment 2). Furthermore, the size of action-specific effects reported are 
sometimes inconsistent. For example, in Linkenauger et al. (2014) it was argued that the 
dominant (right) hand is less susceptible to visual changes in hand size, and the authors 
suggested that “the stability of perceived hand size suggests that the hand is a natural 
perceptual metric that is used to scale nearby graspable objects.” (p.7). However, 
perceived hand size was not constant across experiments. In Experiments 1, 2 and 4, 
participants always had their hand magnified by 18% but participants estimated that their 
hand was magnified by 26%, 3% and 19% respectively. Thus, even when the same 
researchers use the same experimental paradigm, the size of the effect is both variable 
and unrelated to the size of the manipulation (Firestone, 2013).  
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A further example of the poor replicability of the effects reported by the action-
specific account comes from the evidence used by Witt (2017) to respond to Firestone 
and Scholl’s (2015) first pitfall, namely testing disconfirmatory predictions. Witt (2017) 
argued that if an object is too big to be grasped, it would be nonsensical for its perceived 
size to scale according to grasping capacity. This provides a disconfirmatory prediction 
for the action-specific account: the apparent size of objects that are too big to be grasped 
should not alter following a change in grasping capacity. In support of this claim, Witt 
(2017) highlighted Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011, Experiments 2 & 3). They 
reported that, as expected, size estimates for objects that were perceived to be graspable 
seemed to scale according to perceived grasping capacity. However, objects that were too 
big to be grasped showed no such effect. In Collier and Lawson (2017a), we attempted to 
replicate the findings of Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011, Experiment 2). In that 
paper, our analysis focussed on the confirmatory prediction that only objects within 
perceived maximum grasp would show effects consistent with the action-specific 
account. However, we also tested some blocks that were too big to be grasped. In Figure 
1 here, we provide the size estimates for all of the blocks that we tested in Experiment 3, 
along with the percentage of our right-handed participants who thought they could grasp 
each block size. The action-specific account predicts that size estimates for objects to be 
grasped by the right (rather than the left) hand would be smaller for right-handers, but 
only for blocks perceived to be small enough to be grasped. Instead, we found no clear 
scaling effects regardless of block graspability. Thus, the evidence provided by Witt 
(2017) regarding the first pitfall may not be reliable. 
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Figure 1: Data from Experiment 3 of Collier and Lawson (2017a), showing estimates of 
block size (estimated/actual, left axis) and % of participants who thought the blocks were 
graspable at each block size (right axis). Error bars show +/-one standard error of the 
mean. 
 
In the following sections, we provide evidence and arguments as to why we believe 
that grasping capacity does not directly influence perceived object size. We explain in 
detail why we disagree with the arguments given by Witt (2017). To do so, we provide 
examples from our own work to illustrate how many studies claiming to show that 
grasping capacity directly affects perceived object size could have an alternative 
explanation because they fall into at least one of three out of the six possible pitfalls 
outlined by Firestone and Scholl (2015). Specifically, we suggest that the results of 
several studies could be explained by experimental demand and response bias (pitfall #3). 
We suggest that two further pitfalls, effects arising from offline judgement rather than 
online perception (pitfall #2) and low-level visual differences (pitfall #4), could account 
for other effects reported in the literature. We discussed pitfall #1 (disconfirmatory 
predictions) above, but we have not included it in the following sections as we have not 
directly tested the disconfirmatory claim that objects too large to grasp should not show 
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scaling effects. We agree with Witt (2017) that studies investigating grasping capacity 
and perceived object size do not generally fall into Firestone and Scholl’s (2015) pitfall 
#5 (attentional effects) or #6 (memory and recognition effects). On the basis of our own 
findings, we conclude by arguing that perceived grasping ability does not influence 
perception of object size. By extension, this portion of the literature does not provide 
support for the action-specific account. 
7.3 Pitfall #2: Perception versus judgement 
Firestone (2013) noted that in many experiments that have been used to support 
the action-specific account, it is not clear whether an effect has occurred at the level of 
perception (a literal change in what a person sees) or the level of judgement (an inference 
based on what they see). The use of indirect measures can be valuable in disentangling 
effects of perception from other effects. As an example of this approach, Witt (2017) cited 
a study where Linkenauger, Mohler and Proffitt (2011) found an effect consistent with 
the action-specific account using estimated weight to indirectly assess whether 
differences in hand size led to differences in perceived, as opposed to simply judged, 
object size. 
However, the devil is in the detail when distinguishing perception from 
judgement, and this conclusion relied on a complex chain of assumptions. The predictions 
in Linkenauger, Mohler and Proffitt (2011) relied on a previous finding that, when 
participants wore magnifying goggles which globally enlarged the environment, they 
estimated objects as smaller when objects were seen next to their right hand (Linkenauger, 
Ramenzoni & Proffitt, 2010). Based on the size-weight illusion, where small objects are 
estimated as heavier than larger objects of equal weight (Buckingham, 2014), 
Linkenauger, Mohler and Proffitt (2011) predicted that objects would therefore also be 
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estimated as heavier when seen near their right hand. Their participants used a pulley 
system to lift a reference object (a beanbag) and a test object (a basket). Right-handed 
participants verbally instructed the experimenter to add or remove weight from the basket 
to match the weight of the beanbag. Participants in the visible-hand condition placed their 
right hand next to the beanbag, and estimated the beanbags to be heavier than participants 
in the non-visible hand condition who kept their right hand out of sight. Hand size alone 
was not manipulated in this study, either across groups or on a trial-by-trial basis. Instead, 
all participants wore goggles that globally enlarged the whole environment.  
Linkenauger, Mohler and Proffitt (2011) predicted that objects should be 
perceived as smaller when the right hand was present based on the following logic. In 
this study the magnifying goggles should have made all objects appear larger to all 
participants. However, according to the action-specific account, when the right hand was 
visible this should have directly indicated to the participant how large the beanbag was 
with respect to their hand’s known grasping capabilities. This effect should have negated 
the influence of the magnifying goggles and so the beanbag should have been perceived 
as smaller to the visible-hand group than the non-visible-hand group. This, in turn, due to 
the size-weight illusion, should have made the beanbag feel heavier.  
This was, indeed, what Linkenauger, Mohler and Proffitt (2011) reported. 
However, there is a simpler explanation of their effect. Participants who could see their 
right hand had a salient and familiar cue to object size. They could have used this as a 
reference to infer – in other words, judge – beanbag size, unlike participants who could 
not see their hand. Participants might not have had an accurate sense of the effect of the 
magnifying goggles unless they could see something of known size. If so, then placing a 
different, familiar object next to the beanbag (such as a glove) might have been just as 
effective here. Linkenauger, Mohler and Proffitt (2011) did not run this control.  
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Linkenauger, Mohler and Proffitt (2011) argued that their results could not have 
arisen from using a familiar object as a size reference based on the findings of 
Linkenauger et al. (2010). The results of Linkenauger et al. (2010) have rarely been 
discussed in detail in the literature, so we think it is worth doing so here. In Experiment 
1 of Linkenauger et al. (2010), participants wore magnifying goggles which globally 
enlarged the environment. Participants verbally estimated the size of three familiar and 
three unfamiliar objects, once while keeping their hand out of sight and then again with 
their hand next to the objects. One group saw their right hand and the other group saw 
their left hand. Objects were estimated as smaller when the hand was present, and this 
effect was stronger for the group who saw their right hand. Experiment 2 repeated 
Experiment 1 except that minification goggles were used, and only the right hand was 
viewed. Minified objects were estimated as larger when the right hand was visible. 
Linkenauger et al. (2010) argued that these effects of hand visibility could not have been 
driven by familiarity with the size of one’s own hand because otherwise reduced scaling 
effects should have been found for the familiar objects (because these were of known size 
so could, themselves, have been used as size references). However, all six of their objects 
were spheres and it is not clear that participants would have considered some to be 
familiar (e.g., a ping-pong ball) and others not (e.g., a styrofoam ball). Their argument 
that familiarity could not explain these effects would be more compelling had they 
measured it, for example, by having participants rate the familiarity of each object.  
Familiarity effects are also relevant to the interpretation of Experiment 4 of 
Linkenauger et al. (2010). Here, participants estimated the size of the same six objects as 
in Experiment 1 except that, instead of their right hand, a pair of tongs was either present, 
or not, next to the objects. Before putting on the magnifying goggles, one group of 
participants gained experience at lifting and moving objects with the tongs (practice 
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group) whilst a second group did not (no-practice group). The practice group 
subsequently estimated objects as smaller when the tongs were present than when they 
were not, whilst no effect was found for the no-practice group. Since tools are embodied 
after experience using them (e.g., Berti & Frassinetti, 2000), Linkenauger et al. (2010) 
interpreted this finding as showing that perceived object size was rescaled to tool size 
only after the tool was embodied. There is, though, once again, an alternative explanation 
for this finding. Before they made their size judgements, the practice group in Experiment 
4 of Linkenauger et al. (2010) gained experience using the exact pair of tongs in the same 
environment that they were about to be tested with. Although the no-practice group had 
probably used kitchen tongs in their everyday lives, kitchen tongs come in different 
shapes and sizes and this group did not use the exact tongs that they would be tested with. 
Thus, in Experiment 4 only the practice group gained familiarity with the unmagnified 
size of the tongs before they made their size judgements. The different results for the two 
groups could, again, have been driven by the presence of a familiar reference of known 
size rather than by action-specific scaling. 
In Linkenauger et al. (2010) familiarity with the participant's hand size or of tong 
size could explain the results of Experiments 1, 2 and 4 (and also Experiment 5 which 
repeated Experiment 1 but used a visual matching task instead of verbal report). In all of 
these experiments participants were familiar with the size of the comparator before they 
wore the goggles. However, Experiment 3 appears to provide evidence against this 
account of scaling effects being modulated by using references of known size. This 
experiment replicated Experiment 1 except that, when a hand was visible, it belonged to 
the experimenter rather than the participant. Unlike Experiment 1, estimates in 
Experiment 3 were not influenced by hand visibility. Results of both experiments are 
consistent with the action-specific account because scaling effects are only predicted to 
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occur for actions of one’s own body. However, hands vary in shape and size and 
participants would probably have had little opportunity to see the unmagnified 
experimenter's hand before they were tested in Experiment 3. Thus, the experimenter’s 
hand would not have been as effective as that of the participant's hand in providing a 
reference of known size. This could explain why size estimates in Experiment 3 were not 
affected by hand visibility without relying on the action-specific account. Importantly, 
note too that we failed to replicate this finding from Experiment 3 of Linkenauger et al. 
(2010) in a recent, unpublished study that we report below (section 6.3) so the results of 
Experiment 3 may not be reliable. 
Firestone (2013) suggested that the results of Linkenauger et al. (2010) could be 
accommodated by a modularist perspective but he did not specifically outline how. Here, 
we offer a new interpretation of these results which suggests that the reported effects can 
be explained without appealing to action capacity. We suggest that neither the results of 
Linkenauger et al. (2010) or of Linkenauger, Mohler and Proffitt (2011) rule out the 
possibility that judgements, and not perception, of object size are affected by the presence 
of the hand. 
In summary, we do not believe that the use of estimated weight as an indirect 
measure for perceived size has provided convincing evidence in favour of the argument 
that grasping capacity influences perceived object size. This is because the scaling effects 
found in Linkenauger et al. (2010) and Linkenauger, Mohler and Proffitt (2011) could, 
instead, arise from providing a salient and familiar cue of known size (such as the 
participant's hand) which participants then use to anchor their object size estimates.   
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7.4 Pitfall #3: Demand and response bias  
 The action-specific account has recently been under pressure to 
demonstrate that effects consistent with it are not the result of experimental demand 
characteristics (e.g., Collier & Lawson, 2017a, 2017b; Durgin et al., 2009; Firestone, 
2013; Firestone & Scholl, 2015, 2017). For example, Witt (2017) noted that Linkenauger 
Leyrer, Bülthoff and Mohler (2013) tested whether estimated object size would scale in 
ways predicted by the action-specific account if the size of another person’s hand, as 
opposed to the participant’s own hand, was manipulated. This is a good test for demand 
characteristics, since the action-specific account predicts that object size should only scale 
when the size of one’s own hand is manipulated, and participants seem unlikely to guess 
this prediction (Linkenauger et al., 2010). Linkenauger et al. (2013, Experiment 1) used 
virtual reality to manipulate the apparent size of the participant’s hand. Objects were 
estimated as smaller when placed next to a large compared to a small hand and vice versa 
when placed next to a large hand. However, no effect was found when either a virtual 
avatar’s hand size was manipulated (Experiment 2) or when the size of a familiar object 
was manipulated (Experiment 3). Witt (2017) claims this as evidence that the results of 
Experiment 1 were not driven by experimental demand.  
However, this does not mean that the results of Experiment 1 can only be 
explained by the action-specific account. The results of Linkenauger et al. (2013) can be 
interpreted in a different way. For instance, in Experiment 3, participants saw both a 
virtual, familiar object (a pen) and their own hand. The pen changed size on each trial 
while the participant’s hand remained constant. Here, participants may simply have 
preferred to use their own hand as an anchor for size estimates because it was more stable 
and more familiar than the pen. A control condition where the participants’ hand was 
removed entirely from sight and the size of a familiar object was manipulated could 
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address this concern. Without this control, Linkenauger et al. (2013) cannot rule out the 
possibility that the hand provided a convenient anchor, from which the size of other 
objects could be inferred, when other objects that could have been used as an anchor were 
less reliable, less salient and/or less familiar. 
 In our own work, we have shown that at least some studies claiming to show an 
influence of grasping capacity on perceived object size can be explained by experimental 
demand and response bias. After we (Collier & Lawson, 2017a) failed to replicate 
Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011, Experiment 2), we sought to understand why. We 
(Collier & Lawson, 2017b) tested whether a critical difference between their study and 
ours was that, on every trial in Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011, Experiment 2), 
participants were first asked whether they thought they would be able to grasp the block 
placed in front of them before estimating its size. We reasoned that the dimensions of 
graspable-to-ungraspable and small-to-large could be conceptually linked or conflated 
(e.g., Walker, 2012). We therefore hypothesised that judging graspability immediately 
before estimating size on every trial could have led to size estimates being biased by the 
immediately preceding graspability judgements in Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011, 
Experiment 2). This conflation could have led to graspable blocks being estimated as 
smaller. To test this, on each trial we, too, asked participants to rate the difficulty of 
grasping a block before estimating its size. In contrast to the null results that we reported 
in Collier and Lawson (2017a), where such context or conflation effects were controlled 
for, now, in Collier and Lawson (2017b), participants estimated objects they grasped in 
their taped hand as larger than objects they grasped in their untaped hand. This suggests 
that the scaling effect reported by Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011, Experiment 2) 
likely reflected a response bias arising from asking participants about two conceptually 
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linked dimensions in quick succession. If so, then the scaling effect was not a true 
perceptual change.  
 In a different experiment, we used a cover story to try to reduce the experimental 
demand involved with grasping in this size estimation task (Collier & Lawson, 2017a, 
Experiment 5). The inspiration for this manipulation came from previous studies showing 
that action-specific effects are often not found when experimental demand is minimised 
by using a cover story (e.g., Durgin et al., 2009; Firestone & Scholl, 2014). Here, we 
asked participants to visually match the size of blocks they had just grasped with their left 
hand, their right hand and after the fingers of one of their hands were taped together. To 
ensure that participants intended to act, and knew that we were interested in their grasping 
behaviour, we told them repeatedly and explicitly that we were recording whether they 
could grasp the blocks. In addition, on each trial, they had to grasp the block both before 
and after estimating its size. Critically, though, to control for demand characteristics 
associated with doing these two tasks on the same trial, we also told them a cover story 
that the grasping task and the size estimation task were providing data for separate studies, 
and that they were only doing both tasks together because of time constraints. Perceived 
action capacity changed as expected: our right-handed participants believed that they 
could grasp bigger objects in their right hand than their left hand, and bigger objects in 
their untaped hand than their taped hand. However, crucially, we found no differences in 
their estimates of object size depending on which hand they intended to grasp the block 
with, and whether that hand was taped. If the influence of grasping capacity was truly 
perceptual, our cover story manipulation should not have worked and, according to the 
action-specific account, objects should have been estimated as larger for the left hand and 
larger still for the taped hand. These results demonstrate that scaling effects in object 
grasping studies can be eliminated when experimental task demands are minimised. 
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7.5 Pitfall #4: Visual differences 
 Many studies investigating the influence of grasping capacity on estimates of 
object size manipulate apparent grasping capacity by changing the visually perceived size 
of the hand (e.g., Linkenauger, Witt & Proffitt, 2011, Experiment 3; Linkenauger et al., 
2013). Witt (2017) acknowledges the possibility that the effects obtained in such studies 
could be caused by visual differences between conditions because “visual differences in 
hand size are key to obtaining these effects” (p. 15). Manipulations such as taping, which 
alter participants’ grasping capacity with little effect on hand size, should help to rule out 
explanations in terms of visual differences because they largely avoid this fourth pitfall. 
However, when we have used a taping manipulation, we have found no influence of 
grasping capacity on estimated object size when we have controlled for conflation 
(Collier & Lawson, 2017a, 2017b). This means that it is possible that visual differences 
could account for at least some of the scaling effects reported in other studies which 
manipulated hand size using magnification and minification in order to vary grasping 
capacity (e.g., Linkenauger, Witt & Proffitt, 2011; Linkenauger et al., 2013).  
 For example, in Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011, Experiment 3), participants 
estimated the grasping capacity of their dominant hand while it was, and was not, 
magnified and they also estimated the size of objects placed near their hand. Objects were 
estimated as smaller when placed near to the magnified hand. Linkenauger, Witt and 
Proffitt (2011, Experiment 3) claimed that this demonstrated a scaling of object size by 
perceived grasping capacity. They discussed, but ultimately rejected, the explanation that 
visual differences, in the form of size-contrast effects, could explain their result because 
they found that only objects that were perceived as graspable showed the predicted scaling 
effect. They claimed that a size-contrast explanation would produce contrast effects 
across all stimulus sizes, regardless of perceived graspability.  
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Linkenauger et al. (2013) also tested whether size-contrast effects could explain 
their finding, in their first experiment, that objects were estimated as smaller when 
participants’ hands were enlarged using virtual reality. In their second experiment they 
manipulated the size of the hands of a virtual avatar and found no effect on estimated 
object size. Thus, the combined results of Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011, 
Experiment 3) and Linkenauger et al. (2013, Experiments 1 and 2) seem to suggest that 
size-contrast effects cannot explain action-specific scaling effects.  
However, this may not be the case. For example, in a recent study, we used the 
same magnification manipulation as Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011, Experiment 
3). We tested four groups of 16 participants. The first group decided whether their right 
hand could grasp a block that was placed next to it and then they visually matched the 
size of the block. A second group did the same two tasks but a fake, plastic right hand 
replaced their own right hand and they were asked if it could grasp the block if it could 
move. A third and fourth group were matched to these two groups, but they only did the 
size matching task. All groups made estimates while the visible hand, whether their own 
or fake, was both magnified and unmagnified (in separate subblocks with a 
counterbalanced order). We tested whether, as predicted by the action-specific account 
(Linkenauger, Witt & Proffitt, 2011; Linkenauger et al., 2013), scaling effects would 
occur only for the first, OwnHand-GraspabilityThenSize group since only here did 
participants both make estimates when their own hand was visible (rather than a fake 
hand) and intend to act on the block (as they were asked about grasping it). Contrary to 
these predictions, we instead found that blocks were estimated to be smaller when they 
were seen next to a magnified (compared to an unmagnified) hand in all four groups, see 
Figure 2.  
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Figure 2: Mean ratio (estimated/actual) of block size for the unmagnified and magnified 
hands in each of the four groups. A ratio of 1 represents perfect accuracy. Error bars show 
one standard error of the mean. 
 
7.6 General Discussion 
Firestone and Scholl (2015) outlined six pitfalls which, they claimed, can explain 
nearly all effects which claim to demonstrate a direct, top-down influence of cognition 
on perception. They argued that if an effect falls into just one of these pitfalls, it should 
not be considered a true demonstration of cognitive penetrability. An important test of 
this approach are the results used to support the action-specific account, which claims that 
what we perceive is scaled according to our action capacity (Proffitt & Linkenauger, 
2013; Witt, 2011, 2017).  
Witt (2017) responded to Firestone and Scholl (2015) by claiming that at least 
four action-specific effects withstand all six of their pitfalls. One of the four effects that 
Witt (2017) discussed in detail was the influence of apparent grasping capacity on 
perceived object size. In this article we have challenged Witt's claim with respect to this 
effect. We argued that grasping capacity (whether actual or perceived) does not directly 
influence perceived object size. To this end, we critically examined the claims Witt (2017) 
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made, and we provided new interpretations of previous results claiming to support the 
action-specific account. We noted that many of the studies cited by Witt (2017) did not 
directly manipulate grasping capacity but, instead, altered perceived hand size using, for 
example, handedness effects, magnification or virtual reality. We also noted that many 
action-specific effects, including the purported effect of grasping capacity on estimates 
of object size, have been difficult to replicate. Then we provided empirical evidence from 
our own work which suggests that studies claiming to demonstrate this effect in fact 
appear to fall prey to at least one, and possibly several, of the pitfalls outlined by Firestone 
and Scholl (2015). To summarise our findings across several experiments: 
1. We failed to replicate the finding that the greater perceived grasping capacity 
of the right compared to the left hand for right-handers increases estimates of 
the size of objects that are intended to be grasped by the right hand (Collier & 
Lawson, 2017a, Experiments 2 & 3).  
2. We found no effect of directly manipulating perceived grasping capacity, by 
taping together the fingers of a hand, on estimates of the size of objects to be 
grasped by the taped hand (Collier & Lawson, 2017a, Experiments 4 & 5; 
2017b).  
3. We only found scaling effects consistent with the action-specific account 
under restricted, non-ecological circumstances, namely when estimates of 
perceived object size could be conflated with perceived action capacity 
because participants were asked to estimate their ability to grasp an object 
immediately before being asked to estimate its size (Collier & Lawson, 
2017b). 
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4. We found that using a convincing cover story to minimise experimental 
demand characteristics and conflation effects eliminated the effect of grasping 
capacity on estimates of object size (Collier & Lawson, 2017a, Experiment 5).  
5. We found that visual differences resulting from, for example, magnification, 
could explain the apparent influence of grasping capacity on estimates of 
object size (new data reported in this paper; see also supplementary materials).  
 
In conclusion, many studies claiming to show an effect of grasping capacity on 
perceived object size fall into at least one of the pitfalls outlined by Firestone and Scholl 
(2015). Furthermore, the results from our own studies do not suggest that grasping 
capacity influences perceived object size. We argue that the scaling effects that have been 
reported in this case need not be interpreted as revealing a true perceptual change caused 
by altering action capacity and therefore that these effects do not challenge cognitive 
impenetrability. 
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7.7 Footnotes: Chapter 7 
1 However, there is some evidence against this alternative account. For example, in our 
studies (Collier & Lawson, 2017a, 2017b; see also Collier & Lawson, 2018) we taped 
together the fingers of one hand, restricting both actual and perceived grasping capacity. 
Since participants actually acted in our experiments, they received motor feedback about 
the restricted grasping capacity of their taped hand relative to their untaped hand. If 
action-specific effects were driven by such motor feedback, we should have found effects 
consistent with the action-specific account in our experiments. However, we found no 
indication that changes in either actual or perceived grasping capacity influenced 
estimates of object size. Thus, for this action-specific effect we found no evidence that it 
was driven by motor processes.
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Chapter Eight 
8. General Discussion and conclusion 
 
This final section offers a summary of the empirical work presented, a general 
discussion of the results and the concluding message of this thesis. 
8.1 Summary of the findings of this thesis 
According to the action-specific account of perception, action capacity directly 
affects visual perception. Collectively, the empirical work undertaken in this thesis 
demonstrates that there are at least four concerns with this claim. These concerns 
challenge the idea that visual perception is directly influenced by variations in action 
capacity. They are listed here, and discussed in detail below: 
Poor replicability: it is difficult to replicate effects previously reported as consistent with 
the action-specific account 
Poor predictive power: changes in functional morphology reliably affected perceived 
action capacity, but this did not modulate visual size estimates in the ways predicted by 
the action-specific account. 
Visual differences: changing the visual properties of the body can lead to changes in 
visual estimates of the size of nearby objects without appealing to action capacity  
Judgement, not perception: when we did find effects consistent with the action-specific 
account, these could be explained as changes in post-perceptual judgement rather than 
online perception. 
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Poor replicability 
Although replicability is a concern across many domains within psychology 
(Open Science Collaboration, 2015), Firestone (2013) noted that many frequently cited 
and prominent findings from the action-specific literature have proven difficult to 
replicate (e.g., de Grave et al., 2011; Hutchison & Loomis, 2006; Woods et al., 2009). 
In Chapter 2 (Experiments 2 & 3), we failed to replicate Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt 
(2011, Experiment 2) who claimed that apparent grasping capacity influences perceived 
object size. Although we replicated the finding that right handers believe that their right 
hand is larger than and can grasp larger objects than their left hand, this did not 
modulate estimates of the size of objects grasped in the left and right hand. This 
difficulty in replicating effects is problematic, as it casts doubt on the reliability and 
strength of the original effect (Firestone, 2013).   
Poor predictive power 
Firestone and Scholl (2014, 2015) argued that the action-specific account has 
relied on an overly confirmatory research strategy. Specifically, researchers often predict 
the presence of, and then find some effect. However, a theory with strong predictive 
power should also be able to predict the absence of an effect. A disconfirmatory prediction 
from the action-specific account is that action-specific scaling effects should be found if, 
and only if, people intend to act (Witt et al., 2005). We used this disconfirmatory 
prediction to test the predictive strength of the action-specific account. In Chapter 5 
(Experiment 1), participants wore asymmetrical gloves which made one hand wider 
relative to the other. They then visually matched the width of apertures on a laptop screen. 
One group were asked on each trial if they thought they could fit their hand through the 
aperture (Intention-to-Act group) and a second group simply performed the visual 
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matching task (No-Intention group). Both groups showed the expected effect: apertures 
were estimated as narrower for the wider hand. Then in Chapter 5 (Experiment 2), we 
provided a cover story for why participants were asked to place their hand next to the 
aperture while estimating aperture width. To ensure they still intended to act, we asked 
them, on every trial, to imagine moving their hand through the aperture. Here we found 
no effect. Therefore, we found effects consistent with the action-specific account when 
no effect was predicted (when participant did not intend to act) and failed to find such 
effects when the account called for them to occur (when participants did intend to act). 
This suggests that intention to act is not critical for obtaining effects consistent with the 
action-specific account, and therefore the account lacks predictive power. 
A second example of the poor predictive power of the action-specific account 
highlighted by the work in this thesis is that our novel taping manipulation, used to 
directly alter grasping capacity, did not influence estimates of object size. Having failed 
to replicate Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011, Experiment 2) in Chapter 2 
(Experiments 2 & 3), we introduced a stronger manipulation, namely taping together the 
fingers of one hand. The action-specific account predicts that objects grasped in taped 
hands should be estimated as larger than the same objects grasped in untaped hands. This 
is because it is harder to grasp objects in taped hands. Our taping manipulation reduced 
both perceived and actual grasping capacity, however we, again, found no effect of 
grasping capacity on estimates of object size (Chapter 2, Experiments 4 & 5). A final 
example showing that the action-specific account lacks predictive power from the work 
in this thesis is that hunger did not affect size estimates of food products. Based on the 
action-specific account, hungry people who believe they could eat a lot of food might 
estimate food products as smaller in order to facilitate eating more. In Chapter 7, 
participants were split into either the Hungry or Not-Hungry group. The Hungry group 
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were always tested in the morning and were asked to skip breakfast. The Not-Hungry 
group were asked to eat a meal at least an hour before coming to the lab. All participants 
then completed an object size estimation task where they verbally estimated the height 
and width of food and non-food products. Although the Hungry group reported feeling 
significantly hungrier than, and believed that they could eat more food than, the Not-
Hungry group, there was no difference in their estimates of the size of food objects. We 
therefore found no evidence that being hungry influenced size estimates of food products. 
Both of these examples demonstrate that the action-specific account lacks predictive 
power, since we found no evidence that these manipulations, based closely on the claims 
of the account, produced effects consistent with the account. 
Visual differences 
 Witt (2017) acknowledged that changing visual hand size in studies investigating 
whether grasping capacity influences estimates of object size could be problematic. For 
instance, changing the size of the hand could alter estimates of the size of nearby objects 
through size-contrast effects. We investigated this in Chapter 4. Linkenauger, Witt and 
Proffitt (2011, Experiment 3) reported that participants estimated objects seen near to 
their hand as smaller while their hand was magnified than while it was not. However, this 
effect was only reported for objects which were perceived as graspable – there was no 
effect for objects beyond grasp. Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011, Experiment 3) 
claimed this was evidence against a size-contrast explanation, as this does not predict a 
difference between graspable and ungraspable objects. However, we replicated 
Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011, Experiment 3) both when participants viewed their 
own hand, and when they viewed a fake, plastic hand. Since the fake hand had no ability 
to grasp the objects, this effect could not be driven by perceived grasping capacity. This 
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suggests that the original effect can be explained by visual differences induced by 
magnification. Specifically, their result can be explained by size-contrast effects. 
Judgement not perception 
Firestone (2013; Firestone & Scholl, 2015) emphasised the importance of 
disentangling post-perceptual judgements from online perception. This is not always 
simple, since it is not possible to measure perception directly (Witt, 2017) and some visual 
properties can be both perceived and judged, e.g., colour (Firestone & Scholl, 2015). 
Several methods have been employed to tease judgement and perception apart, for 
example the use of highly specific instructions (e.g., Woods et al., 2009), and the use of 
a cover story (Collier & Lawson, 2017a, Experiment 5; Durgin et al., 2009, 2012).  
In this thesis, both of these techniques were employed to demonstrate that the 
results of Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011, Experiment 2) could be explained as 
changes in judgement, rather than online perception. First, in Chapter 2 (Experiment 5), 
we used a cover story. Since there were a number of methodological differences between 
Experiments 2-4 in Chapter 2 and Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011, Experiment 2), 
we ran a fifth study which was more similar in design to the original experiment. In order 
to ensure that participants intended to act, we told them repeatedly that we were recording 
whether or not they could grasp the blocks and that on each trial they would have to grasp 
the blocks both before and after estimating block size. Critically, we also provided a cover 
story where we told participants that the grasping task and the size estimation task were 
providing data for separate studies, but that they were doing both tasks together because 
of time constraints. This meant that spatial estimates of size were made in a context where 
participants intended to act, but which did not explicitly draw their attention to grasping 
capacity. We found that right handers believed that they could grasp bigger objects in 
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their right hand than their left hand, and bigger objects in their untaped hand than their 
taped hand, so perceived action capacity differed as expected across the conditions. 
However, we found no differences in their estimates of object size depending on which 
hand they intended to grasp the block with, or whether that hand was taped. We suggested 
that when participants make spatial estimates in a context which does not draw attention 
to grasping capacity, effects consistent with the action-specific account are not obtained. 
 To test this possibility, in Chapter 3 we tested whether estimates of object size 
were sensitive to the context in which those estimates were made. Again, participants had 
the fingers of one hand taped together and grasped and estimated the size of objects for 
both their taped and untaped hands. When participants were explicitly told that we 
expected them to estimate objects they grasped in their taped hand as larger than objects 
they grasped in their untaped hand, they conformed to the experimental demand and the 
predicted effect was obtained (Chapter 3, Experiment 2). Critically, we also found the 
predicted effect of taping when, as in Linkenauger, Witt and Proffitt (2011), participants 
estimated both the graspability and size of objects on the same trial (Chapter 3, 
Experiment 3). This supported our suggestion that whether or not grasping capacity 
affects estimates of object size is dependent on the experimental context. In other words, 
if it appears that grasping capacity is relevant for estimating object size, then participants’ 
estimates of object size are biased by their judgements of graspability. This is 
incompatible with the action-specific account as it suggests that the effect occurs at the 
level of judgement, rather than perception (Firestone, 2013). 
Thus, the collective results of Chapters 2 and 3 support the idea that effects 
consistent with the action-specific effect can be explained by whether or not action 
capacity seems relevant while completing a spatial task. This is consistent with the notion 
that action-specific-type scaling effects obtained under this condition arise from changes 
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in judgement, rather than perception. It has recently been argued by proponents of the 
action-specific account that attempts to distinguish between judgement and perception 
are fruitless (Schnall, 2017). Specifically, Schnall (2017) appealed to the argument that 
observers often infer their feelings from several environmental cues but that once they 
are made aware of the true underlying sources and reasons for feeling a certain way, their 
responses change accordingly (Schachter & Singer, 1962). For example, in one study, 
participants evaluated themselves as having greater overall quality of life on warm and 
sunny days than on cold and rainy days. However, this effect disappeared when their 
feelings about the weather were made salient (Schwarz & Clore, 1983). In contrast, their 
evaluation of their current mood remained unaffected by being reminded about the 
weather. Schnall (2017) argued:  
“Stated differently, participants’ subjective feelings remained the same, what 
changed was the relevance of these feelings to the judgement” (p. 332).  
She argued that the same process occurs when vision researchers apply methods such 
as specific instructions and cover stories to tease apart judgement and perception: if action 
capacity is seemingly no longer relevant for a spatial judgement, then it should not be 
expected to influence that spatial judgement. However, this seems to undermine the 
central claim of the action-specific account, and instead suggests that such effects are 
simply changes in post-perceptual judgement after all! The results of Chapters 2, 3 and 5 
are entirely consistent with Schnall’s (2017) suggestion. In fact, one can summarise the 
take-home message of Chapters 2 and 3 by changing only a couple of words in Schnall’s 
argument: participants’ perceptions of object size remained the same, what changed was 
the relevance of their grasping capacity to the judgement.   
 
 230 
 
8.2 General discussion 
The empirical work presented in this thesis highlights several concerns with the 
action-specific account and suggests that action capacity does not directly affect visual 
spatial perception. It is important, however, to emphasise that we do not wish to suggest 
that we believe that action and perception are not intimately linked. Instead, the results of 
the work in this thesis suggest that they are not linked in the way claimed by the action-
specific account. There is strong evidence that perception influences our action choices. 
For example, van Doorn et al. (2007) presented participants with aluminium rods of 
varying length that had either inward or outward facing arrows at each end (the Müller-
Lyer illusion). Van Doorn et al. (2007) found the expected effect that rods with outward 
facing arrows at each end were perceived as longer than rods with inward facing arrows 
(Coren & Girgus, 1979). In addition, they found that participants switched from using a 
one- or two-handed grasp earlier when rods with outward facing arrows were presented. 
Although a demonstration that perception influences action choices, this does not suggest 
that action capacity affects the visual representation of the environment.  
Furthermore, many researchers who are critical of the action-specific account do 
not deny that cognitive factors affect action choices. For example, Firestone and Scholl 
(2015) wrote: “Our object-directed actions can and do incorporate what we think, know, 
and judge” (p. 59), and Durgin (2017) suggested: “Energetic considerations must affect 
choices, but they probably contribute directly rather than by affecting the perception of 
spatial layout” (p. 344). In a similar vein, the results of the current thesis do not imply 
that spatial perception does not affect action choices or perceived action capacity. Indeed, 
we consistently found that manipulating the functional morphology of the body 
influenced participants’ perceptions of their own action capacity. Rather, our results 
 231 
 
contribute to a growing literature which suggest that the reverse relation – that perceived 
action capacity affects spatial perception – does not withstand empirical scrutiny (de 
Grave et al., 2011; Durgin et al., 2009, 2012; Firestone, 2013; Firestone & Scholl, 2014, 
2015; Woods et al., 2009). 
8.3 Limitations 
 The work presented in this thesis identified several weaknesses in the action-
specific model of perception, however we do not intend to claim that the entire account 
is incorrect. The majority of the work here focussed on claims that the functional 
morphology of the body affects visual spatial perception. Thus, we have not tackled 
action-specific effects pertaining to energetic expenditure or performance variability 
(Proffitt & Linkenauger, 2013). In addition, there remain several unresolved issues within 
the action-specific literature that should be addressed in future work. We did not directly 
tackle these questions in the work presented here, but some are outlined below. 
Intention to act and cognitive impenetrability 
As discussed throughout this thesis, some action-specific scaling effects have 
been argued to be driven by intention to act (Witt et al., 2005). For example, Witt et al. 
(2005) found that participants estimated the distance to unreachable targets as shorter 
after reaching to those targets with a tool which increased their maximum reach, and made 
the targets reachable. However, they only found this effect for participants who actually 
reached with the tool. No effect was found for participants who held, but never reached 
with, the tool. This was interpreted as showing that intention to act is critical to producing 
action-specific scaling effects (Witt et al., 2005). The importance of intention to act has 
been emphasised in many subsequent studies showing action-specific scaling effects 
(e.g., Lessard et al., 2009; Linkenguer, Witt & Proffitt., 2011; Linkenauger, Bülthoff & 
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Mohler, 2015). Firestone and Scholl (2015) claimed that intention is cognitive, and so if 
intention can directly produce changes in what is perceived then this would challenge 
cognitive impenetrability.  
Recently, however, Witt (2017) argued that the action-specific account does not 
claim that intention affects perception directly and so Firestone and Scholl’s (2015) 
argument is flawed. She argued that rather than directly influence was is perceived, 
intention can “change the information that is processed by perception” (p. 19). 
Interestingly, it has been shown that participants’ gaze patterns are different depending 
on whether the task at hand pertains to spatial perception or to action. For example, van 
Doorn et al. (2009) used the Müller-Lyer illusion to investigate differences in gaze 
patterns when participants considered whether to use a one- or two-handed grasp to pick 
up a rod, and a perceptual size estimation task where they estimated the length of a rod 
by separating their thumb and index finger. They found that the perceptual size 
estimations of rod length were affected by the arrowheads that surrounded the rod, but 
grip aperture when reaching to grasp the same rods was not affected by the arrowheads. 
Van Doorn et al. (2009) also found that gaze fixations during the perceptual task were 
concentrated towards both ends of the rods, while fixations during the grasping task were 
concentrated towards one end of the rod and the centre of the line. This suggests that 
when participants viewed the rods while intending to grasp them, the visual information 
they used to decide which grasp to use was different from the information used to estimate 
its size. However, as discussed by Firestone and Scholl (2015), changing the visual input 
should not be considered evidence of a true top-down influence on perception. In short, 
how intention to act fits both in the action-specific literature itself and in the wider 
argument concerning cognitive impenetrability is, currently, not fully understood. The 
work presented in Chapter 5 of this thesis suggests that intention to act is not critical for 
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obtaining effects consistent with the action-specific account, however further work is 
required to resolve this issue. 
Individual differences 
 Schnall (2017) claimed that critics of the action-specific account have failed to 
explain effects consistent with the action-specific account that appear to occur according 
to individual differences in action capacity. For example, Stefanucci and Geuss (2009, 
Experiment 1) found that participants with wider shoulders estimated apertures that they 
imagined walking through as narrower than participants with narrower shoulders. We 
suggest there are two possible explanations for the results of Stefanucci and Geuss (2009, 
Experiment 1). The first is misattribution effects. As discussed in Section 1.1., it is 
possible that whenever participants are asked to report on some spatial property, they may 
misinterpret the question as an estimate concerning their action capacity. In this instance, 
some participants may have responded to the question “how difficult would it be to walk 
through this aperture” rather than “what is the physical width of this aperture?” A second, 
and in our opinion, more likely possibility is that the effect can be explained by context 
effects. In Stefanucci and Geuss (2009, Experiment 1), participants were asked to imagine 
walking through the apertures while making their width estimates. As we showed in 
Chapter 2 (Experiment 3), effects consistent with the action-specific account can occur 
when the experimental context implies that action and perception are linked in a 
meaningful way. In this case, participants with wider shoulders may have given narrower 
estimates of aperture width than participants with narrower shoulders, without there being 
any true difference in the underlying visual representation. Thus, the effect could have 
been a difference in judgement, rather than perception. However, in the experiments 
presented in this thesis, we did not explicitly test for whether individual differences in 
action capacity affected estimates of spatial properties. Future work investigating whether 
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context effects can influence spatial estimates in experiments investigating individual 
differences in the same way as in experiments with a clear manipulation of action capacity 
would be fruitful.  
8.4 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the action-specific account of perception (Proffitt, 2006a, 2006b, 
2008; Proffitt & Linkenauger, 2013; Witt, 2011a, 2016) suggests that we see the world as 
scaled according to our action capacity. According to the action-specific account, the 
body provides perceptual rulers by which angular visual information is scaled. Different 
rulers are used in different contexts, depending on the perceiver’s goals. For example, for 
walking across a field or ascending a hill, the relevant ruler is the caloric (energetic) cost 
of walking, and for grasping objects the relevant ruler is grasping capacity (Proffitt & 
Linkenauger, 2013). However, many theoretical (e.g., Durgin, 2017; Firestone, 2013) and 
methodological (e.g., Collier & Lawson, 2017a, 2017b; Durgin et al., 2009, 2012; 
Firestone & Scholl, 2014, 2015) concerns have been raised with this account. The aim of 
this thesis was to investigate whether action capacity directly influences visual 
perception, as suggested by the action-specific account. The work presented in this thesis 
provides evidence against the action-specific account of perception, and suggests that 
variations in action capacity do not directly affect visual spatial perception 
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